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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines the ways changing Muslim-Christian relations and new gendered 
norms constitute the identities of orthodox Muslims and charismatic Christians in Java, 
Indonesia. The research is based on 12 months of fieldwork between 2009 and 2010 in the 
multi-religious city of Salatiga. Working with two middle-class Pentecostal congregations, 
with memberships of 400 and 150 individuals respectively, as well as two middle-class 
Muslim women's Koranic sermon groups that involved about 70 households each, this 
research expands the ongoing discussion of gender politics and religious movements in 
modern pluralistic societies, and suggests we re-examine religious identities through the lens 
of inter-religious relations, particularly the role of women in them. 
The dissertation begins with ethnographic scenes where women and Christians figure 
prominently in Muslim-majority public rituals, in order to highlight the centrality of women 
and minorities in constructing religious pluralism. Chapter 1 presents a history of religious 
diversity in Java, and argues that over the last three decades, the children of Javanist Muslims 
have become orthodox Muslims, while the offspring of mainline Protestants have become 
viii 
born-again Christians. Chapter 2 elaborates on the transformation of Salatiga's landscape 
characterized by the proliferation of worship facilities and ascendant inter-religious tensions. 
Building on this foundation, Chapter 3 focuses on women and neighborhood sociality. Here I 
argue that an unexpected outcome of recent religious change has been women's expanded 
public roles and a re-alliance of traditionalist and modernist Muslims in the presence of a 
strong Christian minority. Chapter 4 explains Muslim women's choices of embracing veiling 
and de-legitimizing polygamy in the context of cultural change, and demonstrates the social 
and political nature of the changing interpretations of religious knowledge. Chapter 5 turns to 
Christians' congregational lives, and illustrates the Pentecostal training of "sacrificial 
agency" among both men and women in order to fulfill "successful families." Finally, 
Chapter 6 examines the routine interactions between Muslim and born-again Christian 
women, and discusses their unequal social footings in Salatiga's pluralism. In conclusion, 
this dissertation contends that pluralism in Salatiga involves unequal power relations and 
dialectical negotiations between religious communities, in which gendered identities and 
cross-religious relations are integral components of religious subjectivity. 
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Introduction 
"So as the Father RT, he has no choice but to interact with us. " 
When the Sinaran neighborhood was rumbling with brisk Arabic music on a Sunday 
morning in January of 2010, four women stood forward in a row waiting for their guests, 
predominantly women, to come. The first one was a Christian who wore a black shawl 
above her white kebaya (blouse-dress) and grey sarong; the second one, a Muslim in a 
carmine jilbab (Muslim headscarf), crimson kebaya and sarong embroidered with golden 
floral motifs, and a black shawl; the third one, a Christian in an azure kebaya underneath 
a light-blue shawl; and the last one, our hostess herself. She was in a byzantine-purple 
jilbab embroidered with auburn beads and a gold necklace on top of her lavender kebaya 
and a flowery sarong twilled in taupe and mahogany. Her son's sunatan (circumcision 
ceremony) was just about to begin. 
Living in Salatiga, I learned that religious differences are not the dividing lines of 
neighborhood solidarity, but their very ingredients. Muslims of different factions and 
Christians of discrepant denominations coming together to celebrate certain kinds of 
religious rituals is the norm, not the exception. Given the continued importance of the 
immediate neighborhood as social community, the fact that residence is not determined 
by religious affiliation, and the high percentage of Christian population in the city at 
more than twenty percent, the dynamics of sociality inevitably features handlings of 
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Muslim-Christian relations. A focus exclusively on one single religious group would lose 
sight of this entangled aspect of social life, as the form of sociality and solidarity in 
Salatiga is not, and cannot be, determined solely by religious affiliation. 
Ibu Eka, the hostess of the sunatan, a leader of the Family Welfare Empowerment 
(PKK)1 and a respectable part-time Koranic chanter in the neighborhood, explained to me 
the logic of social obligation in Sinaran: mau tidak mau ("whether you like it or not," or 
"willing or not," literally "want not want"). What she meant was that, willy-nilly, 
neighbors have to mutually help and socialize with one another regardless of religious 
identity. Muslims have to briefly celebrate Christian neighbors' Christmas by eating 
together after their service and invite them to some parts of their Muslim ceremonies; 
alternatively, Christians are obliged to express greetings on Idul-Fitri to Muslim 
neighbors, and have to cook for their weddings and funerals but need not invite them to 
the weddings and funerals held in churches. Most importantly, Christians should never 
try to proselytize in public. That is the spirit of gotong-royong (mutual cooperation) that 
good neighbors would and should desire, Ibu Eka confidently reasoned. 
1 PKK refers to the nation-wide, official, yet unpaid, adult women's neighborhood groups that were created 
during the Suharto regime (1966-1998) to implement state policies regarding reproductive health, 
regulation of fertility and nutrition for mothers and children. The actual activities of each PKK vary widely 
and are decided by the residents themselves, especially after the formal democratization in 1998. 
Photo I. The Christian and Muslim greeters, including the hostess, in the circumcision ceremony. 
nPhoto II. The host family receives people's wishes in the ceremony. 
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The most common forms of gotong-royong take place in the kitchen (since food is 
always collectively prepared by women and their neighbors), non-ceremonial social 
gatherings (such as PKK meetings), and public rites of passage (such as wedding, funeral, 
etc.). Two weeks after sunatan, one afternoon 1 was "interning" as a food preparer for an 
upcoming PKK meeting the next day in the kitchen with Ibu Wati and her sister Ibu De, 
as well as Ibu Nina. All of them are members of the women's Koranic sermon group in 
Sinaran. Leaving aside the mortars teeming with freshly ground chili paste and checking 
in two aluminum pots full of yellow rice, they were simultaneously gossiping about the 
change in character of a new Father RT (Father, the head; RT, rukun tetangga. 
"harmonious neighborhood," the smallest official neighborhood association unit), a 
Salafist (or a follower of literalist, strict and puritanical approaches to Islamic theology ). 
In their conversation, Ibu De and Ibu Nina distinguished two types of people in the 
neighborhood: "the willing" (yang mau) and "the unwilling" (yang tidak mau). This 
distinction has nothing to do with the immense umbrella of Islam or Christianity, but has 
everything to do with whether or not one makes efforts to gotong-royong and 
bersilaturahmi (an Arabic-derived Indonesian word, meaning "to socialize and 
reciprocate") with one another. Some people cannot even fulfill the most basic etiquette 
of greeting, they complained. Like what? I asked. Well, they said, "the willing" salim 
(shake hands in a light brush) with one another; "the unwilling" salim with no one, and 
especially not with women. 
Who wouldn't salim with one another? I was perhaps being too inquisitive, but they 
were already used to it. Ibu De recalled the scenes of sunatan last month we just attended 
together, where a man was standing in the other entrance of the ritual tent. He was 
wearing a white taqiyah (rounded cap) with white kurla (long loose robe), smiling a bit 
reluctantly at four other men who wore batik and songkok (Jv. Fez) and who were 
shaking hands with each other. The very presence of this man actually marked his 
transition from the category of "the unwilling'" to "the willing." This man was a member 
of Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Islamic Dawah. or LDIf), a 
Salafist organization that most neighbors in Sinaran would frown upon. According to Ibu 
De and Ibu Nina, this Salafist man had never attended any public ritual or let his wife and 
female relatives attend the women's neighborhood Islamic sermon group. One day, it was 
about to rain. His neighbors noticed that his family was not home yet. so they helped 
remove the clothes that were hanging on the clothesline. Upon coming home, this man 
and his family saw their clothes were preserved. The first thing they did was to launder 
everything again, because they believed that the clothes were already polluted by 
unpurified hands. Their neighbors of course felt insulted and were quite agonized by this, 
but what could they do? They mulled over the issue for a while, and finally they decided 
to change him. In the selection of RT, they voted to make him the Father RT. The man 
was surprised, but also reasoned that due to his higher standard of virtue, certainly he 
should be the local leader. Yet as soon as he took the position, he found himself 
constantly in the regular neighborhood meeting and hectic communal rituals. Once he 
assumed the responsibility for attending public rituals, he was too embarrassed to avoid 
shaking hands. "So as the Father RT." Ibu Nina said, "he has no choice but to interact 
with us." 
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By the very same standard, the four women standing in a row as greeters in the 
sanatan that day were all "the willing" people. The two Christians, one Catholic, the 
other Protestant, are the wife of the former Father RT and the wife of the current Father 
RW (rukun warga, "harmonious citizen," supervising several RT). They were there to 
fulfill their duty in public rituals so as not to impair the social status of Ibu Eka's family 
by their negligent absence, or indeed their own reputation as respectable families in 
Sinaran. 
How could Christians be the heads of RT and RW, if there were only a few Christian 
households in the predominantly Muslim neighborhood? 1 kept asking. "Well," Ibu De 
said. "Because we do not differentiate people based on religion that way." As I heard 
more and more stories of Christian families being the head of RT or PKK in other 
Muslim-majority neighborhoods in Salatiga, I was eager to learn the perspective of Ibu 
Diyan, a Javanese Christian who went to the charismatic church Ester, and who was the 
head of PKK at the time. Initially, she offered the same answer as Ibu De. Yet she also 
admitted. "People can be tired by mengurusi orang (managing people), so who likes to do 
it?" Like being the head of RT and RW. being the head of PKK was no different than 
doing unpaid social work for the neighborhood community. "People would appreciate 
[your effort]." Ibu Diyan concluded. The evidence was obvious to her: The former 
Christian Father RT was in fact re-elected three times. His family had served the 
community for almost two decades and has earned respect beyond two decades. 
Being one of the four Christian households with sixty-one Muslim households in her 
RT, perhaps the deal is not too bad. I started to muse about the spirit of sukarela (suka, to 
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like, rela, volunteer, sukarela, voluntary), as people often said, as well as "sukit-sukcL 
rela-relaas they also often said. It means if you like, you can volunteer. In reality, if 
you volunteer, there is a good chance that you will be liked. Then you can avoid being 
labeled undesirable. In a Muslim sea, the stakes are too high to be lonely Christian isles. 
Better to be adorable fish. 
The unwritten rules of the inclusion of Christians in the Muslim neighbors' public 
rituals were particularly attested by the participation and contribution of women. In a 
Muslim-dominated ritual like the sunatan, 'important" women such as the Mother RT 
and Mother RW would be in the ritual front although they are not Muslims. Other 
Christians, or those who appeared without headscarves, would stay behind. Ibu Meiyi, an 
ethnic Chinese and a member of a Pentecostal congregation in her forties, for example, 
always helped in the rewang (mutual help, usually cooking for a feast), in the same quiet 
way she attended PKK meetings. She always shied away from appearing in the formal 
ritual scene beyond the kitchen. As for Ibu Diyan. who was often loquacious in PKK. she 
too only helped and stayed in the back during rituals, just like Ibu Meiyi. Among women, 
then, positions in a ritual were differentiated by thoughtful considerations of status, 
religion and ethnicity. 
Starting to notice these invisible, classified and shifting moral boundaries in the 
neighborhood, I was struck by the force of public pressure in the neighborhood and the 
consequences of being a social outcast. It turned out that the Salafit Father RT was not 
the most undesirable kind, since he had converted to silaturahmi. The quintessential 
example of such undesirability, according to Ibu Eka, was a couple who ran an orphanage 
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founded by Aisyiah Muhammadiyah, the women's wing of the largest reformist Muslim 
organization in the country, who lived just a block away. The wife is from East Java, 
while her husband is from Nusa Tenggara (Southeast Indonesia). At the time I had 
befriended the chairwoman of the Aisyiah Salatiga, but 1 was not under an impression 
that the keepers of the orphanage were disrespected by their immediate neighbors. They 
took care of orphans, most of whom were now already high school students who led an 
austere lifestyle. The couple made soap and sold it as a livelihood. I sometimes visited 
them with food and snacks. They were more than happy to receive my gifts, and they 
liked to share their perspectives with me. But neighbors still despised them, and the 
reason was no more than that they never held a syukuran—"the ritual of gratitude," a 
more urbanite, generic term for all sorts of slametan, the ritual meal. That meant they 
never organized a public ritual, that they never invited people to their place, and that they 
were not in the exchange system and consequently were social outcasts. 
Years ago, a rumor was generated among Sinaran residents after the orphanage 
keeper's three unfortunate miscarriages: How did she eventually get pregnant? That must 
be some sort of adat (ethnic custom) from luar Jawa (outside of Java). Swallow some 
evil drink and resort to some deviant ritual. Now they have a little girl, but they still did 
not bother to hold a syukuran. What are they thinking? "Non-Javanese people are just 
weird, don't you think?" Ibu Eka said to me privately the other day in her house. "Yes," I 
immediately replied, as would many Javanese friends 1 know out of a socio-linguistic 
impulse, mau tidak mau. The moment was simultaneously exhilarating and chilling. I was 
glad to be treated as if I was not one of those "non-Javanese people." But my thought was 
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preoccupied by an inchoate hypothesis about the neighborhood: a voluntary, hardworking 
and sociable Christian family fares much better than a ritual-avoiding Muslim family. 
Inadvertently I was entangled in a moral political economy, in which the logic of 
social obligations among different religious constituencies puzzled me. What kind of 
social network is the neighborhood in Salatiga? How do Muslims and Christians of 
different sects and denominations come up with these mutual, but not necessarily equal, 
divisions of labor in the neighborhood gatherings? In fact, what do religious identity and 
public piety mean to them, when they interact as such regardless of religious difference? 
And why is it women who are seemingly in charge of important public rituals, not only 
behind the scenes but also on the main stage, a gender landscape so drastically different 
from older ethnographic accounts where the public side of communal rituals were 
described as exclusive male (Geertz 1960, 12; Woodward 1988, 88; N. Sullivan 1994)? 
This dissertation is about how subjectivities are dialectically reshaped by co-existent 
religious movements, how such mutual-constituencies find their sharpest manifestations 
in gender, and in turn, reshape inter-religious relations2. The object for study is what I 
call the current religious movements of "normative Islam" and " charismatic 
Christianity" in the Central Javanese city of Salaitga, Indonesia, their dialectical 
developments, and women's unprecedented public roles in representing and mediating 
21 define subjectivity as a mode of linkages between self-identity, knowledge, and embodiment that 
processes the limits and resources of how one feels, (re) acts, thinks, means, and so forth, of themselves in 
relation to the socially related others and the world. It is not as encompassing as Bourdieu's outline of 
practice would allow (Bourdieu 1977), or as unchangeable as Douglas' primary experience would envisage 
(Douglas 1973). Nevertheless, I owe a great deal to Douglas' insights into the human body as inscribing 
social boundary, and Bourdieu's conceptualization of the endurable inclinations and sensibilities, or 
habiius. I hence see subjectivity as the unfinished, indeterminate projects (Biehl, Good, and Kleinman 
2007) that are based on long-established possibilities, which are themselves subject to unintended change. 
inter-religiosity. Java, a place that has long been known for its plural religious traditions 
ranging from varieties of Islam (Dhofier 1999; Ricklefs 1979; Geertz 1960; Van 
Bruinessen 2002) and, much less well-known, home to the single largest conversion 
movement to Christianity from Muslim backgrounds in the world (Akkeren 1970; Willis 
1977), is a particular ideal place to approach these questions. 
This study aims to contribute to the ongoing discussion of two theoretical threads: 
first, the ways contemporary religious resurgences assert their importance beyond the 
private sphere, invoking sustained debates surrounding lifestyles, freedom and the nature 
of a pluralistic society (Berger 1999; Casanova 1994); and second, the "gender paradox" 
of women's active support of religious movements that are seemingly inimical to their 
own interests (B. Martin 1990; Robbins 2004). These literatures have addressed the 
question of the omnipresent religious revivals around the world today, challenged the 
long-held assumptions about the secular nature of modernity and the women-oppressive 
nature of religions. 
What remains relatively ignored in both literatures, however, is the question of how 
one's religious identity can be critically shaped by its religious others. For the sake of 
clarity, 1 shall state clearly that the kind of dialectical co-constituency between religious 
communities I strive to explore in this research is different from an investigation of 
"inter-religious dialogue." My goal is more than looking for what people say their 
religion is, what they say other people's religions are, and where the middle ground may 
be. Instead, it is primarily about the ongoing processes in which one's relations with other 
religions have already had impact on them and constituted their religious embodiment 
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before they can formulate their opinions about their religious self and their religious 
others. In what follows, I first outline the literatures on the religious development of the 
late modernity and the salience of gender in religious revitalisms. With the help of the 
rich information provided by the pre-existing literatures, I hope I can more clearly 
identify what is left out and more effectively set out to explore the possible answers 
throughout the dissertation. 
Diverging religiosities 
In providing opportunities for leadership, senses of moral community and self-
discipline among newly urbanized populations, contemporary Islamic resurgence and 
non-Western Pentecostalism have their historical predecessors: Methodism in England, 
Pietism in Germany, Hassidism in Poland, the Protestant Great Awakening in the United 
States (D. Martin 2002, 168; Thompson 1964, 360: Wuthnow 1988, 20). Confronting an 
unsettled modern world, floating masses seek self-definition and cultural legitimation in a 
highly fragmented social universe. As well evinced in multiple religious revitalizations 
today, religious identities weigh significantly in these processes. Historically persistent 
and ever-more pluralized, religion not only survive a vision of modernity that once 
announced the "dusk of religious modes of thoughts" (Anderson 1991, Rev. and 
extended: 11). It may even "unintentionally help modernity save itself' (Casanova 1994. 
234). 
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How? For one thing, high instability is a built feature of modernity, if we see 
modernity not so much a matter of "enlightened reason" as a matter of changing qualities 
of social institutions, notably structural differentiation, technical specialization, 
pluralization of life-styles, and emergence of mass societies (Luhmann 1984). As shared 
public meanings are deeply disintegrated with the collapse of the "sacred canopy"(Berger 
1969) of the traditional moral community, individuals feel "at a crossroads in terms of 
overall life planning" (Giddens 1991, 142). 
If the world has always been uncertain but is now more evidntly so, it also can always 
be remoralized and reanchored. Renewed religious identities offer ample resources to 
lead transformations that assist individuals and collectives to re-anchor themselves in 
new situations. Modern religiosity hence can be seen as not only therapeutic but also 
transformative sources integral to modernity. 
Seen in this light, contemporary religious revivals are not simply consequences of 
marketplace competition, as media-savvy "religious firms" (Chesnut 2003) strive to 
adopt marketing skills to escape a modern world. Rather, one might as well argue that the 
modern world has a structural proclivity to ache for religiosity, just as strong as its desire 
for possibility. Religiosity frankly speaks to ways of engaging strongly in the modern 
world. 
This does not mean, however, that religions only exist to heal the wounds of 
modernity. Following a good number of scholars (Aragon 2000; Atkinson 1983; Bowen 
1993; Cannell 2006; Hefner 1993; Robbins 2004b) who suggest that we stop the long-
held essentialist treatment of world religions as "the perennial outside force—threatening. 
corrupting, or merely dusting the surface of the authentic focus of anthropological 
concerns" (Barker 1995. 165), I consider the deep transformations of life that are 
vigorously envisioned by Islamic resurgence and Pentecostalism. 
Within charismatic Christian movements, anyone who is inspired by the Holy Spirit 
can be a spiritual leader regardless of educational qualifications. Such epistemology is 
conducive to egalitarianism, resulting in highly decentralized, inherently unstable but 
intimate, participatory networks. Moreover. Pentecostalism assumes a kind of trans-
subjective actor with an expansive agency, since the Holy Spirit is located in but not 
bound by the physical person, thus allowing an unhindered extension of the evangelical 
will (Coleman 2000, 205). This quality of personhood is further immersed in frankly 
supernatural stories, ecstatic ritual experiences, and fervent evangelizing. In terms of 
political engagement, however, there is an uncertain relationship between Pentecostalism 
and its political purview. While some tend to leap over their immediate political 
environment and focus on individual salvation or connection to a broad Pentecostal 
identity, others do not hesitate to step into politics (Freston 2001). Finally, Pentecostalism 
produces "guaranteed winners" (Soothill 2007, 40) who can expect to enjoy victory over 
disease, poverty and suffering to achieve success in this world through an exploration of 
individual faith. 
These cross-cultural features of Pentecostalism are rivetingly juxtaposed with those 
of the current Islamic resurgence. First, an heightened "objectification of Muslim 
consciousness" (Eickelman and Piscatori 2004, 39) spreads on the wheels of mass media, 
increased literacy rates, and intensified efforts towards systemization and democratization 
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of Islamic education that have taken place in modern-nation-states (Hefner 2009; Starrett 
1998). Second, although the resurgence has fragmented the former authorities of erudite 
Islamic jurists, there remains a common trend of an increased degree of attention paid to 
Islamic legalism and greater reliance on jurisprudent methodology to generate legitimate 
Islamic discourses regarding public issues. As a result, the problems about religious 
syncretism, religious purification, gender justice, inter-religious relations and political 
ideals are discussed and debated largely through religious agents' reworking of Islamic 
knowledge among ordinary Muslims (Bowen 1993). While erudite Islamic jurists no 
longer monopolize interpretations of religious knowledge, ordinary Muslims become 
more textually virtuosic than ever before. Finally, public piety grows as a legitimate 
paradigm to demonstrate religiosity, as competing authorities and the religious 
knowledge they back up struggle to become the guardians of public morality (Zaman 
2002). The political consequence of public piety is thus often highly at stake wherever 
de-privatization of religions is problematic. 
This development of Islam does not necessarily imply a disruptive break with the pre-
modern past, nor does it mean that Muslims in the past merely unthinkingly obeyed a 
fossilized canon. Quite to the contrary. Islamic knowledge and authority have been 
periodically re-canonized and reformed throughout history to face different challenges 
(Hefner 2009; Zaman 2002, Zubaida 2005). After all, as a powerful mobilizing religion. 
Islam has time and again become a rallying point of struggle against illegitimate 
European colonization, modern or ancient corrupt regimes, secularism, economic 
inequality and individualism during times of identity crisis in the Muslim-majority lands. 
15 
What has become unprecedented in modern times is the proliferation of Islamic 
discourses facilitated by higher education, print capitalism, mass media, technology and 
transnational networks. University-educated Islamist youths in Iraq became martyrs due 
to their resistance to Saddam Hussein's repression(Baram 2004, 536); the pre-revolution 
Egyptian state's attempt to control religion by providing a "synoptic and systemized 
Islam" (Starrret 1998, 9) in schools only increased the number of Islamic movements by 
familiarizing people with the sacred texts; Hizbut Tahrir, found in Jerusalem in 1953. 
now has branches in more than forty countries where they advocate an unified Islamic 
state for all Muslim countries; and Indonesians now are googling "e-fatwa" (Hosen 2008. 
160) regarding questions such as what kind and how many showers one should take 
before and after sex (between a married couple, of course). Seeing religion as capable of 
generating social change, as envisaged in the basic principle (not its prediction) of 
Weber's The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, Robert Hefner (2000) 
observes that Islamic resurgence can be a powerful force, not only for an Iranian 
theocratic regime, but also for an Indonesian democracy. Recent studies on "market 
Islam" also discuss the relations between new forms of Islamic religiosity and marketing 
strategies (Hoesterey 2008; Rudnyckyj 2009). 
The scholarship on Pentecostalism as a modern phenomenon is equally prominent. 
As David Martin remarks, Pentecostalism and other similar movements enable "marginal 
people" to "leap over the local national environment to embrace a global modernity" 
(2005. 149). The rapid rise of Pentecostalism around the world is associated with wider 
processes of globalization and the spread of "global culture" (Coleman 2000, 51-52) that 
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is characterized by increased levels of physical and economic mobility, transnational 
alliances, and the power of mass media. From South Africa to India, previously untrained 
laymen from a humble origin, once touched by the Holy Spirit, can leap to the ranks of 
spiritual leadership and identify with her counterparts regardless of national borders, 
together speaking to the world as part of "a worldwide movement of winners" (B. Martin 
1998, 123). 
The promotion of individual success in Pentecostalism has a wide resonance among 
newly urbanized working and middle class around the world. Pentecostalism provides a 
support network that offers moral refuge for individuals from modern urban life (D. 
Martin 2005, 147; Marshall 1991) while sparing them many "traditional" burdens such as 
extended familial obligations (Meyer 1995, 247-50) that might cause hindrance of 
individual development. Often looking back to Weber's work on Protestantism (Weber 
2002[1958]) and Thompson's (1966) discussion of Methodism, scholars argue that 
Pentecostalism renders members trustworthy and reliable workers (Chesnut 1997, 166; 
Maxwell 1998, 354), and even helps create an acquisitive, hard working, abstemious and 
flexible person better suited to coping with neo-liberalism's economic agenda (Maxwell 
2000, 28). In parallel, speculations about the democratizing force of Pentecostalism in 
facilitating the democratization of the formal political realm are abundant, although a 
definite conclusion is difficult to draw (D. Martin 1990. 267-68; Freston 2001; Gifford 
1998,37). 
The literature of religious revivalisms thus reveals how modern religions can 
become even more capable of rapidly generating pluralization of religiosity through a 
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good use of modern technology, rather than disappearing from the modern world. As the 
beneficiaries of modern education, literacy, privatization of mass media, expanded 
markets, other new communication technology such as cellphones, the Internet and 
DVDs, and the links between transnational religious networks, new types of religious 
authorities make their voices heard. Benedict Anderson's (1993) insight into the effects 
of print media in facilitating an "imagined community" is magnified in contemporary 
religious resurgence. 
More importantly, the literature of religious revivalisms provides some important 
insights into what deprivation theory has left out: the consequences of embracing a new 
religious identity. While different religious movements can similarly take advantage of 
modern technologies, they also avidly aspire to create different types of religiosity and 
models of subjectivity. The leaders of Indonesian Muslim "ESQ" (Emotional Spiritual 
Quotient) represent a type of self-made religious authority that heavily relies on mass 
media that is drastically different from the traditional genealogy-based ulama dependent 
on the leaders versed in textual knowledge transmitted surrounding a religious school. 
Furthermore, numerous laymen ustads (Islamic preachers) that serve at all levels of 
society today are not trained as religious experts but become popular religious teachers 
through self-study of Islamic texts. In parallel, a vast majority of Pentecostal preachers 
are those who never have the strict theological training provided by mainline churches, 
but those who rather are shrewd speakers, skillful admen and network creators. 
What the literature of religious revivalism fails to tell us, however, is what occurs 
when these different kinds of religiosity have no choices but to intensively interact with 
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each another in a pluralistic society that does not celebrate religious privatization and 
"secularism." As a sustainable religious identity requires an intensive process of re-
socialization and readjustment of social actions, such a process might create commitment 
for some, but discordance and incommensurability with other social actors who are 
(re)socialized in different ways. As Weber notes in his fundamental premise on which his 
interpretive sociology is predicated (Weber 1968. 4): 
We shall speak of'"action'" insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective 
meaning to his behavior—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action 
is ^social" insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course. 
To translate this intersubjective nature of social action into the multi-religious life in 
Salatiga, in a social context where nobody is "secular," and different kinds of Christians 
and Muslims have to regularly interact with one another, Christians and Muslims' social 
actions are meaningful insofar as they take account of the behaviors of their religious 
others. 
Gender, Islam and Christianity 
There are two broad stances that have considerable influence on my theoretical 
approach to gender and Islam. One argues that Islamic movement may be women's 
movements in their aspiration and demands, yet Islamic in their language and sources of 
legitimacy (Badran 1995; Cooke 2001; Doorn-Harder 2006; Mir-Hosseini 2006; Rinaldo 
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2008); the other emphasizes that an Islamic subjectivity need not involve the question of 
women's liberation (Mahmood 2005). While I appreciate Mahmood's deconstruction of 
the idea of universal desire of freedom, I am more hesitant to portray my interlocutors' 
subjectivity as primarily taking shape within the domain of a disciplinary project of self-
fashioning and the embodiment it dictates. During my fieldwork, I have been fascinated 
by the ways women navigate between co-existent and competing discourses, and assert 
their own positions on gender issues. The formation of their subjectivity, then, has a 
journey to trace in the ongoing and shifting Islamic discourses generated by social and 
cultural change that does not stem from an Islamic discourse alone. 
While I have been much inspired by the streams of Muslim feminism, during my 
fieldwork I have nevertheless found that a clear concern over women's equality is a 
prominent phenomenon confined to activists and intellectuals, identities that do not 
belong to 99% of my respondents. For the latter, the motivation to lead a more pious life 
has little to do with enhancing women's rights. What is crucial, however, is that through 
participating Islamic activities and embodying Islamic piety, women do gain more public 
roles and opportunities, as this dissertation will show. 
The scholar concern over "the gender paradox" of Pentecostalism is no less intense 
than that of Islam. This gender paradox of Pentecostalism is famously posited by Bernice 
Martin (2001), namely why women accept a religion that places them in a position 
inferior to men. The solution to this puzzle that Martin offers is that despite its 
theological support for male domination, Pentecostalism manages to improve gender 
relations within the household and enhance the possibility of social mobility for the 
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family (ibid, 54). This stance is most clearly supported by the classic ethnography of 
Columbian Pentecostals by Elizabeth Brusco (1995), in which she argued that the 
movement is about the ""reformation of machismo." 
The opponents of this broad stance argue that Pentecostal ideologies do not 
necessarily shatter patriarchal values of gender inequality (Mate 2002). It might 
reinforce, rather than destabilize, the local patriarchal system (Martin Riesebrodt and 
Kelly H. Chong 1999). Worse yet, as a Ghanaian case study shows (Soothill 2007), the 
"charismaticization" of traditional authority of "Big Women" in fact may weaken the 
networks of sisterhood and pit women against one another. 
Although I am also interested in evaluating this "gender paradox," I have been even 
more captivated by the regular interactions between newly pious Muslim women and 
born-again Christian women in the middle of revivalist Islamic and charismatic Christian 
movements. I hence approach the question of women's subjectivity not through a 
language of empowerment and oppression, but primarily through a language of 
prosperity, success, and harmony, the themes that women genuinely care and talk about 
in their daily interactions across religious borders. Like the historical predecessors of 
religious movements, they embody distinctive subjectivities that always envision an 
active evaluation of others as a mirror of the self. Their story thus always points to 
others' story. The co-constituency of the self and other is thus not outside of, but an 
indispensable aspect of religious subjectivity. 
It has to be clear that "women of fire" and "women of the robe" are not native 
categories. Nevertheless, they are allegorical figures that provide a strategic viewpoint to 
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represent the themes of how devout women present their subjectivity. I call the believing 
Pentecostal women in the Ester and Fendi congregations "women of fine" based on their 
narratives about feeling the connection with God as fire burning within them (I Kings 
18:24), a sharply ecstatic experience that draw them back to these ritual performances 
again and again. 1 name the members of Koranic study groups in the Sinaran and Graha 
"women of the robe," because they display their public piety through outer garments (Al-
Ahzab 33:59) along with behavioral observance, and express a consistent concern about 
the obligation of being Muslims and a dignified majority through their representative 
presence of embodied religiosity. 
The existence of agama 
Recognizing the plural nature of modernity and religiosity, this research does not 
envisage a universal definition of religion, but only a socially salient understanding. As 
Asad (Asad 1993, 28) eloquently argues, the notion of the religion that Geertz famously 
defines (Geertz 1973) is an extension of a modern post-enlightenment Western view that 
privileged '•belief' over "practice." a view that reflects the development of secularization 
in the west and is not necessarily translatable to other religious traditions. Islam, for 
instance, Asad contends (Asad 1986, 3), is better treated as a discursive tradition that 
regulates different interpretations of practices with regard to worship and social norms, 
rather than a matter of private belief. 
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Yet the impossibility of finding religion a universal definition of religion does not 
fare well in modern histories. The Chinese government runs a religious department that 
has a standardized definition of religion as ZongJiao that is based on a mix of the 
western notion and Chinese ethical components. Its bureaucratic ambition of social 
control has led to the so-called "Administrative Rules on Reincarnation of Tibetan 
Buddhist Lama." British India polarized and reified distinction between Muslim and 
Hindu identities through censuses and legal dualism (van der Veer 1994, 20-21), while 
western orientalists and missionaries have standardized versions of religious texts and 
decided that dharma meant "religion," hence contributing to the further homogenization 
of Hinduism self-defined as a "religion" (Halbfass 1988, 340). In modern Indonesia, the 
state-mandated religious affiliation and standardized definition of religion eventually 
made Confucianism a "religion." 
The problem, then, is not so much whether the notion of religion is a western one, 
but how historically the ways to think about religious traditions are negotiated, 
rationalized, objectified, and reformed to become a renewable social reality to meet 
practical needs. Sharia or Islamic law in the historical Middle East, for example, was 
previously not a "ready-made" body of law but inherently pluralistic sources of legal 
discourses to derive rules from (Weiss 1998; Zubaida 2005). Distinguished from the 
Western positive law, sharia was never finished, but "the on-going process which yields 
the virtually inexhaustible Law of God" (Weiss 1998: 209). It was only after the demand 
for efficiency and uniformity of modern states and western legal systems that. Islamic 
laws were codified in Muslim-majority countries (Coulson 1964, 150-154). A genealogy 
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of religion thus does not develop in isolation from the larger world where intensified 
interconnectedness has brought different populations, things and ideas into dialogic 
processes and created the new "religions" that should be objects of analysis. 
In the Indonesian context the category "religion" that has been appropriated and 
legalized in terms of ''agamcT in Indonesia is particularly relevant here. A Sanskrit 
loanword that lost its original meaning of "law" and "tradition" (Picard 2011, 5), agama 
combines "a Christian view of what counts as a world religion with an Islamic 
understanding of what defines a proper religion—a prophet, a holy book, and a belief in 
the One and Only God" (ibid, xi). Through the successful implement of state promotion 
of "world religions" as an antidote to communism and a tool of modernization (Aragon 
2000) since 1965, along with that of mass education and universal literacy, Indonesians 
find legitimate means to express and diversify their different visions of the self and 
society through a proliferation of religious discourses backed up by their engagement in 
state-recommended "world religions" (Kipp 1993; Kipp and Rodgers 1984; Hoskins 
1987). A process of religionization— that some pre-modern customs were to be civilized, 
religionized, or culturalized (with a more rigid separation between "culture" and 
"religion") to match an Indonesian vision of modern ethic—is not simply a result of state-
initiated social control, but a journey for numerous modern Indonesians in search of 
legitimacy and meaning in a rapidly modernized world. 
Religionization in the Indonesian context, then, is a modern process in which 
ordinary people become clearly and systematically self-reflexive about their religious 
identities and boundaries, and widely regard the enhancement of religiosity as a 
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betterment of the self. While self-reflexivity is not unique to modern times, the 
intensification of a systematic and self-conscious engagement in articulating drastically 
different religious knowledge among ordinary people is quite modern. 
Highly dependent on ecstatic ritual experience often facilitated by emotionally 
charged soundtracks and videos, many charismatic Christians insist that their religion is 
really not about agama, but about a personal relationship with God. In contrast, placing 
legitimate discourses at the center of morality, many newly observant Muslims are 
convinced that agama Islam is perfect and completely defined by the Koran and Sunna, 
although religious knowledge is filtered through different interpretations. For charismatic 
Christians, "faith'* sounds a lot more modern and appealing than agama. For norm-
minded Muslims, increasing one's ilmu agama is a lot more reasonable than imaging God 
as one's close friend. Yet, again, this study is not merely about how Muslims have 
become more textual and Christians more spiritual, but rather about a journey of how. in 
becoming so, they have been entangled in each other's identity making. 
Notes on ethnicity 
Although ethnicity is not a primary focus in this research, it is worth explaining its 
contributing forces in the religious dynamics I unfold in this work. Statistically, Central 
Java is one of the most ethnically homogeneous provinces (95% being Javanese) in 
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Indonesia. In urban areas especially college towns, this profile is much more complicated 
due to the influx of students, teachers and staffs from all over the country. In Salatiga, 
ethnic Chinese are well represented around the campus of the Christian University and 
downtown area where there has historically been a commercial center that was controlled 
by the Chines business enterprises. In the urban neighborhoods away from the downtown, 
however, one finds stronger homogeneity of ethnic profile: Javanese are the predominant 
group. Yet, the religious profile remains heterogeneous. Most members in the two 
women's Koranic study groups I study are self-identified ethnic Javanese or culturally 
Javanese due to marriage and long-residence. The minority are Protestants and Catholics. 
In the mean time, a few of Christian Chinese households, unlike the prominent 
concentration in the downtown area, also existed in these neighborhoods. 
Within the charismatic congregations in the city, the ethnic profile is more 
heterogeneous. None of these churches bother to differentiate their ethnic composition. 
Some would immediately frown upon such an idea. As the pastor of the Ester 
congregation Pak Toni explained to me, "ethnicity or whatever in the eye of God does not 
matter," and believers "work together, and do not envisage differences (kerja hersama, 
tidak memandang perbedaan).*' Under my persistent inquiry about the ethnic identities 
among members, he described the proportion between the Javanese and ethnic Chinese as 
"fifty-fifty.'" In the Fendi congregation, due to its high concentration of Christian college 
students, ethnic Chinese may account for slightly more than half of the members. 
Nevertheless, among the leadership, Javanese believers are still well-represented. 
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The weakened correlation between ethnicity and religion in Indonesia is not unique to 
Pentecostal congregations, but in fact a long-term development of "dissociated identities" 
(Kipp 1993) in which ethnicity to a greater degree is secularized and culturalized apart 
from the religious domain. Furthermore, one of the distinctive powers of Pentecostalism 
is its mobilizing power across ethnic or racial borders. The legendary story of the Azusa 
Stress mission in Los Angels is an example: led by an African American preacher, 
attended by many whites, Asians, and Latinos. Given the assumption that all are equal 
when used by the Spirit. African Americans and women leaped to speaking at publicly 
services (Wacker 2003, 103-5). In Brazil, the lines between negros and light-skinned 
evangelists are brought together (Burdick 1999). although later racial divides reinstated, a 
phenomenon that also occurred in the United States as well. In Zimbabwe, the multi­
ethnic Zimbabwe Assemblies of God has challenged the previous impression of the 
domination in the congregation by the ethnic Ndau, and attempted to embrace a more 
inclusive pluralism to transcend its sectarian tendencies (Maxwell 2000, 257). Despite its 
myriad forms of proliferation, Pentecostalism continued to feature its egalitarian 
inspirational logic in its outreach among its converts, who are encouraged to see their 
first and foremost identity not as one of class, race, gender, or ethnicity, but as children of 
God (Burdick 1999, 123; Freston 2001. 81: Robbins 2004a, 125). 
In the most successful Pentecostal congregations in Indonesia today, ethnicity is 
downplayed. What is embraced, instead, is a more blunt Indonesian-ness and universal 
Christian identity. Nevertheless, the tension between ethnicity deserves more rigorous 
studies that cannot be covered by my research. Is it possible that the religious fervor of 
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ethnic Chinese pioneers of Pentecostalism in Indonesia is a kind of moral credit and 
debit—they rack up a debit with their discomfort, uneasiness, and fear, and guilt that are 
a consequence of the periodical anti-Chinese riots in the country and their stereotypes as 
wealthy outsiders, and earn the counterbalancing credit by claiming their access to truth, 
their ambition to save pirbumi souls, their desire to become leaders of new morality? 
What are the social consequences of Javanese conversion to Christianity? These 
questions deserve a research topic on their own. and cannot be pursued here. 
Boundary-crossing: discovering research communities 
In my journey into the religious life of Salatiga I encountered many surprises. 
According to my research proposal sponsored by a National Science Foundation grant in 
October 2009, what I originally planned to do was to study and compare changing gender 
norms among female members of Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the two 
largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, and those of the largest Javanese Christian 
church in Central Java (GKJ). against the backdrop of Islamic resurgence. This plan was 
soon disrupted by two unexpected encounters during my fieldwork. both indicating other 
understudied phenomena of religious change. First, as I befriended members of women's 
wings of NU and Muhammadiyah, Fatayat and Aisyiyah, and visited them in their 
neighborhoods, a phenomenon intrigued me: women's Koranic study groups (pengajian) 
and other communal religious activities that crosscut the line between NU and 
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Muhammadiyah. Knowing that there were some long-term prejudices and practical 
differences between them, I wondered how such a social configuration worked out in 
reality. 
This curiosity motivated me to eventually move into the neighborhood Graha where 
members of Muhammadiyah and NU lived side by side. My landlady then, Ibu Parjo, a 
Javanese Christian who provided homestay for foreign researchers affiliated with UKSW, 
was surprised to learn one day that her Muslim guest in the living room knew me from 
the pengajian. The guest kept praising my Indonesian proficiency, and Ibu Parjo further 
added, "not just that, but even Kromo (High Javanese)!" The magic of High Javanese is 
theatrical. People would often be delighted, even if what 1 said was as simple as "mboten, 
Pak" ("No, Sir") or "mangga, Bit" ("Please, Ma'am"). Even the most stubborn tukang 
becak (rickshaw driver) who kept soliciting me would be immediately disarmed by my 
"mboten, Pak" and irresistibly replied in a soft-spoken "inggih" (Yes). As I participated 
in the Koranic sermon group and prayers during the Ramadan in Graha, mothers from the 
pengajian would sometimes give me a Javanese pop-quiz on our way home from the 
mosque. They would laugh in amusement when I answered correctly and continue 
expressing a flattered disbelief to each other for a while after. 
The chairwoman of Aisyiyah Ibu Zulfa was an especially important figure in my 
fieldwork. Knowing that I liked solo and stuffed tofu, she often prepared these snacks for 
me at her place. Before I moved into the neighborhood, she had already made me an 
English conversation teacher in the high school she taught, a request I could not resist 
given how much assistance she gave me in my research. (I finally turned the honorarium 
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into a scholarship for three students with the most improvement.) She also made me to go 
on a live English TV show on the national TV channel TVRI Central Java with a dozen 
of students from STAIN Salatiga—some of whom were the residents of the Sinaran 
neighborhood, the other neighborhood this research focused on. After I moved into 
Graha, Ibu Zulfa convinced me to be a "penggembira" (literally "the cheerful person," 
meaning cheerleader) carried on by one of the chartered buses full of Muhammahdiyah 
members, some also from Sinaran. to the annual Muktamar (national council) in 
Yogaykarta. This turned out to be a 5am to 8pm event mostly spending time on the bus 
because anything within five-mile circumference of the Muktamar was virtually 
paralyzed by buses and crowds. Compared to these unanticipated missions, the most 
enjoyable task remained sitting in the mosque and listening to sermons, which were 
always entertaining. Partaking in these social gatherings in both Sinaran and Graha 
proved a wide-open window for me to see the rich fabrics of sociality and everyday 
pluralism in Salatiga. 
The second adjustment of my original research proposal was equally unexpected. My 
first long-term accommodation starting in 2009 was in a girls' dorm near the campus of 
the Christian University of Satya Wanaca (UKSW), where the tenants were mostly 
student enrolled there. I was reluctantly dragged into the popular culture among educated 
youth. As early as in the summer of 2008, my first encounter with Javanese youths and 
even middle-aged people was almost invariably overwhelmed by their memory of the 
extremely popular Taiwanese soap opera Metro Garden. In 2003 Metro Garden was the 
highest rated TV show ever in both Indonesia and the Philippines, and the show was 
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rebroadcast and reproduced in countless pirated DVDs everywhere in the country. Five 
years later people still remembered vividly the names of the leading characters and the 
theme song's chorus. They would say to me, "Say hi to F4 for me!" F4 is the pop group 
consisting of four handsome tall men that played leading characters in Metro Garden. 
When they held a concert in Jakarta in 2003, and the tickets, priced as high as Rp. 1 
million (about 100 dollars, an insane price by local standards), were sold out 
immediately. Many elites appeared, including the mayor of Jakarta, the daughter of the 
former president Megawati and some Brunei aristocrats, in addition to one hundred 
thousand fans and 6,000 police. As a Taiwanese. I became a walking reminder of this 
phenomenon for Salatiga residents. To my surprise, as late as in 2009, even leaders of 
Aisyiah like Ibu Zulfa and Ibu Siti would seem a little coy and shy when admitting their 
love for F43. 
But popular culture changes rapidly and the youth know better than the elders. Now it 
seemed the Korean soap opera and pop stars have taken over, although Taiwanese pop 
music was still heard almost everyday in my dorm where I lived for my first six months. 
On the first day I entered into the girl's boarding house (kos), the first thing that the 
young housekeeper wanted from me was to know whether I was from Korea or not. In 
fact, at the time we talked, she was, with other housekeepers, watching a Korean soap 
opera. I was a little guilty when I disappointed her for not being a Korean. 
' This is still more pleasant than the experience of a Taiwanese anthropologist Shun-Yuan Yang who 
visited 'the headhunters' in the Philippines Ilongot people in 2006 after mountain-climbing for 8 hours, 
only to discover many posters of F4 in the village. 
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After start living in the tiny room with dozens of house mates, an experience I have 
never had before, I found the life of female Ar«-mates quite intimate to a point that one 
day I found myself trimming a girl's eyebrows because she wanted hers to be like mine. 1 
started to dine out with some of them and went to their churches with them as well. 1 was 
soon introduced to another popular, but religious, culture: Pentecostal ism. 1 was led to the 
Ester church and Fendi church, where I experienced my first contact with speaking in 
tongues, healing and delivering. The ebullient and exuberant atmosphere in the 
congregations shocked me, and reminded me of the academic works on the globalization 
of Pentecostalism 1 have read when I was preparing for my comprehensive exam at 
Boston University. The popularity of Pentecostalism was further attested by some GKJ 
members who told me privately that nowadays they felt compelled to emulate the 
charismatic worship style in order to "keep their sheep." 
To complicate things further. I discovered that some Pentecostal believers lived in the 
same neighborhoods with my Muslim respondents in Sinaran and Graha, and they had 
also been part of the golong-royong system. Understandably, there was little about 
Christianity mentioned in "the Religion of Java," the classic authored by the renowned 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz. That absence was one of my major rationales for studying 
GKJ. since so many decades had passed since Geertz, yet the remarkably expanded 
Christian constituencies still remained understudied. It was only in my wildest dream that 
in this tiny city the alleged two largest religious revivals in the present-day world— 
Islamic resurgence and Pentecostalism—were so closely coexistent, so strategically 
adjacent to each other. Then, my step towards researching GKJ as planned in my original 
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research proposal was intercepted by the cutting-edge status of charismatic churches in 
the city. 
In the continuing vibrant plurality of religious lives, religious communities in Salatiga 
have shown capacities to cross factional or denominational boundaries. Women 
dominated the organization of voluntary Koranic sermon groups in most neighborhoods 
that recruited followers of both NU and Muhammadiyah, the two largest, and long 
considered as competing, Muslim organizations in Indonesia. Mainline churches and 
Pentecostal congregations also often exchanged guest speakers and held cross-
denominational ceremonies, although their relations can be strained at times. 
Pentecostal leaders of Fendi and Ester as well as Muslim leaders of traditionalist or 
reformist wings in Graha and Sinaran shared a quite optimistic attitude regarding civic 
pluralism in the city. In their rose-tinted view, Salatiga has managed to remain a safe, 
tolerant place even in the nation's most tumultuous moments such as the political 
upheavals in 1998. A story that proves this is often told: On the main road of the city 
Jalan Diponegoro, the mainline church GKI (Indonesian Christian Church) and the 
largest mosque in the city Pandaran are across the street from each other, and they 
regularly use each other's parking lot. On Sunday, Christians park in the mosque. On 
Friday. Muslims park in the church. Although this does not mean there was no tension 
between inter-faith communities, this idealized version of pluralism in the city is at least 
indicative of the efforts that religious leaders make to cope with tensions. 
Methodology and data 
The 13 months ethnographic fieldwork research was carried out in the Central 
Javanese city of Salatiga during the summer of 2008 and from October 2009 through 
September 2010. According to the 2010 census (BAPPEDA 2011) Salatiga numbers 
174,234 inhabitants, and 21 % of the population comprises Protestants and Catholics. In 
the 2000 census conduced by the provincial government (BPS Jateng 2000), this number 
was 23%4. Despite this possible decline in the Christian population5, compared to Central 
Java in general and the capital city Semarang, where the Christian population amounts to 
2.8% and 12.9 % in 2000 respectively, Salatiga has a highly Christianized demographic 
profile in the predominantly Muslim-majority environment. 
The proportions of religious population since the 1970s in Salatiga have achieved 
equilibrium to a great degree. An expansion of territory occurred in 1992 as a solution to 
the problem of increasing urban activities of trade, government apparatuses and housing 
that precipitated wider land use. Based on Regulation Number 69, 1992 issued by the city 
government on the changes of the border area of Salatiga municipality and Semarang 
Regency, the administrative area of Salatiga City was expanded from 3,890.86 ha to 
5,678.11 ha by merging a part of Semarang Regency consisting of thirteen village 
4 More research on the probability of statistical anomaly is needed. The agencies that conduct the statistics 
in 2010 and in 2000 are different. The former is the Regional Body for Planning and Development in 
Salaitga. and the latter is the Provincial government. Unfortunately, the former's 2000 census and latter's 
2010 census are not available. The national statistics on the Christian population in Indonesia indicates that, 
for the first time since the 1960s, the percentage of Christian populations has declined, albeit only a small 
amount. If the statistics are correct, then the percentage of Christians in Salatiga dropped slightly. 
s The decline cannot be seen as an absolute trend, since between 2001 and 2005 there was a 2% increase in 
the percentage of the Protestant population and 2% decrease in that of the Muslim population. More 
recently, assuming the statistical data are not problematic, the trend has been reversed by a minor increase 
in the Muslim population and decrease in the Protestant population. 
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districts (kelurahan). The number of villages hence rose from 9 to 22, and the entire 
population from 86,476 in 1990 to 174,187 in 1996. This administrative expansion 
incorporated many outskirt villages, all predominantly Muslim areas, which explained the 
minor increase of the proportion of Muslims in the population from 74% in 1990 to 78% 
in 1995. Ever since 1995, the percentages of Muslim population have ranged between 
77% and 78% and those of Protestant between 13% and 15%. 
Participant observation has mostly focused on two Pentecostal congregations, Ester 
and Fendi, which claim about 400 and 150 membership respectively, and two Muslim 
women's Koranic study groups in the neighborhood of Sinaran and Graha. involving 
about 70 households each. Some of the Muslim women are members of Aisyiah of 
Muhammadiyah and Fatayat of NU in Salatiga, each claim 200 members respectively in 
the city. I regularly followed church services, fellowship (sel), bible study (PA), Koranic 
study (pengajian), neighborhood women's organization (PKK), and also attended life-
cycle rites such as wedding, funeral, tahlilan (Muslim praying for the dead), as well as 
social outreach and major religious festivals (Eid al-Adha Christmas, Easter, Eid ul-Fitr, 
etc.). I took brief notes during the events and typed them up into a summary later in the 
day. An example of each type of event was taped and subsequently transcribed; major 
ceremonies were videotaped. Other methods used in the study incorporate interviews, 
oral history, archival research (including church news, pamphlets tabloids and Muslim 
organization's journals and magazines.), and a survey of 200 women (100 Muslim, 100 
Christian, snowball sampling) in Salatiga concerning their economic participation, 
political awareness, educational attainment, household pattern, and religious identity. 
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In the following chapters, I focus on the reformulation of subjectivity within two 
religious streams I call normative Islam and charismatic Christianity, particularly through 
the lens of the Pentecostal congregations and Ester and the Koranic study groups in 
Sinaran and Graha. Here, in order to lay out a general picture, I introduce them through 
simplified sociological categories in terms of age, ethnicity, occupation and social class. 
Further discussions that may unsettle these categories in actual contexts will ensue 
throughout the dissertation. 
Fendi and Ester are multi-ethnic churches featuring ethnic Chinese pastors, Javanese 
and Chinese shepherds (leaders), as well as 400 and 150 members, respectively. The 
majority of the members are ethnic Chinese and Javanese, with a minority of other ethnic 
groups such as Batak. Minanhasa, and Ambon. There was no obvious gender skew in the 
proportions of the congregations. My interlocutors range from lower- to middle- and 
upper-middle class people, including educated college students, teachers, professionals, 
housewives, caterers, bank clerks, and small entrepreneurs. Ester and Fendi belong to 
different higher national organizations respectively, which were the genealogical 
products of periodic schisms of an older church body. The church organization that Ester 
belongs to is one of the fastest-growing churches in Indonesia, which included some 
lower-class constituencies. By contrast, the "brand"" that Fendi affiliates with has focused 
on college towns across the nation. In their branches in Java, both attract large numbers 
of Chinese Indonesians and Javanese, who together comprise the largest groups among 
congregants. In Salatiga, each of the congregations has a church building in the 
downtown area. 
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Many converted to Pentecostalism despite the initial objection of their family who 
were still Catholics, mainline Protestants or to a lesser degree, Muslims. The most 
thorough conversion of an entire family often comes from the experience of miraculous 
healing (of infertility, tumors, cancer, etc.), or from members who are the first-generation 
middle-class who convinced their family with their own prosperity stories. A common 
argument that justifies conversion among new converts is that their "spirituality can grow 
stronger" (kerohanian lehih bertumbuh). Converts from Christian backgrounds 
unanimously told me that the reason they decided to switch to Pentecostal churches was 
because the style of their mainline church service was ngantuk (sleepy) and 
membosankan (boring). By contrast, charismatic churches are entusias (enthusiastic) and 
seru (exciting). 
Sinaran and Graha are both predominantly Muslim neighborhoods. Sinaran is a 
lower- to middle-class neighborhood. Active members of the women's Koranic sermon 
groups are petty traders, entrepreneurs, civil servants and housewives. All are married 
and aged between thirty and sixty-eight. Most of them are ethnic Javanese, but a few are 
half Javanese or married to Javanese. Graha is a middle to upper-middle-class Javanese 
neighborhood on a north edge of the city on the way to Semarang. The neighborhood is 
proudly known for having many haji, male and female, who have made the pilgrimage to 
Mecca. Active members of the women's Koranic groups are schoolteachers, storeowners, 
entrepreneurs, civil servants and housewives. All are married and aged between thirty and 
seventy-two. Most of them are ethnic Javanese. In both Koranic groups in Sinaran and 
Graha. about one third of members have organizational or spiritual affiliations with the 
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traditionalist Muslim organization (NU), another one third ally with reformist Muslim 
organizations Muhammadiyah, and the rest specify their allegiance to "Islam" only. 
These three groupings of women organize Koranic study sessions and communal rituals 
together based on their geographical proximity rather than factional differences. Some of 
them even name themselves "NUMU" or "Just Islam." This is because in Graha and 
Sinaran, mosque operation, holiday ceremonies and women's Koranic sermon groups 
crosscut the line between NU and Muhammadiyah. 
I employ the term "normative Islam" to allude to the generally heightened concern 
over public piety across ordinary Muslims of different factions, which contributed to new 
convergences between NU and Muhammadiyah both at the level of local neighborhoods 
and that of leadership of these two national organizations in Salatiga. One day in 
December 1 was attending a conference held by Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia 
(Indonesian Women's Coalition) in a downtown hotel. Seeing Ibu Zulfa, the chairwoman 
of Aisyiah in Salatiga, and Ibu Farida, the chairwoman of Fatayat in Salatiga, sitting 
together, I joined them and listened to their conversations. There I learnt that they have 
known each other for years through cross-religious activities across the city. It was also 
there they told me that ultimately that what they endeavored to do was "just Islamic" and 
whether it was NU and Muhammadiyah, they were just organizations, not the religion 
itself, and one should not be fanatik about an organization. 
In several separate interviews with Ibu Zulfa or Ibu Farida alone, I discovered that 
both of them believed that NU and Muhammadiyah had a shared agenda today: to reject 
the recruitment of radical Islam and to unify a prosperous Muslim community. This 
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awareness of alliance had their organizational manifestation in the women's Koranic 
groups in the Sinaran and Graha. Around seven thirty on the holiday of Idul-Adha in 
2009,1 had performed public morning prayer with Ibu Zulfa, her daughter and mother, 
and one thousand other people in Lapangan Pancusila, where Ibu Zulfa's husband on 
behalf of the Muslim leaders, happened to be the preacher that gave a sermon to the 
entire city. Later we had some soto ayam with gravy eggs before we undertook the work 
in the neighborhood. Back to the main mosque in Graha, I was introduced to the 
chairwoman of the women's Koranic study group, Ibu Nginsih, fifty-four-years-old. Next 
thing I knew, 1 was with Ibu Nginsih, dividing raw beef and lamb that men had already 
slaughtered on the other side of the mosque, into hundreds of equal shares in order to 
distribute them to the neighbors and the poor. There, Ibu Nginsih told me her philosophy 
of organizing the group: 
We don't separate ourselves by [different religious] streams (aliran). Well, isn't 
that nowadays Christians also have many kinds of churches? Like that, we have 
many kinds [of Muslims], too. After all, we are all the same, [and] have to stand 
together. It's like climbing Mt. Merapi, no? One can go up by walking, driving 
motorbikes or driving. But the summit is only one... Islam is only one. NU or 
Muhammadiyah is but organisasi. We have to unite, otherwise [we] may be said [by 
others that] Islam is falling apart (dipecah-pecah). 
Although followers of NU and Muhammadiyah practiced the prayer in different 
manners in the morning and during Ramadan in accordance with their different 
interpretations, they have nevertheless prayed together, and have rejected dividing their 
communities along these streams. 
On the other side of the story. I use the term "charismatic Christianity" to refer to the 
quite straightforward self-identification with karismatik Christianity of the Fendi and 
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Ester congregations. They practiced speaking in tongues, healing, and prophecying, and 
emphasized a theology of prosperity. Although much attention has been paid to 
individual success, proselytizing was also conducted through "showing the love of Jesus 
through exemplary behaviors" among non-Pentecostals. A female preacher and a church 
employee of Fendi, aged 30. in a fellowship before the Day of Ascension, told the 
congregation: 
We are very lucky. We are different from those who don't know. There are still 
many people out there who don't know Jesus yet... The other day it was raining. 1 
saw a lady in a headscarf, waiting for someone but did not carry an umbrella. I 
invited her in so she would not be rained on. She asked me what place this was. 1 
said, it was a church6, Mother. Then I asked her if she had heard of Jesus. She said 
no. I said Jesus was Isa in the Koran. I didn't impose anything. I just want to show 
that I am a good person and this is a good place. Maybe next time, when the power 
of the Holy Spirit is working, this mother would remember that I told her about Isa. 
Many times on Sunday services, I saw youths wearing Fendi's self-designed T-shirts 
while dancing and singing on the altar. One of these T-shirts said "WE ARE 
DIFFERENT" in English on the back. I could not help but think of the Mt. Merapi 
metaphor I nwhich Ibu Nginsih told me that: "After all, we are all the same." How 
different are the ways that the Muslim Koranic sermon groups in Sinaran and Graha 
envision their communities from the ways that the members of charismatic Christians 
envision theirs? What sparks would fly when they inevitably encountered one another, 
since they live not simply in the same anonymous city, but in the shared neighborhoods 
that define most residents' social communities? 
*' As will shown in chapter 2, Fendi's church is rather inconspicuous that one can easily pass by without 
knowing there is a church. 
40 
Overview of the dissertation 
The chapters that follow assess the different social footings and religious aspirations 
of norm-minded Muslims and charismatic Christians with regard to historical 
development, establishing worship facilities, cultivating religiosity, refashioning gender 
norms, and engaging in cross-religious activities. To map out the different natures of the 
localities of "normative Islam1' and "charismatic Christianity," it should be noted that, as 
two types of religious community, one is grounded in the neighborhoods, the other in the 
congregations. However, as the dissertation will show, the former in fact encompasses 
the latter, and the moral economy that the neighborhoods embody contains the spiritual 
economy that the churches pursue. Precisely because of a compulsory solidarity in the 
neighborhoods, it should be emphasized that one's religious subjectivity is partially, but 
critically, shaped by one's self-positions vis-a-vis the religious other. 
Chapter 1 reconstructs a history of the religious streams in Javanese society in order 
to clarify the place of "normative Islam" and "charismatic Christianity" in Javanese 
society. I outline how, over the last three decades, the children of Javanist Muslims have 
become orthodox Muslims, whereas the offspring of mainline Protestants are becoming 
born-again Christians. Chapter 2 elaborates on the politics of the Christian and Muslim 
narratives about the proliferation of worship facilities in Salatiga against the backdrops of 
Muslim-Christian tension in Indonesia, and summarizes the dialectical narratives between 
the Christian fear of "religious persecution" and the long-term Muslim worries over 
"Christianization" (Kristenisasi). 
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Chapter 3 explores new trends of the Javanese religious streams that feature a 
feminization of public rituals and a re-alliance between traditionalist and modernist 
Muslims in the presence of a strong Christian community. The result is the inclusion of 
women into ritual realms that were previously men's reserve, and a new identity shared 
by mainstream Muslims as "not fanatical." Chapter 4 further illustrates the complexity of 
the subjectivities of Muslim women by explaining their choice to celebrate veiling and 
de-legitimize polygamy that represent their efforts in making religious distinction 
(veiling) and accommodation (polygamy). 
Chapter 5 turns to Christians' congregational lives, and illustrates the Pentecostal 
training of sacrificial agency and cultivation of "insincerity" among both men and women 
in order to fulfill "successful families," and foreshadows their implications in the 
neighborhood. Finally, Chapter 6 examines the routine interactions between Muslim and 
born-again Christian women, and discusses the nature of pluralism in Sinaran and Graha. 
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is an inv itation to experience the interactions 
between religious movements, where the battle is not between men and women, but 
between different visions of the religious self and pluralism. To start, I shall tell of the 
stories of the multiple streams that have transformed the Javanese religious landscape 
into what it is today, through a particular lens of Muslim-Christian relations. 
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Map I. Central Java and Salatiga 
IK/lNi 
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Chapter 1 Stories of Streams 
'But Pak Modin himself is a Christian.' 
On a November Friday afternoon, I had my first "bible study'" meeting in Java. 1 was 
with eleven female members from the Javanese Christian Church (GKJ) aged between 
forty and eighty in this persekutuan pengertian Al-Kitab (bible study). This happened 
before I fully recognized the popularity of charismatic churches and decided to devote 
more time to the latter. Unlike charismatic congregations, GKJ was a mainline protestant 
ethnic church that received legacies from the Dutch Reformed Church. That afternoon, 
we gathered in a member's house, and started with 'hand-shakes all around' as the 
unavoidable etiquette. We sang hymns in Javanese, read biblical verses in Indonesian, 
had some discussion over pre-prepared topics, and had some snacks and typically over-
sweetened tea. Knowing my interest in inter-religious relations, after the study was 
finished, people started to generously and playfully share their family stories with me. 
Nine out of eleven of them had direct multi-religious experience in their families. The 
hostess in her forties told me that she had a Muslim brother. The inter-religious problem 
that bothered her most was the difficulty in holding a birthday party for their parents, 
because the ways she and her brother celebrated simply "feel different" (berbau hedcu 
literally 'smell different'). A woman in her 50s said she was herself from a Muslim 
background. Because she hated ngaji (learning Koranic recitation) as a teen, she was 
eventually attracted to Christianity. Finally, the stories of the two oldest ladies. Ibu Garini 
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in her 60s and Ibu Mada in her 70s, sharply captured the changing terms of Christianity 
in an increasingly cross-religious Java. Ibu Garini, seated in her dark purple batik shirt, 
told the story in a calm but cheerful manner: 
I do have siblings who are Muslims. But, there is no problem. No problem. For 
example, several years ago... what year was that? O I already forgot, anyway, when 
they went on pilgrimage, [I] also received special uniforms to wear to see them off 
at the plaza...out there. 1 accepted it, but of course I did not wear it. Well, I didn't 
want them to see that I refused to wear it, so I excused myself from seeing them off. 
When they came back, 1 was also given many souvenirs of Mecca. Still happy (that 1 
could) get gifts! Like Mecca mugs, Mecca T-Shirts...You see, there is no problem. 
It seemed that I was not the only one who was amused by the story about Christians 
receiving gifts from the Muslim holy land. Then Ibu Mada who was sitting next to Ibu 
Garini also started to say something. She wore a pair of heavy glasses with granny chains 
hanging near her ears. She was a small, hunched old lady, but her voice was substantial, 
sounding unusually strong and determined against her bony shoulders: 
When I was young we were still in East Java. [That was] already a previous era. At 
the time the entire village converted to Christianity. Entire. Perhaps nowadays it is 
hard to have that kind of village again, no? Imagine, the entire village became 
Christian! But interestingly, when we had to hold rituals like a funeral, we still 
needed someone who knew things, how to do things, like that. So whom would we 
call? Still Pak Modin. Well, okay, let's call Pak Modin. But, Father Modin himself is 
a Christian. Hey (Lho)\ How come Pak Modin can be a Christian? Well, since a long 
time ago he had already been Pak Modin. After he converted to Christianity, he was 
still known as Pak Modin. 
In Indonesia, leaders are often respectfully called by their positions rather than their 
personal names. Pak is the standard honorific term to address any older man; modin 
refers to the village Islamic official. A modin administers and instructs affairs with regard 
to funerals, marriage, divorce, inheritance, religious tax, halal food production, and many 
other communal rituals (Geertz 1960, 206-07), including making sure people follow 
proper conduct according to Islamic Law. "Pak Modin himself is a Christian1' is 
intriguing precisely because it is absurd. The absurdity lies in a man with a Muslim title 
simultaneously being a Christian. 
These accounts from GKJ members reflect an important theme of the idealized past in 
which the social memories of the older Muslim-Christian tension is systematically erased. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the metanarratives of this conversation is premised upon the 
incommensurability between the Christian identity and the Muslim one. This chapter is 
dedicated to providing a history that traces the evolving religious lives in Java that 
contributed to precisely this self-conscious and mutually exclusive religious identities 
(see Kipp 1993, Aragon 2000). 
This chapter traces the evolution of religious plurality in Java, particularly a 
procession in which both Muslims and Christians have become more self-conscious 
about their religious identities and concerned about religious boundaries. It should be 
emphasized that, however, the transformation in the religious lives is best epitomized by 
the shifts from one type of diversity to another, rather than a homogenous development. 
In fact, there is much debate surrounding the appropriate use of terms to identify a 
growing number of Muslims and Christians who fit into the categories "'normative'" and 
"charismatic." To engage into the socio-religious lives of the followers of normative 
Islam and charismatic Christianity and situate them in relation to each other, it is 
necessaiy to outline a social history that has generated the diverse streams (aliran, flows 
and streams, referring to religious factions) or within Islam and Christianity in Java and 
properly locate their positions among the multiple religious streams. A useful reference 
would be the anthropologist Geertz' influential study The Religion of Java (1960). 
Engaging in his insights can help us to identify the generative forces that have reshaped 
the variety of religions in Java prior to and after the 1950s. 
The polarization of Javanese society 
Based on the fieldwork carried out in Modjokuto, a small town of some 20,000 
residents in east central Java, Geertz builds a general image of religion and social life of 
Javanese culture. Rather than lumping all the Javanese together by identifying them as 
undifferentiated "Muslims," he offers a tripartition of religious actors: the ahangan, 
nominal Muslims, who care less about the Five Pillars and more about ritualistic 
performance and animistic belief; the santri, pious Muslims, who adhere more strictly to 
religious observances and pay more attention to doctrine rather than ritual; and the 
priyayi. who are predominantly Hindu-Buddhist-mystic in belief and practice. The three 
variants also correspond roughly with class and status differentiations—in a more 
Weberian sense rather than Marxist sense of class—in which the abangan belong to 
peasantry, the santri form a middle class of urban merchants, and the priyayi relate to 
noble class and bureaucracy. 
The core of religion of Java, according to Geertz, is the meal ritual slametan. The 
ahangan are presented as the mainstream Muslim and, at least in the brief version of 
Geertz's delineation (1967), "animist" elements are treated as constitutive of the heart of 
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Javanese religion, whereas Islam is portrayed as somewhat more intrusive rather than 
indigenous. In the slametan, all the Islamic, Hindu-Buddhist, and most prominently 
indigenous animist elements are merged, altogether serving for its central concerns of 
pleasing the local spirits and enhancing social solidarity. As such, the slametan reassures 
and reaffirms the social universe in which selamat (Indo. serenity, safety) is given to 
everyone. 
But the social climate in the 1950s was not all that selamat. During the first decades 
after Independence (1945-1965), the nation was divided by severe political antitheses 
between communists, nationalist and Muslim parties, culminating in the tragic clash in 
1965 (see below). The priyayi dominated the nationalist party, a portion (a substantial 
minority) of the abangan allied with the communist party and Nahdlatul Ulama (the 
Islamic party), and the santri showed allegiance to the Masjumi (the Islamic party). These 
ideological divides worked to tear the society apart to a point that Geertz notes that 
"religion does not play only an integrative, socially harmonizing role in society but also a 
divisive one" (1960, 355). The priyayi accused the santri of their hypocrisy and 
intolerance, while derided the abangan beliefs and practices as "mere superstition.'" In 
return, the santri attacked the abagnan of being idol-worshipers and the priyayi of 
idolizing themselves by enmeshing themselves with God. 
Nevertheless, Geertz argued that the prospect of social integration hinged on the same 
cultural world and ethos that all Javanese share: the concern for status formality; i.e., an 
emphasis on rigid politeness and the dissimulation of emotion and avoidance of intense 
external stimuli combined with inwardness and the participation in organizations of 
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mutual cooperation (1960. 366-67). The underlying unity of the Javanese people, and 
beyond them, of the Indonesian people, should not be underestimated, according to 
Geertz. This optimistic view, however, was proved wrong by the upcoming 1965-66 anti-
communist massacre in the aftermath of a failed communist coup, in which half-million 
ahagan-?¥A sympathizers were slaughtered by squads of santri youth allied with the 
military. 
As more recent scholarship has revealed, the religious variety and conflict in Java that 
Geertz aptly described was but one phase of the constant developments of the shifting 
boundary between religious cultures in Java. As the historian Ricklefs (2007) and the 
anthropologist Van Bruinessen (1994) demonstrate, the antagonistic relation between the 
abangan and the santri dates only from the mid-nineteenth century. For one thing, the 
religious infrastructure for canonized Islamic education and worship before then was 
largely undeveloped. Commoners did not attend mosques for there were not many to 
begin with. People had for centuries identified themselves as Muslims, but they were not 
concerned with a canonized set of beliefs and practices. Islam was sustained by multiple 
sources of religious authority, ranging from the palace-centered, philosophical "mystic 
synthesis" (Ricklefs 2007, 10), often politically marginalized Islamic scholars 
(Woodward 1989, 92), popular wayang (shadow puppet performance) (Headley 2001), 
and a wide array of local spiritual forces under the Islamic canopy. In other words, there 
have always been diverse streams of religious piety, yet the kind of discourses that 
separated the abangan and the santri as distinct styles of religious culture was a recent 
phenomenon. 
This is not to say that Islam was but a thin frosting on the multi-layered cake of 
Javanese religion. Islam has been implanted in Java via long-term, more or less peaceful 
trade relationships between Muslim merchants (who traveled between India, Southeast 
Asia, and China since the end of the thirteenth century) and through "raja-centric" styles 
of mass conversion that was often accompanied by dreams and miracles (Reid 1993, 
132). Unlike in parts of India where Muslim empires had conquered, in Java the 
Islamization of the previously Hindu-Buddhist has eventually led to an almost total 
collapse of the Hindu-Buddhist temples and monasteries that once flourished in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries (Hefner 2009, 14). In the following centuries, the Islamic 
landscape in Java became increasingly similar to the scenes one could find in rural Egypt, 
Persia and Central Asia in the Middle Ages and later. Taking slametan as an example. 
Woodward (1988) has presented the scriptural origin and practical similarity of ritual 
meals across a wide range of Muslim societies (in Central Asia and Persia). Rituals like 
the slametan are thus not unique to the Javanese and might well be Islamic in their 
nature. 
With the slow but steady deepening of Islam in Java prior to the late nineteenth 
century, a hierarchical re-arrangement of religious knowledge had localized and 
subjugated non-orthodox ritual specialists under a larger community called Islamic. The 
polarization within society however was intensified in the late colonial and early post-
independence periods. First it was the rise of Islamic reformism in the late colonial 
periods that laid the foundation for future categories of abangan and saniri\ later it was 
the severe political rivalries between communists, nationalist and Muslim parties in the 
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1950s. The accentuated identity of the abangan tradition that Geertz described in the 
1950s, then, was in fact a modern phenomenon created by historical contingencies and 
reinforced by political antagonism. 
In what follows, I explore the socio-historical conditions that constituted the changing 
varieties of Islam and Christianity since the late nineteenth century, and placed them in 
relation to one another. For my purposes, I construct three threads: Islamic reformism and 
the roots of Christianity in Java in the late colonial and early independence periods; 
modernization and religionization during the New Order regime (1965-1998); and finally, 
the current democratic period, a time when Islam paramilitary groups once mushroomed 
and fervent evangelical Christian movements flourished. This is also a time when 
episodes of ethno-religious violence died down (Klinken 2007), but Muslim-Christian 
tensions continued to mount (Jones 2010). 
Muslim reformism, Christian "syncretism, " and Churches 
The standard missionary accounts of Java often depicted Islam as a veneer of local 
beliefs (Laffan 2003). Here I wish to mention different voices from the past. These 
include some perspectives from some evangelizers under the Dutch authority. The Dutch 
held an ambivalent attitude towards Islam. Since the very beginning they considered Java 
as a land of Muslims, but they also constructed a view that Javanese Muslims were 
nothing but "nominal" Muslims, given that Javanese contradict their orientalist 
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imaginations of "true Muslims.'' To their commercial and ethical interests, any attempt at 
Christian missionizing was viewed as a time bomb that could stir up "Moslem 
fanaticism" (Gunning 1915. 64). This policy orientation toward Java was clearly reflected 
in the activity of the Dutch Missionary Society (Nederlandsch Zendeling Genootschup), 
which sent a large number of missionaries to the Moluccas Islands in the far east of the 
archipelago in 1814, but only granted three to Java. Finally, when the first Javanese 
translation of the New Testament was painstakingly completed, it was immediately 
confiscated by the Dutch government and locked in a warehouse until it rotted (Ricklefs 
2007, 89). 
The ban on missionary work was lifted as the crackdown of the last indigenous 
aristocrat-led armed resistance (the Diponegoro Rebellion 1825-1830) left the Dutch in 
"undisputed control of Java" (Carey 1976, 52; Ricklefs 1981, 113). Yet even after 
Christian evangelizing was finally permitted in the second half of the nineteenth century 
among Central Javanese, the results were just as bleak. Around 1850 there were only a 
few Dutch-speaking congregations in the major cities and towns of Central Java 
(Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 670). In 1857 the Dutch missionary Zeldam Ganswijk. 
upon observing the rapid spread of Islamic boarding schools (Partonadi 1990, 17) or 
pesantren, remarked that Islam would "ever more penetrate the spirit of the population" 
(Ricklefs 2007, 90) Similarly, Poesen noticed in 1863 the increasing influence of the 
santri (the students of Islamic schools, or orthodox Muslims) over those who still 
"inclined to paganism." He predicted that sooner or later Islam would "entirely penetrate 
the organism of the moral and spiritual life of the Javanese world" (ibid). Contrary to the 
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predominant impression of the superficial affiliation with Islam among the Javanese, 
some missionaries and orientalists held different perspectives. The French Orientalist 
Antoine Cabaton, after spending two years in the Netherland Indies, remarked that "the 
religion of Java is a sincere Islamism" and that most Javanese were "earnest 
Mahomedans" (1911, 136). In 1946, Elder would characterize the Javanese people as 
"almost solidly Moslem" (1946, 337). 
This observation of "sincere Islamism" was part of the consequences of what Ricklefs 
(2007) called the "polarization" of Javanese society. With the heightened colonial control 
over the Netherland Indies, the change of socio-economic infrastructure was 
accompanied by reformulations of religious life. The cooperation of the priyayi class with 
the colonial authority was the most crucial factor to ensure the success of the implement 
of Cultivation System1 that was introduced in 1830 (ibid: 46). With the help of the 
priyayi, the Dutch obtained access to the social nexuses to organize the labor force. The 
peasants became wage labors and were exploited in this process of development. As a 
result, in the late-nineteenth century, there was a gradually clear polarization between a 
prosperous class, the unprecedentedly empowered priyayi, and an exploited, 
impoverished class, the peasantry (ibid: 28). Between the two there was nonetheless a 
relatively successful cluster of people who managed to gain profits from new 
entrepreneurial opportunities and formed a distinguishable social class. This merchant 
class was more dominant in northern coastal areas (pasisir) than elsewhere. They had 
1 This was a Dutch government policy in the mid-nineteenth century for its East Indies colony that required 
a portion of agricultural production to be devoted to export crops. Indonesian historians in general refer to 
it as Tanam Paksa ("Compulsory Planting"). 
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strong social, commercial ties with Arab communities, and they would become the future 
santri. 
Thanks to the technological advancement of steamships, the opening of Suez Canal 
in 1869 and the final approval of the Dutch authority, the numbers of haji (pilgrims) from 
Java since the mid-nineteenth century increased dramatically. The Dutch scholar and 
government officer Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje even suggested in 1885 that "Jawa," the 
name referring to Southeast Asians in the Arab lands, formed the single largest 
community in the holy city (Ricklefs 2007. 129). The hajis upon their returns typically 
opened new Islamic schools, constantly imported refined religious knowledge, and 
erected new criteria of Islamic piety (Van Bruinessen 1999, 49). More significantly, as the 
Dutch's cooptation of the priyai caused a legitimacy crisis, the popular classes began to 
look to these newly ascendant Muslim leaders as guardians of native welfare (Hefner 
2009, 19). The turn to Islamic reformism thus reflected an Indonesian version of a new 
political economy of religious cultures that rose to face the challenge of the penetration of 
Western colonialism in the Middle-East. 
Influenced by the ideas of reformism in the Middle East, the New Group (Kaum 
Muda) Muslims emphasized the transparency and perfection of the Quran and the Sunna. 
and the need to purge Islamic traditions of all local innovations (bid'a). Among these 
innovations that the New Group saw as un-Islamic were the practices central to the 
Muslim traditionalists, or the Old Group (Kaum Tua): "faithful reliance (taqlid) on the 
study of classical religious texts (kitabs); affiliation with an established school of Islamic 
jurisprudence (madhab)\ the recitation of a catechism (talqiri) to the deceased 
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immediately after burial... and pilgrimage (ziyarah) to the burial sites of Muslim saints" 
(Hefner 2009, 21). Underlying this vision of religion is an intense purification of religion, 
in which "Islam was understood as knowledge and practices detached from any particular 
place" (Bowen 1993, 33, 37 my emphasis), that is, distinguished from local forms of 
religiosity and removed from embedded social relations. Moreover, the New Group 
rejected the Old Group's heavy reliance on kitab kuning, the classical texts consisting of 
the legal opinions of "scholars, jurists, doctors and Sufis of the formative centuries of 
Islam"' (Dhofier 1999. viii) and the major curriculum the Old Group taught in their 
pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) communities. Instead, personal interpretations and 
independent reasoning (ijtihad) should be allowed. In this vein, the New Group reasoned, 
to compete with the Western powers, Muslims should abandon superstition and embrace 
science, technology, education and medicine to empower the native population by 
incorporating secular and religious knowledge into their new elementary and 
intermediary schools named after the Arab term madrasa (originally referring to 
advanced schools). 
In response, the Old Group reformed their curriculum by adding secular subjects and 
expand their pesantren in the 1930s, while allowing certain practices by conceiving a 
variety of rituals that concern deeper social relations as present in, and consistent with, 
Islam.2 This contest of empowering society through reforming Islam has been continued 
since the founding of the largest reformist Muslim organization in today's Indonesia, 
" In fact, prior to the twentieth century, pesantren were the only formal education institutions found in Java. 
They offered an almost exclusively religious curriculum to a mix of students including future religious 
leaders, court poets (Florida 1995), and members of the ruling class (Adas 1979; Pemberton 1994:48-49). 
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Muhammadiyah ("the Followers of the Prophet"), in 1912, and the following 
establishment of Nahdlatul Ulama ("the Awakening of Religious Scholars ") in 1926, the 
largest Muslim organization in the country still today. 
Gaining momentum in the early twentieth century, the New Group started to be 
openly averse to what they thought of as the mixture of local customs and the pure Islam 
(Benda 1983, 35-40). As Ricklefs has shown, among nominal-Muslim peasants, "a few 
learned that they were 'bad Muslims' and decided that, if this was so, they would rather 
not be Muslims at all" (1979, 117). Consequently, this tide of Islamic reformism at the 
turn of the twentieth century in fact had some minor effects that unwittingly motivated 
conversion to Christianity among Javanese peasants, although the number was rather 
small. 
Believing that "quitting Islam" was a major problem for Javanese to convert, the 
missiologist Kraemer commented that "considering the hard soil of Islam, a respectable 
piece of work has been accomplished" (Kraemer 1923, 268). Indeed, for many Javanese 
at the time, to renounce Islam was to give up Javanese identity. Christianity was even 
called hagama tahi asu (the religion of dog manure), a religion that forced people to 
ignore the customs, including circumcision, almsgiving, slametan, and wayang (Wilhelm 
1889, 49 cited in Partonadi 1990, 51-52). With the complication of anti-colonialism. 
Muslim leaders, including the haji, santri, modin, and village leaders rallied to see Dutch 
Christianity as the destroyer of their culture, a denial of their Javanese-ness, and a 
collaborator of colonization. These leaders warned their people to stay away from 
missionaries and ridiculed Javanese converts as Landa wurung, Jawa tangung, meaning 
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"not yet Dutch and half-baked Javanese" (Partonadi 1990, 50). 
These rationales behind the general rejection of Christianity explained why initially 
only more syncretic forms of Christianity gained currency among lower class Javanese in 
the rural areas, in a contrast to the small Christian enclaves of European and Eurasian in 
the cities. The degree of openness towards Javanese customs and Muslim identity was an 
important index in differentiating the kinds of agents of evangelizing in Java in the late 
nineteenth centuries (Cooley 1968, 90; Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 673): we have on 
the one hand the agonized, somewhat jealous European missionaries who insisted on the 
rigid boundaries between Christianity and Javanese customs; and on the other hand, the 
"heretical ly'" charismatic indigenous (or of Euro-Javanese ancestry) Christian kyaL the 
same title that traditionalist Muslims call their headmasters of Islamic schools. Between 
them, there were European lay evangelists who were often more sympathetic with the 
latter. The accommodation of Christianity to Javanese Muslim worldviews proved the 
key to success in missionizing in this early stage. However, as what follows would show, 
at the turn of the twentieth century, this phenomenon was soon replaced by the stable rise 
of organized churches that assumed more Western outlooks. 
The Christian kyai were the earliest successful evangelizers of mass converts in Java. 
The first such person was the influential Russo-Javanese kyai Conrad Laurens Coolen. 
Believing that God was revealing to him a higher truth in the wilderness, he founded a 
new settlement in Majaagung, East Java, near the uncultivated forest of the old site of the 
pre-Islamic kingdom of Majapahit in 1825. He soon became the owner of a considerable 
plantation with hundreds of workers who were turned into followers of his Christianity. 
For Coolen, it was possible to be a Javanese kyai and a Christian (Ricklefs 2007,112). He 
led a gamelan orchestra to hold the Christian ritual, incorporated the Muslim creed "La 
illah la illolah'"' ("There is no God but God") into the Christian creed sung like a Sufi 
dhikr, and set up wayang shows to tell biblical stories. He soon converted hundreds of 
villagers. Dutch missionaries were critical of this development, calling it Christianity 
"beyond recognition", but failed to compete with it. 
This idea of building special Christian villages as a missionary strategy was borrowed 
by other Javanese Christians and western missionaries in Central and East Java and 
contributed to the concentration of Christian congregations in the rural frontier areas 
where until then Islam had little hold (Aritonang and Sttenbrink 2008, 676). A Javanese 
hermit from Jepara of the pesisir area, called kyai Ibrahim Tunggul-Wulung, would be the 
first successful mass evangelizer in Central Java. In fact, until today, the Pentecostal 
congregation Ester I worked with still screened a documentary about him and admired 
him as their spiritual predecessor. Tunggul-Wulung came in contact with native 
Christians in Semarang. one of the principal ports of the Indies where a church had been 
operating since 1750 for Eurasians. One day he found a copy of the Ten Commandments 
under his mat (Akkeren 1970, 154-56). Later he heard a voice from heaven advising him 
to go to a mountain and hear the truth. There he found the Dutch missionary Jellesma and 
persuaded the latter to baptize him as a Christian in 1857. More than Coolen, Wulung 
consciously opposed his Kristen Jawa (Javanese Christianity) to the Kristen Landa 
(Dutch Christianity) (Aritonang and Sttenbrink 2008, 673). He founded three new 
Christian villages north of Jepara. By the time of his death in 1885 he converted more 
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than 1000 disciples, an achievement that none of the Dutch missionaries could have 
dreamt of. 
Both Coolen and Wulung were believed to be supernatural men. with abilities much 
like the Muslim kyai, presumably capable of running at amazing speeds, turning people's 
heads into animals", flying, appearing in two places at once, etc. In these Christian kyais* 
framework, Christianity was but another form of knowledge (ilmu) whose nature was not 
inherently different from other religious inspirations already received. Successful 
missionizing was almost invariably without missionary supervision. For example, in 
northern Central Java, it was three devoted Christian women who helped Christianity 
take hold: Mrs. Philips van Oostram in Banyumas, Mrs. Philips-Stevens in Purwareja and 
Mrs. de Wildt-le JolJe in Salatiga. They were wives of colonial officials, and they spoke 
Javanese and proselytized to their Javanese servants. Among them, Mrs. Philips-Stevens 
even supported the next powerful Javanese Christian kyai, Sadrach. 
Sadrach was once a typical santri (student in an Islamic school). Seeing his former 
guru convert to Christianity upon failing in a debate with Tunggul-Wulung, he sought out 
the latter and was similarly converted. He then followed Tunggul-Wulung travelling 
through Java especially on the east coast, and later was baptized in Batavia in 1867. In 
1869 he established himself in Purwareja and continued the legacy of Mrs. Philip-
Stevens. On the strength of his education and strong personality he became a leader of 
Kristen Djawa (Javanese Christians), in contrast to those converts who followed the 
European missionaries and bore the name of Kristen Blanda (Dutch Christians). Sadrach 
challenged Javanese kyais and guru to public debates, and upon defeating them, would 
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accept their conversion along with their followers. From 1870 to 1873 he built five 
churches and converted 2500 Javanese. These churches were called "mosques" (mesjid), 
and women were instructed to wear headscarves inside the churches. By 1890 it was said 
that Sadrach had more than 7000 disciples (Ricklefs 2007,120). His high profile, though, 
incurred some problems. By 1880 all five churches were burned down by Muslim mobs. 
Sadrach was also arrested by the government for instigating his followers not to accept 
the vaccination against smallpox. When released for not having enough evidence of guilt, 
Sadrach returned to an even stronger position among his followers, who named 
themselves as Golongane Wong Kristien kang Mardika (the Group of Independent 
Christians). 
When Sadrach died in 1924, his congregations were dispersed and absorbed by a few 
societies of missionaries already working in Java since the late nineteenth century3 that 
had gathered less success. Around 1909 there were about 5000 Protestant Christians in 
Central Java, Sadrach's followers not included. This is a time period characterized by a 
shift of Christian communities from villages to towns and cities in Central Java. It is also 
a phase when the syncretic Christianity faded, and organizational Christianity based on 
churches, instead of villages, took its hold (Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 677; Akkeren 
1970,138). Subsequently, the phenomena of the relative isolation of Christian 
congregations from the mainstream society would be gradually broken and be succeeded 
by church-initiated projects of hospitals, schools and teacher's seminaries, particularly in 
3 They are NZG. NZV, and NGZV. In addition to them, there was a non-confessional Salatiga mission that 
was supported by Dutch and German evangelizers. Each of them only had a few hundreds converts, except 
NGZV that had several thousands. NGZV handed over its work to GKN (see below). But the Salatiga 
Mission remained independent, and became a force ofGKJTU. Before then, the Salatiga Mission worked 
mainly in rural areas. 
60 
Yogyakarta and Surakarta after 1910. 
The champions of building urban Christian communities were the Christian Church in 
the Netherlands (GKN) and its daughter church Javanese Christian Church (GKJ). In 
Central Java, they were the first to emphasize the necessity to work in urban settings 
(Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 677). Absorbing a large parts of pre-existing three 
mission societies, they also represented a reaction against Sadrach's "Javanized 
Christianity." Facing the relative low growth of Christian populations, they decided to 
provide medical care and schooling to advance their influence in society. GKN initiated 
intensive contacts with the priyai and created a type of congregation that showed self-
confidence and power. Within twenty years after 1910 GKN supervised a number of 
hospitals and well-equipped medical personnel in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, including a 
teacher's seminary that later developed in the present Universitas Kristen Duta Wacana 
(ibd:681). These works have attracted people from Javanese and ethnic Chinese 
backgrounds who had desire for literacy and who became employees of the mission as 
teachers, nurses, or evangelists (see also Kipp 1995, 868). 
It was against this backdrop in the early twentieth century that Muhammadiyah rose 
to emulate Christian strategies to fulfill their aspiration to Islamic reform inspired by 
Middle Eastern thinkers. Its founder Ahmad Dahlan had held deep concerns about the 
poverty of the population and aspired to imitate Christian missionary social work 
especially in the domains of medicine and education (Maarif 1998, 3-4; Schumann 1974. 
7). In fact he had close relationship with Christian missionaries to a point that he was 
called by his Muslim opponents a Kristen putih (''white Christian," white meaning "pious 
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Muslim") (Burhani 2011, 337: Maarif 1998, 3-4). The missionary Elder hence 
commented that Muhammadiyah "patterned after Christian missions and working for the 
spread of education, the care of the poor and sick, and a deeper and purer faith and life" 
(1946, 338). Christians' influence thus partially explained why that it was in this southern 
part of Central Java where Christian hospitals and schools flourished, not the 'hardcore 
Muslim' northern coast (as some may have it), where Muhammadiyah was brought into 
life. 
It is thus fair to say that the earliest form of Christianity in Java had to borrow a local 
Islamic skeleton to invoke new souls, but cropped highly unstable harvest of souls until 
the coming of Christian institutionalization of education and medicine; Muslim reformists 
emulated these organizations, and thrived. But there was one more interesting twist: The 
puzzle about the extreme difficulty and the relative ease of Javanese conversion to 
Christianity prior to the mid-twentieth century was two sides of the same coin: Mass 
conversion to Christianity was difficult unless it was meshed into Javanese sensibilities as 
Javanese identity had been embedded in Islam in general, and all the more so with the 
rise of anti-European sentiments. Christians by and large remained relatively isolated 
from the mainstream social matrix. Were it not for the establishment of schools and 
hospitals, the churches could only expect to win a few souls when the requirements for an 
Islamic identity became too strict. 
There is yet one more surprise out of these early Muslim-Christian dialectical 
developments: the birth of the term abangan. According to Ricklefs (2007, 89-91), the 
term seems to appear not only among Muslims but also among the earliest Javanese 
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Christians4. As early as in 1861 in Mojorworno, East Java, the Javanese Christians were 
calling their Muslim fellows, pious or lax alike, wong abangan (the red one, or the 
profane group), while themselves were named putihan (the white one, or the sacred 
group). In 1885 in Semarang, Central Java, the term was observed to be used in Muslim 
contexts, and later to refer to the profane Muslims or nominal Muslims. 
To sum up, in early periods of evangelization in Java, we have witnessed the interplay 
between local moral dispositions and larger socio-economic transformations at work. The 
social stigma of Christianity as a symbol of an infidel European culture might 
occasionally provide a refugee from harsh charges from revivalist Islam, but Christian 
and Muslim organizations' strategies of providing education and medical care had far-
reaching consequences. Both Islamic reformism and organized Christianity have 
challenged the older ways of integrating ethnic identity and religious identity. Moreover, 
Muslim reformers and Christian missionaries brought revolutionary ideas, particularly 
organizational skills, schooling, medical care, and print media, typically associated with 
Western civilization. Although these religious pioneers already envisaged a more 
normative and bounded purview of their religions, as these ideas became new elements of 
Javanese society, their power would be magnified under the New Order regime, which I 
now turn to. 
Religumization, modernization and pluralization 
4 This was based on the observation recorded in the archives left by the missionary Hoezoo who lived in 
Semarang in Central Java from ] 849 until his death in 1896. 
During the Guided Democracy (1955-1965), the political canopy of NASAKOM (the 
Republic's first President Sukarno's acronym for nationalism, religion, and communism) 
towards the end of the first regime (1945-1965) was a formula meant to contain the rift 
between secularism and religion in formal politics. An abortive communist coup in 
October 1965 reversed this political strategy and led to an outbreak of religious 
fanaticism. In the following months, the military general Suharto rose to power in the 
name of protecting the nation in crisis. As the political shuffling ushered in a vast 
redistribution of power, hatred resulting from recent years of land reform and religious 
divergence was inflamed into killing. The communist party (PKI) was portrayed as the 
top enemy of the nation, and the communist strongholds in Java and Bali became zones 
for bloody execution. In Java, Muslim youth groups worked in conjunction with the 
military, searching out and executing suspects from village to village (Boland 1982, 146; 
Mujiburrahman 2006, 24; Willis 1977, 92; Hefner 1993a, 114). Within a year, half-
million suspected PKI supporters and sympathizers were slaughtered. Soon, a state-
produced film was launched for annual broadcast in schools of all levels; in it 
communists are portrayed as traitors, sexual perverts, and beasts (Wieringa 1992). The 
PKI was not only outlawed but has been remembered ever since as the synonym of 
immorality. 
During Suharto's New Order (1966-1998), religious policies were implemented in 
order to root out any remaining communist ideology. To claim legitimacy, the state 
emphasized its monotheistic, and hence moral, character. Suharto reaffirmed the 
importance of the preamble in the 1945 Constitution, consisting of five (panca) principles 
(sila): belief in One God, humanitarianism, unity, democracy, social justice (Herb Feith; 
Mcvey 2004; Kim 2007; Ramage 1995). Since then, every citizen has been required to 
profess one of five state-recognized religions that fulfilled the requirement of a prophet, 
holy book, and international recognition: Islam, Protestant Christianity, Catholicism, 
Buddhism, or Hinduism (Boland 1982, 231; Mujiburrahman 2006, 27). It is worth 
remembering that after a decade of severe economic recession, the top priority of the new 
state was development-at-all-costs, rather than any theological concern. Nevertheless, 
religious education was viewed as a part of this ambitious project of remaking docile 
citizenry out of the kaleidoscopic, variegated subjects with different religious interests. 
In all educational institutions from elementary school to university, Indonesian 
students received religious instruction according to their respective faith. From their 
textbooks, written exams and supervision, new generations have acquired ideas of the 
absolute importance of formal religiosity as part of the self and of the society. The new 
notion of religions has been elevated to be the unavoidable duty of citizenship, the 
indispensible element of civilization, even a prerequisite of modern humanity. All other 
belief systems outside of world religions were labeled kepercayanan (beliefs), which 
were sometimes associated with derogatory implications, such as "backwardness" and 
"primitiveness" (Atkinson 1983, 685). Having a religion not only meant anti-
communism; it also meant embracing modernity that is consistent with the nationalist 
struggle. Consequently, most populations in remote regions, at least officially, gave up 
their traditional religions for Christianity or Islam (Hoskins 1987, 138). 
Mainstream religions were systematically taught in school and in public discourses 
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that were circulated from civil apparatuses to local neighborhood organizations. Each 
religion was required to have clear boundaries but similar ontological status. Despite their 
differences, they would lead eventually to the same goodness despite the distinctly 
designed paths, or so as it was presented in the national discourses. A metaphor of 
religion as mountain-climbing has become a cliche that people tell among themselves, as 
I still repeatedly heard in Salatiga. All religions are like climbing Mt. Merapi, simply 
some ride motorbikes, some walk, and some drive. 
The discrepancy between developing religious difference within a single nationalism 
was easy to see. Against this background the indoctrination program the Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guide to Comprehension and Practice of the 
Pancasila, or P4) was invented in 1978. P4 was promised to be the glue that connected all 
the fragments of the nation through cultivating the proper nationalist mindset. From civil 
servants to students, peasants to housewives, everyone was provided with the compulsory 
Pancasila course. This program made it explicit that the nature of the nation was not 
rooted in Islam, but monotheism. Furthermore, the idea that pancasila was a distinctively 
Indonesian ideal of pluralism that suited this distinctive country was extended to the de-
politicization of Islam and the protection of minority rights. In short, the ideological tenet 
has become the default formula of pluralism in the country: every monotheistic religion is 
good in itself and superior to atheism, and every citizen of the nation, who by default 
believes in a religion, should peacefully co-exist. 
But religions were not only the moral agent of the modernization and domestication 
projects launched by the state. They are also powerful means for minorities to resist 
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marginalization to wider social system. In Indonesia, churches have strongly supported 
nationalism, not merely for their survival strategies, but also because they share common 
goals with the government: "Monotheism, nuclear family-based economic growth, 
patriarchal domesticity, biomedicine, and intensive agriculture-—all denigrate local 
knowledge and skills" (Aragon 2000:276). This effort is a familiar scene in mainland 
Southeast Asia and Indonesia, where Christianity has enjoyed their greatest success in 
areas not previously claimed by the majority religion (Aragon 2000; Keyes 1977, 21). In 
the cases of the Hmong in the Thai state, the Karen of Burma, and the Tobaku in Central 
Sulawesi, the image and linkage that the Christian faiths serve to bring have elevated the 
highlander's image of self-modernity, and counterbalanced their marginal place in the 
nation without eradicating their distinct identities (Aragon 2000, 310-11; Keyes 1996; 
Tapp 1989, 89). 
In regard to the benefits of Indonesian national integration, Kipp has observed that the 
dissociation between religious and ethnic identities may counterbalances distiction and 
stabilizes a polity consisting of an extremely heterogeneous ethno-religious profile (1993: 
85, 213). Through a series of state policies that promote ethnic pride and religious 
affinity, Christianity may provide a buffer between Muslim populations, Islam can 
mitigate the divides between politically dominant Javanese and non-Javanese 
collectivities, and class issues can also be diverted to a focus on the development of 
cultures and religions. This neatly integrative vision is nevertheless accompanied by more 
complex dynamics of pluralism. Among them, for my purposes here, I first examine the 
contestation between religions and customs in Java, and then shift to Muslim-Christian 
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conflicts beyond ethnic divides. 
Religionization in Java 
As one of the consequences following the 1965 bloodbath in the country, many 
former nominal Muslims in Java whose relatives were killed in the purge started to 
develop complicated feelings toward Islam, particularly after seeing its supporters 
become their persecutors. Under the political pressure to proclaim some formal religious 
affiliation, they started to view Christianity as an ideal option. Others, tired of the "bad 
Muslim" accusation reminiscent of the late nineteenth century santri-abangan conflict in 
the growing resentment of Muslim puritanism in general (Jay 1969, 14-21: Hefner 1985, 
125^41), joined the former's rank. As a result, two million Indonesians converted to 
Christianity, more than a million of them being Javanese (Akkeren 1970; Willis 1977). 
There was even a joke that during the late 1960s, some priests were too busy to baptize 
converts one by one so that they did it with a water hose. 
Absorbing such a great number of converts during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, 
churches in Java soon faced the "statistical Christians" problem (Sumardi 2007, 90-91). 
The influx of nominal Christians started to bother pious Protestants as they saw it as a 
danger that threatened to disintegrate the holiness of Christianity. Sincerity became an 
issue as many new converts merely took refuge in Protestant Christianity to escape 
persecution. Subsequently, church boards had been busy discussing whether "Javanese 
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traditions" such as the slametan—the ritual meal held at passage points in the life cycle, 
on calendrical holidays, at certain stages of the crop cycle, upon changing one's 
residence, and so forth—was compatible with Christianity. 
These scenes of the struggle for drawing boundaries between Christianity and 
traditional customs are familiar to anthropologists, and the rich literature on Christianity 
in Indonesia, is particularly relevant. In Sulawesi, Sumatra and Sumba, anthropologists 
have elaborated the accommodation between Christian ethical values with local magical 
efficacy, a development sometimes resulting in the modern separation between the 
domains of agarna (religion) and adat (cultural customs) or a secularization of the 
customs (Adams 1993; Atkinson 1983; Aragon 2000; Hoskins 1987; Keane 2007; Kipp 
1993). Despite these transitional difficulties, as Atkinson (1983), Kipp (1995) and 
Avargon (2000) have indicated, Christians in Sulawesi and Sumatra have increasingly 
taken their religious identities seriously such that a paradigm of seeing Christianity as an 
alien, inauthentic import imposed by Western missionaries is no longer appropriate. 
The same can be said to Christians living in Java. In the social consequences of 
conversion, initial practical motivations that have little to do with faith may be 
superseded by serious commitment to a religious identity due to changing socio­
economic environments (Hefner 1993b. 122). Pious GKJ members, for example, have 
been consistently sensitive about their traditions and ethnic identity. Although in recent 
decades Indonesian has replaced Javanese to become the dominant language in church 
services, I have seen them sing hymns in High Javanese, stage a Christmas skit of 
Matthew Passion (where Jesus could fluently switch between High and Low Javanese), 
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and play gamelan to celebrate Christmas. But many educated GKJ members feel deeply 
ambivalent towards the ritual slametan. Some are sensitive enough to avoid using the 
term slametan to refer to social gatherings altogether. For them, to name a ritual as the 
way of slamet, the term for the traditional notion of safety and tranquility as well as for 
salvation in the Christian doctrine, is to imply that the ritual itself can bring about slamel, 
and this is ignorant and potentially blasphemous. Ibu Ina, my colleague and an active 
member of GKJ told me: "In fact, if [we] already became Christians, why [are we] still 
doing that [slametan]?" After all, the only path to slamet is through Jesus Christ, and this 
was not negotiable. As a GKJ pastor told me, it was better not to use the term slametan at 
all if someone really feels the urge to hold one. 
Yet, most of them reasoned that there was nothing wrong about a wish to express 
gratitude to God and retain sociality in the community. In order to carry out these rituals 
while being compatible with Christianity. GKJ members have named all the slametan 
syukuran (Indo., the ritual of gratitude) and transformed the ritual content into a form of 
prayer fellowship. Muslim urbanites have a parallel naming tendency in a direction away 
from the instrumentalist connotation the original term implies. Some older GKJ members 
took one step further. They continue to hold ritual meals in Christian manners, but they 
name such events as bidstond (Dutch, prayer meeting). A Dutch name thus guarantees its 
Christian nature, just like an Indonesian name guarantees its modern character. 
The ambivalence towards the slametan could still be felt today among Muslims with 
a stronger reformist purview of Islam in Salatiga. Even among those holding a more 
traditionalist attitude, the practice of the slametan was not entirely unproblematic. In fact. 
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the latter has largely accepted the former's ways of drawing the boundaries between 
religion and customs. Ibu Zulfa, the leader of Aisyiah, expressed to me at her house that 
slametan was not taught by Islam, but by tradition. She did not openly object it, but she 
warned against the danger of polytheism entailed in the ritual. Mbak Nur, a state-run 
madrasa teacher and a member of Fatayat, whose school and place I often frequented, 
held that although slametan was not part of Islam, it was allowed by Islam. She reasoned 
that keeping social reciprocity is a good tradition, as long as people kept in mind that it 
had nothing to do with appeasing local spirits but only with strengthening communal ties. 
This tension between a more normative understanding of Islam and a separated realm 
of local customs was perhaps most obviously felt in the post-funeral memorial rituals on 
the 7th day and 40th day or even 100th day after the departed passed away, typically 
conducted by Muslims in tahhlan (recitation, chanting and prayer on behalf of the 
deceased). Ibu Zulfa, standing from her Muhammadiayh perspective, held a rather 
cautious attitude towards post-funeral rituals. She clearly expressed that once human 
beings died, their souls were handed over to God. People should not believe that they 
could do anything for the soul. Yet, Ibu Zulfa still visited the funerals of Muslims who 
carry out these memorial rituals. In fact, she was often entrusted to wash a woman's body 
in neighborhoods around Graha, if the family had no knowledge to perform such acts5. 
"Whether what kinds of streams [they believe in], I do not pick." 
During my stay in Salatiga, I had attended the Muslim lahlilan as post-funeral 
5 In the past it was the Modin or others with better religious knowledge that performed the washing. 
Nowadays more and more people do it for their family members, as they have learnt proper knowledge to 
conduct the act. 
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memorial rituals several times. One time in April, it was the 7th day post-funeral ritual of 
an old lady in a middle-class neighborhood two miles away from downtown on the way 
to the district of Kauman KiduL where a good friend of mine Melati, a Javanese UKSW 
student, and her family, lived. A tent has been set up right on the alleyway outside the 
deceased family's house, but it was the neighbor's house that was used as kitchen and 
reception. Guests did not arrive until well an hour after Isya. Finally, I sat with fifteen 
middle-aged women on the porch of the house, whereas five men, who were office­
holders of the RT and RW, and a male preacher, sat outside under the tent. Like other 
iahlilan I attended, the ceremony was rather short, about half hour, consisting of prayers, 
a brief statement and a collective chanting that repeated "La illah la illolah.'" which by 
the time I already could follow with ease. 
After the ritual finished with everybody handshaking all around. I asked two women 
who were sitting next to me about the meaning of the ritual. Melati's mother, who was 
the treasurer of PKK in the neighborhood, joined my conversation with other women and 
reassured me that tahlilan was served to console the family members left behind by the 
deceased, and that they did not really mean to do something to the deceased's soul. The 
somewhat defensive reaction of Melati's mother and her neighbors, quite consistent with 
Mbak Nur's comment, manifested the ongoing influence of a more rationalized 
expression of religiosity and awareness that certain types of rituals might well be 
considered problematic by others. Even for practitioners who wanted to keep 
questionable customs, they had to resort to an orthodox language or manner to justify 
their practices. 
Such development of religious consciousness cannot be solely explained by state-
mandated religious education. The broad changes in Indonesian societies also construct 
an environment that is unfriendly to non-orthodox abangan public rituals (Hefner 2011). 
As economic development played a significant role in the spread of Islamic reform and 
Christian development, the correlation of religion, education and modernity was made 
stronger. Urbanization dislocated people but also provided them with new opportunities. 
Side by side with the religious resurgence, there has been an individualistic economic 
ethic sweeping from the urban to the countryside, one profoundly incompatible with the 
traditional village-bounded rituals. Islam and Christianity have served as common 
denominators shared by people of diverse backgrounds in plural urban contexts. Students 
and workers who traveled from afar confront a host of intellectual problems that the old 
cosmology was no longer sufficient to explain. They have thus been more willing to 
embrace orthodox religions for their more awesome powers. Moreover, NU, 
Muhammadiyah and both Catholic and Protestant Christian churches have reached out 
grass roots society by providing formal education and social services as an effective way 
of religionizing society. 
Ethnographic evidence from Sulawesi, Sumatra and Java all indicated that Christian 
churches and Muslim reformism escalated during the New Order and sought to eliminate 
ancestral ritual practices in favor of more "modern" monotheistic ones (Aragon 2000, 
276; Bowen 1993. 327; Brenner1998, 229-236). Both Christian and Muslim institutions 
strived to pull villagers away from their ancestral and animistic orientations toward 
compliance with a more bounded religion and a monotheistic God wielding more 
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magnificent powers. By the late 1980s, overtly syncretistic aspects of the communal 
rituals in Java such as the presentation of offering to village founders (cikal bakal) 
(Geertz 1960, 26; Jay 1963, 33) and those celebrated at ancestral shrines (dhanyang) 
(Geertz 1960, 121-28) that had thrived in the 1950s vanished one by one, as if devoured 
by time (Hefner 1987, 3). Some hostility toward further Islamization from a minority of 
the Javanese had continued in the kebatinan (Javanese mysticism) movement, but no one 
was able to defend the old style of religious worship and make it a "religion" recognized 
by the state (Hefner 1987. 538). Similarly, in Sumba, the attempt to make the ancestral 
worship marapu a religion modeled after Christianity also failed (Hoskins 1987,152). 
This dramatic erosion of the abangan public ritual in recent decades was replaced by 
an accentuated the ethos orang Kristen (Christian) and orang Muslim (Muslims). The 
defense of Islam or Christianity "as a superior ethical code for modern man, as a 
workable social doctrine for modern society, and as a fertile source of values for modern 
culture" (Geertz 1960, 127)—that was once used to describe a minority of pious Muslim 
Javanese only, could be said to apply to a great majority today. The close relationship 
between modernity, heightened religious boundaries and more reflexive religious identity 
thus has left little question about the compatibility between religion and modernity. From 
the very beginning religion has been on the list of "development" alongside economy, 
education and technology. Modernity in Indonesia has reincarnated religions, and 
religions have firmly established their places in the modern world6, contrary to the 
h The intimate relation between modernity and modernized religion is not confined to Indonesia or a 
society governed by an authoritative regime only. In India, for example, modernity and democracy has 
created, and been supported by, increasing orthodox religiosity and hardened religious boundaries (van der 
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previously dominant social theories of secularization (Casanova 1994; Hefner 1998). 
These religious boundaries, again, do not mean that religious identity has been 
flattened and homogenized. Quite to the contrary, the diversity within Christianity and 
Islam was continually shifting and growing, for at least two reasons. Thanks to state 
mandatory religious education and secular education in general, the near-universal 
literacy rate has opened up channels to effectively transmit, circulate, and debate 
religious knowledge. Furthermore, increasing influence from global religious 
communities has been evinced by the generous Middle-Eastern investment and the 
import of Western missionary funds. Along side with the religionization in the religious 
lives, another problem facing societal transformation and integration has been Muslim-
Christian conflict. 
Muslim-Christian conflict: drawing boundaries 
According to some limited but valuable sources of literature, religious differences 
between Christianity and Islam were not a point of conflict in social interactions in the 
1950s, the early 1960s (Akkeren 1970, 136; Soemarjo 1959, 99) (Akkeren 1970, 136; 
Soemarjo 1959, 99) and well into the 1970s (Mohammad 1979, 177). In more recent 
decades, however, clashes have been rendered visible. As mentioned above, Pancasila 
has been provided by the state as an ideological canopy to assure citizens' allegiance to a 
Veer 1994; Hansen 1999). 
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common nation-state based on monotheism. Nevertheless, such imposition of abstract 
harmony was often not so much a solution but rather a conceptual pause on differences. 
Furthermore, such formal pluralism may even failed to supersede inherent conflicts from 
time to time. A good example would be the Muslim-Christian controversy of "religious 
freedom" in the late 1970s. 
With regard to religious freedom, Pancasila has promised different things to different 
constituencies. Christians have interpreted Pancasila as the right to choose religion and 
to change one's religion (Sidjabat 1960, 288), the very presumption of missionary work. 
By contrast, Muslims have read Pancasila as permission for religious diversity, rather 
than a license to total religious freedom. As Mujibrahman (2006) demonstrates, 
underlying this conflict was a Muslim fear of "Christianization" of the nation in tandem 
with a Christian anxiety over "an Islamic state." Muslim activists lobbied the Department 
of Religious Affairs to restrict the activity of Christian missionizing in Muslim-majority 
areas; Christian activists accused these Muslims' acts of violating the spirit of Pancasila. 
Eventually, the Ministry of Religion concluded in favor of the Islamic viewpoint by 
issuing the 1978 decrees stating that it was forbidden to direct a new religion to a person 
or persons who already had another religion (No. 70). Moreover, the Department of 
Religious Affairs also had the right to manage foreign Christian funds and to issue 
permits to foreign missionaries (No. 77). Special permission is required to build a new 
church in a predominantly Muslim area. 
The controversy surrounding religious freedom was settled on paper, but in reality it 
never was. Christian missionizing did not stop, although it did become cautious. 
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Whenever churches received new converts who "already had another religion," 
evangelizers had to emphasize that it was thoroughly voluntary act on the part of 
converts. Church establishment has continued to be a problematic social issue, as 
perceived by both Muslims and Christians. More details on the politics of building church 
in Muslim lands will be examined in chapter 2. Here, suffice it to say that the term 
"Christianization" (Kristenisasi) has continued to be a haunting catch phrase that 
denigrated the missionary activities of Christians and has been a hard word to hear for 
both Muslims and Christians. 
The measures taken to prevent Kristenisasi even played a part of reforming marriage 
laws. In 1974. the new Marriage Act implied that two parties of different religions should 
not be married. Thus, each religion should maintain its own endogamous community and 
should be vigilant about the consequences about "apostasy or conversion via marriage.'' 
In line with these segregationist policies, in the early 1980s, the MUI (Indonesian 
Council of Islamic Scholars) issued a fatwa that forbid cross-religious prayers and 
attending rituals not of one's religion. Inter-religious conflict was raised as an issue 
among Muslim circles in the early 1990s. The Muhammadiyah Congress held in 1990 
and an article it published the same year, for example, expressed the anxiety over the 
advancement of Christianity (Muhammadiyah 1991:104-105, cited in Kim 2007:183): 
As we witness in Indonesia, Protestants and Catholics have spread their religion 
professionally. For two decades since the installation of the New Order Government, 
we have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of these two religions: the increase in 
the percentage of Christians, many churches and the spread of schools [established 
by Christians]. 
Such a comment reflected a competitive spirit among Muslim reformers to be more 
competent in the arenas of schooling and proselytizing. Nevertheless, one thing that this 
comment may obscure is that since the 1980s the growth rates of both Christian schools 
and churches have actually decreased compared to the previous decades. Some of the 
crucial reasons for this development were the Islam-favoring policies such as the decrees 
we just discussed, and the expansion of Islamic infrastructure in society in general. 
Islamic resurgence and new streams 
Inter-religious tension and religious organizations during the New Order regime were 
systematically repressed and harnessed with a series of de-politicization measures. 
Political parties of different interests were forced to merge in the 1980s so the probability 
for oppositional parties to thrive was effectively diminished; all religious organizations 
were forced to base their philosophy on Pancasila rather than their own religious creeds; 
and the policy of "normalization" on campus forbade any political networks among 
students. 
Like the Dutch colonial policy, the New Order regime in its first two decades had 
tolerated "cultural Islam" but was cautious about all forms of political Islam, if not 
always capable of successfully putting them under control. Ironically, thanks to the New 
Order regime's relatively impressive success in promoting the economy, its 
implementation of religious education at all levels of schooling, and its sponsorship of the 
Muslim-favored, proselytizing-oriented Department of Religious Affair, the regime 
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would face a widespread Islamic resurgence that Dutch never saw. This is partially 
because the promotion of personal piety through education paradoxically generated an 
increasing tide of moral critique of the government (Rahmat and Najib 2001). The 
repressive policy on campus effectively prohibited explicit political activity but 
unwittingly benefited Muslims precisely because religious organizations were less 
heavily controlled by the state. An unintended consequence of this was that Islam came 
to be seen as an alternative to the seriously circumscribed political structure and an 
antidote to dictatorship (Collins 2004; Hefner 2000). As the 1990s marked the peak of the 
Islamic resurgence. Islamic discourses of democratization were widespread among anti-
government social movements, particularly among activists from NU and 
Muhammadiyah. 
This pro-democracy Islamic movement was accompanied by the rise of conservative 
Islam. During the last decade of the New Order regime, the force of Islamic resurgence 
pushed President Suharto to take an unprecedented "Islamic turn," co-opting conservative 
Muslim leaders in order to split the pro-democracy alliance, financing militant Muslim 
groups, and rebuilding his legitimacy under the banner of Islam (Hefner 2000). This 
political move was reinforced by the increasing religious influence from the Middle East 
since the 1980s (Hasan 2002: 145), together contributing to the eruption of Islam into the 
political landscape even after the regime collapsed. 
The fall of the New Order was precipitated by the aftermath of 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis. In 1998, Indonesia lost 13.5 percent of its GDP in 1998. The exchange rate 
between the rupiah and the dollar, previously being roughly 2000 rupiah to 1 USD, had 
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plunged to over 18000 rupiah to 1 USD. The consequent financial gridlock led to serious 
problems of factory closure, unemployment, and frozen banking system. The poverty 
rate, having fallen to less than 14 percent of the population in early 1997, moved towards 
40 percent in late 1998. Although sound fiscal policy remains one of the New Order's 
achievements, the scale of the crisis overwhelmed the measures that the macro-
economists were able to devise (Dijk 2001; Hefner 2000: 198). With inflation continuing, 
resentments from all sides permeated the society and demonstrations paralyzed Jakarta, 
with young veiled Muslim women activists in as a familiar sight on the front lines 
(Smith-Hefner 2007: 398). Following the May riots in Jakarta, where a dozens of ethnic 
Chinese were killed and raped and buildings destroyed, Muslim leaders of NU and 
Muhammadiyah allied with others leaders altogether urged Suharto to step down. The 
New Order regime was officially ended in May. 
Yet, the multi-dimensional crisis continued to ravage Indonesia after the fall of the 
New Order. Among the casuses, we should mention the mushrooming of militant Islam 
groups and severe ethno-religious violence across the country between 1998 and 2003. 
Taking the now-disbanded Islamic paramilitary Laskar Jihad for example, its roots were 
in apolitical and puritanical Salafist movements. Already in the mid-1980s the so-called 
Salafi Da'wa movement expanded rapidly on university campuses and mosques. Young 
men openly wore long beards (lihya). Arab-style flowing robes (jalabiyya), turbans 
{imama), and young woman wore enveloping black veil (niqab) in public. They called for 
a return to the Qu'ran and Sunna in order to combat the moral decay of the society and 
the corruption of the state. To expand their da 'wa (proselytizing) movement, they 
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obtained generous funding from Saudi Arabia7 to construct new mosques, orphanages, 
hospitals, and madrassas, distribute free copies of the Qur'an and other books, and train 
preachers (Hasan 2007:88). The funding also created a cluster of Middle Eastern-
educated intellectuals who zealously isseminated and defended what they saw as "true 
Islam." Accordingly, they distinguished themselves from other mainstream Muslim 
organizations, particularly NU and Muhammadiyah, criticizing the latter as betrayers of 
the spirit of Islam (Hasan 2007: 91). 
This group took a stark shift from apolitical quietism to realpolitik dogmatism and 
formed Laskar Jihad, as the regime transition in 1998 left a power vacuum that 
precipitated intense competition among various groups over seizing the newly opened 
prize in the political realm. Laskar Jihad has been particularly notorious for sending 
members ready to martyr themselves to the Ambon civil war in early 2000s for 
combating the Christian force. At the end of March 2001 they even enforced a rajm 
(stoning) sentence against a member who committed rape in Ambon in order to prove that 
they are indeed ready to espouse shari 'a. Along with other political Islamic forces, they 
asserted that the enforcement of the shah 'a is the best solution to curb the various 
problems and disasters afflicting contemporary Indonesia. 
The scenes of religion-turned-politics obtained its tragic expression in the severe 
ethno-religious violence in five provinces following the collapse of New Order in 1998. 
Muslim-Christian violence in Sulawesi, Ambon and the Malakku was particularly 
7 This is related to the Salafiyya (purification) movement in the Middle East since the 1970s and its call to 
return to the tradition. 
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devastating (Klinken 2007), as they resulted in hundreds of thousands of casualties and 
refugees. In the case of Ambon, it reached the scale of a civil war that virtually destroyed 
the infrastructure of the city. After 2003. ethno-religious violence and Islamist militant 
groups have lost their momentum in the ongoing institutional consolidation of democracy 
and reconstruction of civic pluralism. Nevertheless, the rampant ethno-religious rivalries 
erupted so fast and ferocious that one wonders whether the indoctrination of Pancasila 
was ever translated well into sustainable social structures of civic pluralism. The formal 
pluralism that had been advocated for three decades proved a lot weaker than it had 
seemed. 
Alongside this continuing religious transformation came the arrival of a new era of 
democratization and a policy of decentralization. The new laws have endowed local 
districts with expanded authority and autonomy. One result is that in West Java and South 
Sumatra, there are districts which have already implemented certain Islamic laws 
(Robinson and Bessell 2002). In some areas of Indonesia certain alleged "Islamic laws" 
find their most visible manifestation in regulations on women, new policies surrounding 
female mobility (the ban against women staying outside at night), appearance (the 
mandatory rules of the veil), and behavior (the demanded avoidance of bodily contact 
with males such as shaking hands). This raises urgent questions as to how gender 
relations will be effected in the larger Islamic trends, and how women will respond to the 
religious change and its consequences, whether being Muslim or Christian. 
Reflecting on this recent turbulent history, leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah, 
which now claim 30 million and 29 million members respectively, have made a deeper 
commitment to combat the forces of what they view as radical Islam, including ultra-
conservative Islam and political Islam. Already since the 1980s they have renounced the 
myth of an Islamic state, geared their primary attention towards improvement of 
education, public health, and care for the poor, and led Muslims organizations in general 
toward involvement in social welfare on an unprecedented scale. With regard to women's 
rights, Muhammadiyah has been dedicated to women's education since the early 
twentieth century, where the women's wing of NU Fatayat has been famous for its 
progressive Muslim feminist thoughts (Rinaldo 2008). In the post-Suharto era, NU and 
Muhammadiyah had just one more common enemy: not the already vanished 
authoritative regime, but the threat of radical Islam. Although many factional differences 
remained, compared to decades ago, the boundaries between Muhammadiyah and NU 
have become more porous. 
As I will show throughout this dissertation, in Salatiga, the conspicuous presence of 
Christianity has brought the followers from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds even 
closer, particularly in the women's voluntary neighborhood Koranic groups. To 
understand the inter-play between Islam and Christianity, not just in Salatiga but in many 
major cities where Christians are a prominent minority, I now turn to an outline of the 
recent trends of Christian movements in Indonesia. 
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Christian Charismatic movements 
Religious expression and diversity mushroomed and thrived all the more in the 
democratic era, and they were not confined to the walls of family or any boundaries that 
define the private domain. Rather, they become sites of contestation and conflicts in the 
public sphere. As Sidney Jones commented in a recent report (2010). religious tolerance 
in Indonesia has become an urgent issue, "particularly where hardline Islamists and 
Christian evangelicals compete for the same ground." 
The term evangelical is a problematic one that can encompass both fundamentalism 
and Pentecostalism. It is, however, a mistake to conflate the two, despite some shared 
features (Freston 2001, 288). Here I follow Cox (1995, 310), Riesebrodt (1993, 45-46) 
and Robbins' criteria (2004, 123) that separate Christian fundamentalism and charismatic 
Pentecostalism. The former emphasizes the authority of the Bible in a literalist command 
to live by a strict ethical code and reject the belief in unmediated human contacts with the 
Holy Spirit, whereas Pentecostal believers receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit and obtain 
ecstatic experience such as speaking in tongues, healing, and prophecying. In what 
follows, I will confine my discussion to Pentecostalism only. 
In Indonesia, the earliest presence of classical Pentecostalism can be traced to the 
missionizing of the Bethel Temple church from Seattle, USA, in 1921. Since then 
Pentecostalism remained a marginal denomination, although limited evidence suggested 
that there was an impressive growth due to the convergence between the post-1965 mass 
conversion and the arrival of US-based neo-Pentecostal movements in the 1970s 
(Aritonang and Steenbrink 2008, 687). In the 1980s, the post-anti-communist period of 
mass Christian conversion ended, for there was no longer a widely approved cultural-
political incentive to convert to Christianity. What took over the scene in the Christian 
landscape was the expansion of Pentecostal ism, its ethnically pluralistic congregations, 
and its international connections. 
The legacies of universal education and mandatory religious education have equally 
contributed to the Christian revivals. As described above, for many, Christian identity has 
been accepted as a serious part of self-identity. Young people growing up began to regard 
mainline churches as listless, soulless places to worship God. The resurgence was also 
accelerated by the import of the so-called theology of prosperity in the 1980s (Aritonang 
and Steenbrink 2008, 892). This theology was first introduced by American authors such 
as Norman Vincent Peale, Kenneth Hagin and Robert Schuller, and then propagated in 
Asia especially by Paul (who later becomes David) Yonggi Cho from Korea. One of his 
prominent disciples in Indonesia is Yakub Nahuway, later the chairperson of the Mawar 
Sharon (see below), a rapidly developing denomination in college towns across 
Indonesia. 
Pentecostal ism today is no longer a marginal phenomenon in Indonesia. In terms of 
its size, Aritonang and Steenbrink suggest that among around 17 million members of the 
Protestant churches, at least 6 million are Pentecostals, including those who were still 
registered in mainline churches (2008:882-83). They believe that this number will 
become bigger if we count those fellowships with charismatic styles present within the 
mainline churches since the early 1970s. They even predict that Pentecostals in Indonesia 
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would soon become "the first power" within the Christian communities in Indonesia, 
instead of "the third power" after the Roman Catholic and the mainline Protestant 
churches. 
Commentators have recently pointed out that the Pentecostal churches are "far more 
ethnically inclusive and appealing than their mainline predecessors" (Nagata 2005:114), 
and are "multi-ethnic and highly indigenized, expansive" (Robinson 2005, 342). 
Although among the pioneers (see Cooley 1968) and current leadership in Java, Chinese 
Indonesians are well represented, the most successful congregations have not presented 
themselves as having an exclusive ethnic identity. In fact, they have worked against such 
association. My first contact with Pentecostal Indonesian was a Javanese teacher who I 
met in United States before my fieldwork. In her introduction of the conversion of her 
family and her engagement in the church activism, she never mentioned different ethnic 
groups as a constitutive factor of the congregation, to such a point that I was utterly 
surprised by what I witnessed in person later in Java. Many Javanese leaders have been 
among the high ranks of spiritual leaders of Pentecostal congregations. The father of 
Tiberius church, for example, is known to be a "pure" Javanese, and their congregations 
have a mixed profile of both ethnic Chinese and Javanese leaders and members. This 
certainly does not mean that ethnicity is no longer sociologically important. Quite to the 
contrary, it is due to the reality of living with ethnic tensions that a religiosity 
downplaying ethnicity has an additional appeal. Regardless of ethnicity, converts were 
former Catholics, ethnic church members and even non-Christians such as Buddhist and 
Confucianists, and to a lesser degree, Muslims. 
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The success of Pentecostalism can be internally linked to the ways believers spread 
and sustain their religion. The self-aware, emotional-charged transformation in 
motivating conversion is crucial. In 1986, the anthropologist Kipp recorded conversion 
stories of three Karo Pentecostal evangelists in the North Sumatra region. These stories 
traced a similar pattern describing either "a string of serious, intractable illnesses, 
depraved living, depression and angst...followed by an encounter with the Holy Ghost 
and its "baptism by fire" that had healed and totally reoriented the individual's life" (Kipp 
1995. 869). This dramatic self-willed conversion pattern contrasts greatly with the 
mainline ethnic churches following Dutch Reformed traditions that considered 
conversion should not occur prior to a sufficient period of study. The cheerful clapping 
and dynamic entertaining worship atmosphere also has constantly attracted members to 
stay in the church communities. Pentecostalism thus provides an advanced path to deepen 
a pre-existing Christian identity that was acquired originally out of practical reasons such 
as abiding by state policies. 
These new trends notwithstanding, it is too early to say that ethnic mainline churches 
will be buried in the new trend. Some of them have already incorporated limited 
charismatic ways of worship, but many still cherish their own solemn and sedate services. 
A third-year UKSW student and a GKJ member, after a class in which I gave a speech on 
campus, told me that "T do not feel calm in charismatic church. Only in a quiet place like 
55 (the nickname of the GKJ building across the campus) can I feel God." Similarly, Pak 
Gigih, a good friend of mine, also a Father RT in his neighborhood and an active 
participant in a GKJ congregation, one day in our casual visit to the mountain areas near 
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the city, said "I can dance and cry like them (Pentecostals), too. The atmosphere is there, 
exciting (seru). But what about afterwards? Can (we) find God there?" On the other 
hand, the director of the Gender Studies Center at UKSW expressed that "Sometimes I go 
to Catholic churches, sometimes GKJ, sometimes Bethany. No problem," showing a 
relative open-minded attitude. 
It is clear that the streams within Christianity are no less heterogeneous than those 
flowing in Islam. In addition to Catholic churches, mainline churches and the rising 
Pentecostal congregations, there are also smaller communities of Seventh-day Adventist. 
Baptists and Mennonite. Yet almost all of them have felt the influence of Pentecostalism. 
The trend is all the more clear in the post-Suharto era, as many former Catholics, 
Calvinistic Protestants and some non-Christians have converted to Pentecostalism. 
Meanwhile, an intensification of the schism among Pentecostal congregations, a tendency 
that has been consistently present since 1930s, is also underway. As the direct heir of the 
Bethel Temple church from Seattle, the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia (GPdl) 
experienced at least a dozen splits in the last century. The most recent development is the 
split of the Bethany church, the Tiberias church and the Mawar Sharon church between 
2003 and 2004 from GBI (the Bethel Church in Indonesia), which itself has gained 
independence from the GPdl geneology in 1971. Despite the schism, cross-denomination 
gatherings often take place, sometimes involving coordination with mainline churches as 
well. Despite the diversity and difference, the communication among different 
congregations has continued. While GKJ and Catholic churches increasingly feel the 
pressure to adopt more "charismatic" means to keep their sheep, some of them also 
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openly invite Pentecostal preachers as guest speakers. 
Conclusion 
Reconstructing a generative history of the religious streams in Javanese society in 
order to historicize the place of''normative Islam" and "charismatic Christianity" in Java 
today, this chapter argues that the plural streams within both Islam and Christianity have 
become more "religionized" and self-aware. These religious movements represent and 
reshape the complex developments of modernity in Indonesia, which include state-
mandated religious education and compulsory profession of a world religion, a modern 
political economy that has favored religious networks of "universalis! religions" over 
"localized cults," mass education and media technology that contributed to near-universal 
literacy rate and provide an open channel to effectively transmit and circulate knowledge, 
and an intensifying exchange with global religious communities. 
The religious architecture and worship facilities in Salatiga have well represented these 
purling streams that have carved their way through the Indonesian religious landscape in 
recent decades. In the city, some brooks are running louder than others. Different kinds of 
social riverbeds also have guided and limited the flows. To wade into the water, 
sometimes clear, other times muddy, the chapter that follows assesses the different social 
footings and religious aspirations of mainstream Muslims and charismatic Christians in 
Salatiga with regard to establishing religious facilities. 
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Chapter 2 Under the Same Shadow 
"Your quality is like foam adrift in the middle of the sea. 
This chapter probes the inter-subjective and dialectical developments of the 
Pentecostal and Islamic discourses about worship facilities. It contends that Salatiga's 
religious landscape over the last three decades has been most forcefully transformed by 
the heightened Islamic public awareness, growing Pentecostal congregations, and 
ascendant inter-religious tension. Accordingly, this chapter aims to map out the rapidly 
changing components of the religious terrains and outlines perceptible competition about 
religiosity and prosperity between Christian and Muslim communities. 
The miscellaneous religious architectures represent the religious heterogeneity of 
Salatiga with different degrees of visibility. Put in a simplified dichotomy, most mosques 
were immediately recognizable, if not remarkable. By contrast, charismatic churches 
were often small, if not barely noticeable. Fendi's worship hall was hidden in a once 
abandoned theater, a plaster building amid a few canteens, shops, and a motor repair store 
in a quiet corner of downtown. A small banner with the church's name on it was hung 
above the entrance, surrounded by six-foot tall aluminum fence. The inconspicuous 
appearance would easily lead a motorbike driver pass by without leaving any impression. 
Not far from this place. Ester's worship hall was located within a renovated dormitory 
above a parking lot. A larger banner was hung above the entrance, with more explicitly 
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displayed schedule of worship activities. Nevertheless, from outside it still looked very 
much like a dormitory. No cross on the roof, and no green courtyard —the two 
characteristics that typically marked the buildings of mainline churches, many of which 
were also located in the downtown area. 
In contrast to their plain exteriors, the interiors of Ester and Fendi's worship halls 
were gorgeous. In Ester's, two symmetrical rolls of velvet banners were neatly 
juxtaposed on the two sides of the front altar, with different captions on them such as 
micijal (an Arabic-derived Indonesian word, the standard translation of'"miracles" in the 
Indonesian bible), bahasa rah ("glossolalia"), rendah hati ("humbleness"), and so on. In 
Fendi's, the hall was maintained as if it were a professional concert stadium. The altar 
was at the bottom, enclosed by rows of performance lighting devices. In a service, one 
could stand at the entrance at the top and oversee the hali, feeling the rumbling of live 
gospel rock and dazzling video montages in the slightly darkened space resplendent with 
colored lighting. 
While I was collecting founding stories of Ester and Fendi. an emphasis that the 
pioneers "had never planned to build a church" stood out. As the pastor of Ester church of 
Salatiga Pak Toni revealed to me: 
I had never planned to build a church, or even to become a pastor. It was merely one 
day in 1990 that I dreamed that this place had become a church. At the same time I 
saw the name "Ester" right there, and I had not even heard of the name yet. What is 
this Ester? I asked. It was only after that I asked my friends whether they had heard 
of the Ester churches, and they said it was in Surabaya. Oh really, I see, I said. And 
then I just forgot. I did not care. Several years later I was encouraged by a spiritual 
mentor (Bapak Rohcmi) from Ester in Semarang to organize a bible study group 
{Family Altar, or FA). When we had the FA, we were often called and asked by 
many different people, "you guys want to build a church right?" "Absolutely not," 1 
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always said. We were just a small worship group. But the mentor kept telling me 
"this will become a church. It definitely will." Well, I did not believe it...We did not 
have the place or money...So really, it was a miracle. "Unless the Lord builds the 
house, the builders labor in vain" (Psalm 127:1). 
The official document of the founding story of Fendi church tells a different story 
but still stresses the "unplanned" motif. In fact, a section in the document is explicitly 
titled "no intention towards church-building" (tiduk ada arah ke gereja). It traces the 
origin of the church in the late 1990s to a few enthusiastic teens who wished to inspire 
urban youths to meet their expectation of Salatiga as "a Christian city." The 16-year old 
leader of the worship group was approached and encouraged by a pastor from Semarang 
to initiate a church. The young leader rejected the idea, and even disbanded the 
fellowship and ordered his followers to return to their original churches. It turned out 
they did not. As a result, this young leader felt responsible. He said to himself: "I am the 
one who has made them reborn, I should also be the one who raises them up." The story 
thus reveals the stance of Fendi that it has no intention to compete with other churches, 
yet the church had to be built for those souls that only they can save. It is simultaneously 
a justification for their existence, and a challenge to other churches for being "not 
Christian enough." 
The occurrences prior to church-planting are widely narrated and celebrated in public 
as mujizai, or miracles, in Salatiga and Indonesia as a whole. The renovation of the old 
church building of Gereja Bethal Indonesia (GBI) Johar, for example, was said to realize 
a prophecy that was predicted back in 2000 and other miracles in the last decade; the 
Pentecostal Church of Isa-Almasih (Isa-Almasih, Arabic. "Jesus the Messiah") also 
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boasted a couple of miraculous stories concerning its renovation, including the 
mysterious donation that rescued the project when it was held in abeyance. All of these 
occurences are invariably understood in private, and celebrated in public, as mujizat, or 
miracles. 
Outside of Salatiga, the founding story of the Pentecostal Church in Indonesia in the 
town of Rungkut of Surabaya features a Pastor who was described as recalcitrant but who 
eventually surrendered to God's calling. When he encountered difficulty in securing a 
location for his congregation, it is said that God literally led him and his wife on a 
motorbike to "the right place." The official permission for the new church building was 
obtained only after some difficulties, but it is still celebrated as a mujizat. Later the 
building project was short of funds, but suddenly someone appeared during the pastor's 
nap time to donate a large sum of money. One more example of an initial recalcitrance 
was the founding pastor of the Church of Tiberias, Yesaya Pariadji. He self-identified as 
someone who "time and again rejected God's calling." In the document of the church 
history, the pastor opened it by saying that "The church of Tiberias is the church of power 
and miracles. A church is founded not based on human wisdom, but on revelation that 
was given directly from the Heaven." Comparable examples are abundant, but suffice it 
to say that these narratives consistently resort to divine intervention as the prime mover 
of ministry-calling and church-founding. 
Although the narration of miracles is a hallmark of the global Pentecostal repertoire, 
what stands out these stories is the way they are implicated in the local politics of 
recognition. As Coleman remarks on the politics of Pentecostalism (Coleman 2000, 39), 
the logic of Christians' self-position is locally variegated. In Latin America, it is 
inevitably influenced by conflicts between the Catholic hierarchy and Protestant activists; 
in many parts of Africa today, the ideological wars between Christianity and Islam; and in 
Europe, the threat from the far right and atheism. 
Pentecostalism thus cannot be viewed as a singular project of cultivating the 
techniques of the self in different societies. Instead different modalities seem to be 
present in the ways that Pentecostalism has become a simultaneously transcultural and 
local phenomenon. One of the significances of the miracle narratives in Salatiga is 
precisely its engagement in the local struggle for church-planting in the predominantly 
Muslim environment. 
Part of the struggle of churches is intensified due to the fact that the law regarding 
worship place makes minority religions more vulnerable. In Muslim-majority areas, 
Islamic facilities do not seem to be affected. Over the recent decades, mosques have 
sprouted along the roads between districts, neighborhoods and hamlets at almost a 
lightning speed (see chart 1). When I was living within the easy walking distance of the 
Sinaran neighborhood, the residents were excited about the project of the renovation of 
their mosque and a new Islamic center under construction next to it. During maulud (the 
celebration of the Prophet's birthday) held after the Isa prayer on February 27th, 2010, the 
head of the mosque board proudly announced the progress of the center. He expressed 
that the project would make the old mosque grander and help the local Islamic education 
to be more effectively carried out. "Hopefully, the umat in the local society will benefit 
from this center, and the children and the youth will learn to obey religious teachings." 
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the head paused, as the 180 congregants gathered in the mosque unanimously responded 
"Amin." 
There was an important Muslim cliche that captures succinctly the way the 
normative narratives calling for the "correct" religious life was still rattling like a 
bulldozer in local neighborhoods. Ibu Eka, an active member of women's Koranic 
sermon group in Sinaran would say, "According to religious law, it is our obligation to 
shalat (perform the prayer) in the mosque as an umat, no?" Active participants in the 
Koranic sermon sessions held an ardent wish that shalat be practiced by every Muslim, a 
request that was unthinkable twenty years ago. When they mentioned establishing an 
Islamic facility, they rather righteously claim it as part of their duties (kewajihar). "This 
is obligatory," the madrasa teacher and ustadza (female Muslim preacher) in her late 
twenties, Mbak Nur, explaind to me, 
As Muslims we have to build places to worship God. After all, shalat is the most 
important thing for an individual Muslim. If one does not shalat, one already 
commits a sin. For men, shalat in a mosque on Friday is obligatory...Well, one can 
usually do the shalat at home, but on Friday a man should go to the mosque. God 
has made it clear that we have to worship collectively in a mosque. To show we are a 
united umat. 
When Mbak Nur recounted to me that eight years ago her neighborhood in the outskirts 
of Salatiga finally had gathered enough funding to build their own mosque and ever after 
exempted them from visiting the one in the neighboring RT, she could not disguise her 
obvious pride for her neighborhood. 
The joy over owning a mosque for one's neighborhood, of course, does not mean 
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that Salatiga is currently short of mosques. The reality is quite the opposite. As in other 
Muslim-majority cities, practically the density of mosques in Salatiga is saturated to a 
point where the broadcasts of the adzan (call for prayer, Ar. adhari) of multiple mosques 
have penetrated every corner of the city, often in discordant tones mixed with one 
another. It is therefore not to accommodate a large numbers of Muslims per se that more 
mosques have been built. The reasons behind are closely linked to the changing religious 
landscape that is imbued with the inter-religious competition. 
Changing religious landscape in Salatiga 
This rise of Ester and Fendi congregations reflects a larger charismatic Christian 
movement in Indonesia since the 1980s. In the last chapter I mention that in the 1980s, 
the period of mass Christian conversion ended, and Indonesia experienced an 
unprecedented Islamic resurgence. But Christianity did not remain static. Mainline 
Protestants, evangelicals, Catholics. Buddhists, and to a much lesser degree Muslims, 
began to convert to Pentecostalism. Almost like a parallel development of the children of 
abangan (nominal Muslims) becoming santri (pious Muslims), the offspring of mainline 
church members are becoming born-again Christians. 
Within the Ester congregation in Salatiga, the primary pastor (pendeta) was a former 
Catholic, whereas his wife, the young pastor (pendeta muda), was a former member of 
the Indonesian Christian Church (or GKI). In general, it is not uncommon among 
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members to have GKI. Catholic, GKJ backgrounds. Meanwhile, some senior leaders 
from GKJ have complained to me in private that many of their younger members were 
switching their enrollment to charismatic churches. Still others have continued their 
formal registration in mainline churches, while switching their spiritual allegiance to one 
or more charismatic churches. This situation has made statistical evaluation difficult. 
Moreover, as many members of charismatic churches are university students, they often 
leave upon graduation and thereby constantly alter the size of congregation. Despite these 
factors, charismatic churches usually meticulously documented the growth of their 
congregation. Ester started with 7 members in 1995, when it was only a prayer group. 
Today it has more than 300 registered members. Fendi began with 6 people in 1998 and it 
has harvested more than 150 today. 
Ester and Fendi belong to different higher national organizations respectively, which 
were the genealogical products of periodic schisms of an older church body. The church 
organization that Ester belongs to is one of the fastest-growing churches in Indonesia, 
whereas the "brand" that Fendi affiliates with has focused on college towns across the 
nation. As 1 mentioned earlier, a common statement that justifies conversion is that in 
Pentecostalism, "spirituality can grow stronger" {kerohanian lebih bertumbuh). Javanese 
converts have had greater obstacles to conversion, and some never obtained the approval 
or forgiveness of their family. For example, a male convert in Ester was renounced by his 
Muslim parents until their death, and they left him no inheritance. The most thorough 
conversion of an entire family often comes from the experience of miraculous healing (of 
infertility, tumors, cancer, etc.), or from members who are the first-generation middle-
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class who decided to share their prosperity stories with their family. There are also a 
small number of Batak, Manado. and Ambonese as well, many of whom were students or 
teachers in the city. Regardless of ethnicity, new converts from Christian backgrounds 
unanimously told me the reason they went to Pentecostal churches now was because the 
style of their mainline church service was ngantuk (sleepy ) and membosankan (boring). 
By contrast, the worshipping style in Pentecostal churches is highly emotionally charged, 
exciting and even spectacular (seru). 
In the city, the most visible change is nevertheless not the activity that has taken place 
inside the churches, but the mushrooming of the shops displaying a pied collection of 
headscarves, the ever longer string of traffic jam approaching main mosques for Friday 
prayer, and indeed the many more mosques themselves. The change in terms of 
infrastructure is rather dramatic. While the proportions of religious population since the 
1970s (see chart 1) have achieved equilibrium to a great degree within the relatively 
consistent size of the population, the number of worship facilities has grown 
astonishingly. Protestant churches achieved an impressive growth rate, namely 227% 
since 1980 (from 22 to 72 buildings). More than any other worship places, however, 
mosques have had the highest growth rate. 642% since 1980 (from 26 to 193 buildings, 
see chart 2). This development is particularly striking since mosques and churches have 
fundamentally different social ecologies to begin with. While larger mosques in the cities 
serve wider congregations, most mosques are embedded in local neighborhoods, and thus 
they are structurally different from churches that are not based on territorial relations. 
Hence it would be a false comparison to directly consider the proportion of the number of 
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worship facilities to the religious population per capita and say that Protestant Christians 
have a slight advantage. Furthermore, there is incentive to not build more mosques 
precisely because of the embeddedness of Islam in neighborhoods, where the smallest 
neighborhood units have already obtained sufficient facilities. Taking this discrepant 
ecology into account, the skyrocketing growth of mosques in this "Christian city" is all 
the more impressive. 
Meanwhile, the number of pilgrims departing to Mecca increased from 213 to 322 
from 2002 to 2006. Although the total number of pilgrims is still small due to the high 
expenses beyond the financial capacity of the majority, this growth rate of pilgrims (50%) 
is double the average growth rate of pilgrims in Central Java (25%) since 2002. In fact, if 
one knew that in 1976 there were only four pilgrims out of the entire city, one would be 
amazed to hear that there have been almost 300 haji (pilgrims to Mecca) every year in the 
last decade (see Chart 3). 
Along with this tide of Islamization, there are emerging Muslim proselytization 
groups striving to 'awaken the consciousness of the umai in Salatiga,' who are not 
content with the status quo in which "Salatiga is under the shadow of Christianity" 
(Salatiga. Di Bawah Bayang-bayang Kristen). They intend to reform the city, making it 
"a city of pious Muslims" (Komunitas Santri Salatiga on the net 2008). This discourse 
about "the shadow of Christianity" manifested in a large-scale protest that took place on 
March 2nd, 2008. Five thousand Muslims from various Islamic organizations— 
Indonesian Networks of Mosque Youth (JRMI), Muslim Students Association (HMI), 
Union of Indonesian Muslim Students Action (KAMMI), Student Movement of 
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Indonesian Islam (PMII), Ansor (the youth branch of Nahdlatul Ulama or NU, the largest 
Muslim organization in Indonesia), and Pemuda Muhammadiyah (the youth wing of the 
largest reformist organization in the country), together coordinated by the Indonesian 
Islamic Scholar Council (MUI) of Salatiga—gathered in the Mosque of Al-Atiq Kauman 
to protest against Salatiga's incumbent Christian mayor over the use of a piece of land 
called Salib Putih by the Javanese Christian Church. Until today the dispute remains 
unsettled. Yet, the repercussion of this mass protest was to revive the magic word 
"Kristenisasi" (Christianization) that has long haunted the nation and still can easily 
disturb the feelings of Muslims and Christians alike. 
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The inter-religious fear in the global and national context 
Christian missionizing in Muslim-majority areas in Indonesia has never ceased to be 
a controversial issue. The law regarding the establishment of new worship facility, known 
as revised SKB Dua Menteri involves a long procedure that requires permission from the 
government and local neighborhood and is becoming ever more complicated. Indonesia is 
not unique in this matter, though. The mistrust over the importation of Christianity and its 
threat of undermining local authorities has a much broader geography and deeper 
historical roots. From Africa, Asia, to Oceania during the colonial periods, Christianity 
was typically viewed as "White men's religion" and one of the forms of Western 
dominance, despite the sometimes conflicting agendas of the colonial authority and the 
missionaries (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). In Latin America, the Catholic priests and 
bishops have long portrayed Protestantism from the United States as an instrument of 
subjugation and imperialism to destroy Catholicism (Smith 1998, 4) and to cause 
"division and discord" (Geary 1992. 7) in order to perpetuate socio-economic inequality 
(Stoll 1991, 33-34). In China. India, and Thailand, the governments have kept strict 
regulations on the establishment of Christian facilities, and in some districts, conversion 
was officially illegal. 
In Indonesia, the awareness of the potential danger associated with erecting a new-
church building can be periodically intensified along with political upheavals. Prior to the 
political democratization in 1998, the years between 1995 to 1997 were critical, given 
that churches in Indonesia received more than fifty attacks per year, a number higher than 
any time periods before (Steenbrink 1998: 338). The most disturbing and bizarre cases 
happened in East Java. Following reports of a supposedly emotionally disturbed Muslim 
who insulted the religion of Islam, the trial, his conviction, and a tenuous rumor of his 
presence in a church—a crowd of some 1500 people attacked and seriously damaged ten 
churches in the provincial capital city of Surabaya on Sunday morning, June 9 1996 
(Hefner 2000:191). These churches were mostly small buildings of evangelical and 
Pentecostal congregations, but two mainline churches also suffered severe damage. 
Churches were set atlre and totally destroyed, accompanied by robbery and sexual abuse in 
the north area of Surabaya (Steenbrink 1998:336-37; Tahalele and Santoso 1997:2). On 
October 10. 1996. twenty-four churches were burnt and destroyed and five people died in 
the town of Situbondo, three hundred kilometer east of Surabaya. District court, schools, 
orphanage, houses and stores were also burnt. The five people who died were a pastor, his 
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wife, their child, his nephew, and a female evangelist. Most of the victims of church-
burning in this episode were again Pentecostal churches, but a few mainline churches and 
Catholic churches were also brutally ravaged. Orphans and school children were 
dislocated since their orphanages and schools were burnt down. 
At the end of the 1996, another incident of riots took place in the West Java town of 
Tasikmalaya. Rioters went on a rampage, burning churches and shops owned by mostly 
ethnic Chinese. Like the Situbondo incident. Tasikmalaya started with a nominal Muslim 
insulting Islam, resulting in some obviously orchestrated troops of gangsters to invade 
Christian facilities. These bizarre connections of events have made the investigation on 
the cause and effect extremely difficult. Until today, the truth of these incidents remains a 
mystery. Many Indonesians believe that President Suharto was behind the scene. The 
orchestrated riots were said to be his trick to curb the rising call for democratization from 
the society, supposedly demonstrating that this unruly nation was still desperately in need 
of a high-handed authoritarian regime. There was also suspicion that the largest mass 
Muslim organization NU. or at least some fractions within it, were involved in the 
instigation of violence. In response, following the Situbondo event, NU declared a 
statement in what later became known as the "Situbondo White Book." They made it 
explicit that NU was to ally itself with Christians. They also sent their youth corps, Ansor. 
to guard Christian churches in Kast and Central Java (Hefner 2000:192). 
A conclusive analysis regarding the political rationales of manipulating the riots for 
specific purposes is not the task of this essay. Rather, I focus on Christians' responses 
following these catastrophic attacks. Whatever the truth may be, these violent events have 
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stirred up some latent anxiety about safety among Christian circles. This situation led 
Christian activists based in Surabaya Tahalele and Santoso, who edited volumes that 
documented the strings of church attacks, to cry out, albeit in an ambivalent voice mixed 
with self-blame— "'Because Christians cannot work together in the Lord, He allows 
another blow." (Tahalele and Santoso 1997: 2)—and desperation (ibid: 11): 
The Minister of Religion only talked about cliche that the harmony among the 
believers of different religions was the best in Indonesia that has Pancasila and 1945 
Constitution. He said that other countries took Indonesia as a good example. The 
fact is that [since 1945 until May 1997 there have been] 358 churches Indonesia that 
were closed, destroyed or burnt. The Republic of Indonesia is the first world 
champion in church destruction and arson.1 
These two segments of narratives contained some important tendencies within the 
Christian socio-psychology over the anti-Christian sentiments in Indonesia. The 
avoidance of blaming the society while also blaiming themselves ("because we Christians 
cannot work together") is often in tension with a resentment that is rarely conveyed so 
bluntly ("The Republic of Indonesia is the first world champion in church destruction and 
arson."). The former stance has been a repercussion of the domination of evangelical and 
Pentecostal congregations since the 1980s. These churches were known to be quietist. 
apolitical and inwardly turned and only concentrated on individual ethics and spirituality 
at the cost of social connection with other groups. In this vein, then, rather than 
condemning the persecution of Christians, this stance blamed Christians for failing to be 
part of the nation. Such a stance assumed that if the Christians had worked harder, they 
1 Between 1966 to 1997, 25.9% of church destruction in Indonesia occurred in East Java, 
21.4% in West Java, and 13.3% in Central Java. See Tahalele and Santoso 1997:232. 
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could have prevented riots from happening. The latter sentiment is the opposite; it 
implied that the government and the nation altogether should take responsibility for the 
tragedy. The outcry of Tahalele and Santoso seemed to imply that, Pancasila was merely 
a useless ideology, if ethno-religious violence could be allowed to ravage religious 
minorities as such. These acts have tarnished the reputation of Indonesia, they argued, a 
reputation that the nation did not deserve unless the nation could live up to it. Following 
the logic of this narrative, the destruction of churches was not merely the business of the 
Christians; it should concern every single citizen of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Despite the seemingly contradictory elements in these two stances in the narrative, 
they presume a shared minority strategy to secure a place in a state—resorting to a 
nationalist discourse that stresses the common good for the public while downplaying 
religious or ethnic difference. Such a covert claim to righteousness is quite clearly 
conveyed in a statement declared jointly by a rare union of the Protestant Churches 
including the Council of Ecumenical Churches (PGI), Evangelicals (PII), 
Pentecostals(DPI), the Salvation Army and the Seventh Day Adventists on 27 March 
1997 (Tahalele and Santoso 1997: 224): 
Nowadays we see some people who try to disturb the unity of the nation and 
state... Although there are people who see the violence as enmity of religions and of 
ethnic groups, but we do not see it as a tension between the Christians and the 
Muslims.. .Basically the riots and violence are the actions of some people to make 
the society oppose with each other by using some delicate situations in the society to 
destroy the important part of lie as a nation and a state which is based on Pancasila 
and 1945 Constitution to achieve certain purpose. 
We are touched seeing our Muslim brothers and sisters participate in coping with the 
violence and riots and even in the repair of church building and other damage. We 
also appreciate the armed forces and state officials who have restored order; we are 
really grateful. 
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The attacks that Christian facilities received in the late 1990s have significantly altered 
the previously inward styles of evangelical and Pentecostal congregations. In addition to 
carrying out social outreach activities, they have organized inter-faith forums, not to 
discuss theological differences, but to develop closer relationships, effective lines of 
communication, and regular exchanges of information among religious leaders (Buijanto 
2009: 175). 
Miracle discourse and the local politics 
It is thus not surprising that after the tumultuous attacks on Pentecostal churches in 
the late 1990s in Java there would be an increased need of the miraculous narratives 
about church founding. Under the combustible circumstances, the miracle narratives are 
both sociologically realistic and psychologically reassuring. Sociologically realistic, 
because founding a new church is difficult and in a sense it is a miracle. According to a 
decree issued in 1969 and revised in 2006 (often referred to as SKB Dua Menteri, in the 
media)2, the building of a new worship facility demands the endorsement signed by at 
least 90 followers. 60 local residents and the local district office, accompanied by 
2 SKB Dua Menteri meant "'the jointly decided decree of two ministry"' by Department of 
Interior and that of Religion. After the revision in 2006. the decree was named PBM Dua 
Menteri, but mostly commonly it was still referred to as SKB Dua Menteri. The revised 
decree makes the regulation stricter and diminishes the possibility of leeways to build a 
worship facility without the endorsement of local residents and religious leaders. 
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recommendations from the head of the religious department of the city or regency, as 
well as from the correspondent Forum of Harmony among Religious Community 
(FKUB) that represented all religious groups. It is easy to imagine how hindrance may 
occur at any step of the process. 
Miracle discourse is psychologically reassuring, because the stories can be 
interpreted as God's mighty power staying on the side of the chosen few. Before 
recognizing the meaning of his visionary dream, Pak Toni in fact had looked for several 
places as candidates for the location of his church-to-be. only to meet objections. It was 
at an impasse in late 1996—when he failed to gain permission from local religious 
leaders to build a new church in several different locations— that he miraculously 
recalled the prophetic dream, in which his mother-in-law's boarding house has become a 
church, and in which the name of Ester was revealed. 
The miraculous stories also serve to combat stereotypes. Within the common anti-
church repertoires in Java, one of the sources of hostility was based on an 
overgeneralized stereotype of Christians being ""wealthy:" that fancy church building is a 
way for arrogant (.sombong) Christians to show off, and proves that they have 
"illegitimate" donations from the foreign missionary societies or rich Indonesian 
entrepreneurs (Mujiburrahman 2006, 72-81). In counter-balancing such stereotypes, 
Pentecostal church-founding stories often carefully articulated the difficult journeys of 
fund-raising that could be solved only by miracles. As shown above. Ester's story fits into 
this pattern. Pak Toni's mother in law is in fact a wealthy matron, but in the story he used 
miracles to explain the source of funding. Similarly, both the re-establishment of GBI 
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Johar Salatiga and the Pentecostal Church of Isa-Almasih at Salatiga (GPIA1) involved 
some mysterious donor who appeared unexpectedly as a crucial agent and who helped 
prevent the project from failing. In the case of the Church of Isa-Almasih, this "miracle" 
waited ten years to happen (from 1998 to 2008): A family from Semarang who was not 
even a member of GPIAI and who had absolutely no clue about the renovation plan 
suddenly came to them and donated a huge sum of money. In the official document this 
person was understood to be delegated by God. 
Miracle narratives, then, do more than simply reproduce the global charismatic 
charm of a strong spiritual voluntarism that characterizes Pentecostalism worldwide 
(Marshall 2009, 45; Martin 2002, 145; Maxwell 2000, 249; Schram 2010, 465) to receive 
"frankly supernatural" and "experientially robust" (Robbins 2004, 120) miracles. What 
distinguishes the miracle narratives surrounding church-buildings from the individual-
based miracles is its distinctive power in pronouncing the socially censored wish of the 
minority. Using miracles to parse their own social history is seminal for Pentecostals in 
repositioning their place in the broader society. When it comes to church planting, a 
socially unwelcome project, narratives of the miraculous occurrence, and hence divine 
intervention, assists to bring about empowerment that would otherwise be lacking. 
Human voluntarism is considered relatively dangerous, because it implies the move as 
part of the illegitimate plot of "Christianization." Human intention is thus better placed 
secondarily, after the divine will. Hence "unless the Lord builds the house, the builders 
labor in vain" (Psalm 127:1), as cited in Pak Toni's testimony. 
These founding stories shed light on the inter-religious context of the congregational 
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experience that has been often left out in the anthropological literature of Pentecostalism. 
The narratives of "we had never planned to build a church"' places human desires only 
secondary to a divine blueprint. Displacing agency onto a miracle allows for audacious 
action and exempts individuals from the responsibility for creating a potential discord 
with the mainstream society. Nevertheless, behind this disclaimer of agency was a larger 
theological interpretation: a public claim that God authorizes the effort. The attachment to 
miracles provides a means to address things that are not immediately available to be 
discussed, and also creates a moment to invert the hierarchy of social power. Even it the 
invocation of miracles is a discourse that cannot persuade conservative Muslims, the 
discourse nevertheless represents a rather bold assertion of authority and legitimacy 
hidden behind the apparent passivity. 
The sensitivity over Muslim-Christian relationships in the stories of church building 
is perhaps best epitomized by the legend of the founding father Pak Alex of the Bethany 
Church, one of the fastest-growing Pentecostal denominations in the country today. Pak 
Alex decided to launch his ministry after he caused a terrible car accident and the dying 
victim was miraculously cured in the late 1960s. He later built fourteen churches in the 
suburbs of Surabaya, East Java, but failed to secure a place to build a church in the city 
proper. The plan was halted until one day in 1985 he met a wealthy Muslim landlord who 
was in a coma. He prayed for this Muslim and God awakened him. This Muslim man in 
turn generously donated a piece of land for the new church, which is still located at 36-
38, Manyar Rejo II Road in Surabaya. Upon seeing the location, Pak Alex immediately 
recalled that he had dreamt of the number of the address a long time ago. 
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In this narrative, the role of miracles and that of Muslim-Christian relations are all 
the more accentuated. The identity of the willing and grateful donator, a Muslim, seemed 
to legitimize the acquisition of land for the church. Moreover, healing a Muslim and 
peacefully winning the Muslim land via God's miraculous deeds cleverly dissociates the 
evangelizer from the agentive position, and helps him decline the accountability for 
building a church. Revelatory dreams and miracles, then, serve as a powerful terrain 
through which uncomfortable fears and desires obtain their means of expression. In turn, 
the discourse of miracles empowers Pentecostals to brace themselves for the arduous 
aspiration in a predominantly Muslim society. In line with the global Pentecostal spiritual 
focus on inspirational knowledge and unmediated relationships with God (Martin. 
Maxwell), these narratives of church-building enrich the religious tradition and renew its 
relevance in the minority situation. 
The necessity of Muslims 'self-empowerment 
If miracle discourse empowers Pentecostals' censored wishes by resorting to the 
arrangement of divine intervention, the mainstream Muslim constituencies frame their 
social position in terms of the need of the unification and empowerment of the Muslim 
community. This section contends that the self-perception of Muslims has to take into 
account the influence of the perceived national and even global status of Islam vis-a-vis 
Christianity. The ground for feeling threatened is not merely determined by the national 
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politics of religions, but also by the ways Islam and Christianity have become sharpened 
as transnational identity markers in global politics. In Nigeria, for example, Christians see 
the implementation of shariah in the Northern region as a symbol of the ongoing Muslim 
control of national politics and the "jihadization" of Nigeria, whereas from a Muslim 
point of view, shariah is a bastion that guards Northern Nigeria against the southern 
"crusaders" (Marshal 2009, 224). Demonization of Islam is commonplace among 
Pentecostal congregations. The famous priest Adeboye even went so far to suggest that 
Islam was the obstacle of the mission of Nigeria designated by God to become a 
Christian nation that should fuel the end time revival out of Africa to the rest of the world 
(Ojo 2001 cited in F.-K. Ukah 2009). 
Pentecostalism and Islam are politicized to a much greater degree in Nigeria than in 
Indonesia, but the inter-subjective dialogues between them is comparable. As I shall 
demonstrate below, in early January of 2010,1 was invited as a speaker on the gender 
panel in the national intermediate training of HMI held in Edi-Mancoro, apesantren 
(Islamic boarding school) located in the outskirts of Salaitga that has been famous for its 
promotion of civic pluralism and regular events of doa bersama (praying together) across 
religious affiliations. The HMI training invited scholars and leaders from various 
backgrounds to give talk on issues of democracy, pluralism, gender justice, and other 
topics. Thanks to the event I was able to obtain contacts with many students and engage 
in some lengthy discussion over various topics with them outside of the panel. Once I 
touched upon inter-religious relations in Salatiga, Mbak Sri, a second-year student of 
STAIN and the head of women's wing in HMI at Salatiga, explained to me in agitation: 
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The issue of Christianization (Kristenisasi) is serious. Many people have the 
impression that this is a Christian city, while the truth is it is not. Even though 
Christians are the minority, they are strong. We are the majority, but we are not 
united. Recently we again see a new church built, just around Lapangan Pancasila. 
This is but one evidence of Christianization in this city. That's why we Muslims 
have to work together. That's why we allied with all other Muslim organizations to 
protest at the continuing domination over the land of Salib Putih by Christians. 
However emotional this may sound, this line of thinking is not unique to Salatiga, 
but a recurrent motif in Indonesia. In Manado, a Christian stronghold in the province of 
North Sulawesi, for example, there exists parallel tension between Christians and 
Muslims. Churches have broadcasted their hymns and rock gospels more vehemently 
than mosques, but Muslims have also started to observe more diligently. As a result. 
Christians accuse Muslims of "acting as if they were living in a Muslim city," whereas 
Muslims jibe that the Christians "act as if they were living in a Christian country" (Dan 
Slater, personal communication 2011). In fact, a dorm-mate of mine who is originally 
from Manado and now a member of Ester told me that she felt the mosques in Salatiga 
were broadcasting "too much" Arabic that gave her a headache, and she missed Manado, 
where on the streets one would "never hear of Arabic" but only exhilarating Christian 
songs. She did not seem to recognize the double standard she employed in this comment. 
For her, because she is from a "real" Christian city, Salatiga already seems excessively 
Islamic. 
The Muslim and Christian communities both feel insecure. Muslims feel their 
majority status in the nation is overshadowed in the presence of vibrant Christian 
activities, while Christians are ever mindful of how the majority would interpret their 
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acts, and are cautiously in confine any controversial speech to insiders' circles only, even 
in a "Christianity city" like Salatiga. Although from the vantage point of hindsight one 
can say that the anxiety of Muslims over "Christianization" is unwarranted hyperbole, the 
fear is not entirely unfounded. The feeling of fear is a manifestation of "subjective 
meaning" that, as Weber puts, "takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby 
oriented in its course" (Weber 1968, 4). With the constantly growing percentage of 
Christians in the total population since the late 1970s (that is, after the major period of 
mass conversion due to state policies)3, there is a reason to ponder upon the question 
whether the slow but steady Christian expansion will continue in the long run at the 
expense of the Muslim community. 
Thus despite the steady rise and further improvement of Islamic infrastructure in the 
city, the shadow of Salatiga as a "Christian city" still looms large even in the mind of the 
most moderate mainstream Muslim leaders. Ibu Zulfa has expressed in private that it has 
been quite difficult to develop an Islamic organization in this city, because it is so 
"Christian." Compared to Yogyakarta, where she is originally from and where 
Muhammadiyah was founded in 1912, the scale and strength of Aisyiah here is rather 
small. She reasoned that this explained the relative weakness of Muslim NGOs in the 
city, where Muslims of various factions and sects have redirected more of their efforts 
into their immediate community, the neighborhoods. 
But it is not only the growth of Christian facilities that has concerned the 
The total Christian population in 1971 constitutes 7.5% of the total population, compared to 2.8% in 1933 
and 8.9% in 2000. In central Java, it is 0.2% in 1971 and 2% today, and above 10% in bigger cities 
(Ricklefs 2001, 379). 
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mainstream Muslim leaders of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama in Salatiga. The 
surge of radical Islam also worries them. In Salatiga, one of the conservative Islamic 
forces at work is the local branch of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian 
Council for Islamic Propagation, DDII), founded in 1967 by the former leader of 
Masyumi Muhammad Natsir. With a generous funding from Saudi Arabia in the 1980s 
and 1990s, it supported programs that trained and prepared believers to conduct da'wa 
activism with the idea that Islam was under siege primarily due to the expansion of 
Christian missionary projects (Hansan 2002:151). Another conservative Islamic stream in 
Salatiga is Indonesia Institute of Islamic Dawah (LDII), a puritanical Islamic organization 
that requires its members not to touch the hands of anyone outside the community and its 
female members to cover themselves completely except for the eyes. Members of LDII 
were deeply frowned upon by the local residents in the neighborhoods of Sinaran and 
Graha. Finally, I should mention Hizbut Tahrir, an international political organization that 
believes in an Islamic state or caliphate ruled by Islamic law in predominantly Muslim 
areas in the world. Founded in 1953 in Jerusalem, it has spread to more than forty 
countries and is particularly active in the United Kingdom. In Central Java they have 
published and circulated a series of volumes to promote an Islamic state, which have 
appeared in many book fairs. They claim a caliphate would provide stability and security 
to both Muslims and non-Muslims, solve all the social problems, eliminate political 
corruption, and curb moral decadence caused by the influence of western culture. 
To compete with these more radically conservative Islamic organizations, since the 
mid-1980s mainstream Muslim organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah have 
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undertaken the endeavors to build new mosques, schools and neighborhood networks 
with lenient or even progressive ideological inclinations to balance the extremist social 
force (see Hefner 2000: 119). This aspiration remained an influential legacy, despite the 
fact that after the political democratization in 1998 NU and Muhammadiyah resumed 
their earlier engagement in political parties. 
While leaders and members in these two mainstream Muslim organizations do not 
necessarily share a single perspective on the convoluted religious development in 
Indonesia, those active in the organizations and neighborhoods in Salatiga do adhere to 
an Islamic aspiration of peaceful pluralism. In several separate interviews with Ibu Zulfa 
and Ibu Farida, the chairwomen of women's wing of Muhammadiyah and NU, 
respectively, both of them expressed that NU and Muhammadiyah in Salatiga had a 
shared agenda today: to reject the recruitment into radical Islam and to unify a prosperous 
Muslim community. Ibu Farida is faithful to such an ideal: "How can (they) make syariat 
the state law? How about non-Muslims? What about them?" she said in her house when 
she asked me to try her stewed lamb the day after Idul-Adha. "Islam is only part of 
Indonesia. Those fanatik like Hizbut Tahrir are wrong and they are not in accordance with 
(tidak sesuai) Islam. You know Hizbut Tahrir right? They are already blacklisted by NU." 
Ibu Zulfa is a loyal supporter of Islam as a religion of peace who deeply disagrees with 
the various syariat and anti-apostasy movements in the country. In early 2009, when 
some representative from Hizbut Tahrir visited her in person at her place to ask for her 
support—"Of course I rejected them," Ibu Zulfa firmly recounted this scene to me when 
we were resting in the teacher's office. "There is no coercion in Islam. They are not in 
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accordance with (tidak sesuai) Islam," she concluded. 
But the scope of the Muslim awareness in Salatiga goes beyond the city proper. 
Linked to the contemporary positions of Muslim fellows in the world, the self-
consciousness of being appropriately Muslim is often repeatedly pronounced lest the 
people of Islam forget their duties in a still much troubled world. This sense of a unified 
umat is most clearly embodied in the mass gathering of Muslims on holidays and the 
sight of thousands prostrating themselves in the direction of Mecca. 
Around seven thirty in the morning on Idul Adha in 2009,1 had participated in the 
morning prayer with Ibu Zulfa, her elderly mother and newly wed daughter, as well as 
one thousand other people on the grass land in Lapangan Pancasila. Ibu Zulfa's husband, 
a lecturer in STAIN and a member of Muhammadiyah, was the preacher who gave the 
sermon to the entire city on behalf of the Muslim leaders. His sermon, featuring the 
themes of Idul Adha—sacrifice—clearly shows the global nature of Muslim awareness: 
...O God we all remember the noble event that happened to your glorified servant, 
Abraham, because of his submission [he was] already willing to slaughter his 
beloved son to obey Your command, although later You replaced the sacrifice with a 
huge sheep... 
Today we gather again in celebration of Idul Adha as a symbol of the unity of the 
Muslim community. More than a billion of Muslims at this moment are knitting 
togetherness into a sturdy bond of faith. Far out there, different races, nations and 
languages now unite in a great ritual, namely the holiday of Idul Adha. 
The sounds of takbir (the recitation of "God is great"), tahmid (the recitation of 
"Praise God") and tahlil (repeated recitation of the profession of faith) that has 
reverberated in the air since the sun went down yesterday until the end of 13th of 
(Dzulhijjah the last month of the Islamic calendar) is the proclamation of the unity 
of the Muslim community world-wide. We witness how beautiful it is as Muslims 
come together to perform the prayer, and how strong the connection of their hearts is 
in ruku (bowing down) and sujud (prostration) in front of their Creator. This process 
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is precious and it implies the reality in building the strength of the togetherness of 
the people of Islam... 
God orders us to slaughter animals for us to eat with the poor and the needy, which 
shows that in Islam to bring the self close to God, it is advised that we get close and 
joint together with the poor and the needy. 
The teaching of Islam is full of guidance for providing social justice and the same 
rights between human beings... thousands or even millions of people in other places 
perhaps do not have things to eat. [and] they cry over their fate. They are hungry and 
thirsty, they lost their property and wealth, residence, they lost their children, wives, 
husbands, parents or relatives...they may even have to flee from their homeland due 
to disaster or conflict... 
Isn't it a kind of brutality if we just let them suffer there, while we do not bother to 
help them? Because of this I ask you who are capable of donating some parts of your 
property to help diminish the suffering of our fellows... 
Every time [when] we celebrate Idul Adha certainly we will apply several 
teaching.. .first, to look for blessings that are lawful...second, to make a 
sacrifice.. .for other people.. .In the context of improving the quality of the life of 
[our] nation, sacrifice cannot be neglected. Damage and confusion made to our 
society and our nation is the result of the lack of the spirit of sacrifice... 
Finally, let us prepare ourselves, our families and our society to carry out a better 
life. Toward that [goal], it requires a good leader, a leader who does not only have 
the status of a Muslim (berstatus sebagai muslim) but also really can show the 
identity of Islam and choosing the values of Islam (menunjukkan identitas 
keislaman, keberpihakan pada nilai-nilai Islam), and is capable of serving the 
society. The momentum of Idul Adha in the present represents a great moment for us 
to try harder and sincerely so that we can create a good country that obtain the 
contentment of God. For that, let us close the sermon of Idul Adha with praying 
together... 
It is difficult to ignore the theme of "the unity and the togetherness" of the Muslim 
community in the sermon, a theme that figures rarely in Christian sermons. Without 
taking into consideration the ways Muslims position themselves in global politics, neither 
the theme of sacrifice as an ethical code or that of submission to God can be reasonably 
linked to the theme of "the unity and the togetherness." According to Pak Zulfa's 
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explanation, "the damage and confusion" are caused by those religious streams that are 
excessively violent and that damage the peace, property, and even human lives. "Those 
who suffer" include all the poor, the Palestinians and victims in the Iraq War and 
Afghanistan War. Pak Zulfa's speech thus echoes the group solidarity and sympathy 
towards Muslim fellows whose nations are ravaged by Israel and the United Stated, a 
sentiment that is widespread in Indonesia. 
If the efforts to alleviate the forces that oppress Muslim fellows in other nations are 
limited, at least they have to show their strength in their own nation, and indeed their own 
city. The discourse of "the unity of the umat" and "the prosperity of the umaf thus entails 
some particular implications in Salatiga. For example, students and teachers were 
expecting the new building of the Great Mosque (masjid raya) at STAIN to be a 
landmark of the city. Pak Zulfa explained to me, Salatiga did not yet have a Grand 
Mosque (masjid agung) yet that could be compared to those in Semarang, Solo and 
Demak nearby in Central Java. Rather, there were only two Big Mosques (masjid besar), 
namely Masijd Pandawa and Masijd Kauman. A Great Mosque then would enhance the 
Islamic character of a city, he said. 
Interestingly, in Mbak Sri's comment on the "Christianization" in the city, she did 
not mention precisely these omnipresent traces of "Islamization," including the ongoing 
project of the Great Mosque of STAIN just a few feet away from where we had this 
conversation, let alone the rapid emergence of mosques everywhere in recent decades. 
Mbak Sri's argument was grounded on an inter-subjective self-position: the duty of 
Muslims was not merely to follow God's law. erect worship facilities, and make their 
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men attend Friday prayers, but be a strong and dignified people in the face of the 
religious other. 
The tone of Mbak Sri's comment on Christianization in Salatiga was a noteworthy 
revelation of the wider discontent with the minority in society. Although Mbak Sri had 
stronger hostility towards the expansion of Christianity stronger more than anyone I 
know, the rationale behind her attitude was not questioned even among the most 
moderate mainstream local Muslim leaders. The same gist could be conveyed in a much 
softer assessment, as made by Mbak Nur, the madrasa teacher and a member of NU: 
"To dominate".. .well... this sounds very disturbing in its connotation.. .But it is true 
that now in all the cities, or in the city [here], there are many Christian worship 
places (peribadatan Nasrani)...almost in every corner, and at every moment there 
are perhaps some [who] observe that Christian [facilities] are much bigger or much 
more, whereas if we look at the data we realize they are but a minority.. .it is not just 
[there are] many worship places, but also many schools...even Muslim kids, many 
of the them also go to Christian schools. Then, for those who.. .how should I put 
this... who have a strong faith in Islam would of course hold a more critical attitude 
in this sort of matters...so if the person wants to say that "Christians dominate 
Salatiga," it is up to her/him. 
Interestingly, this narration happened right after Mbak Nur told me that there should 
be no discrimination against people of different religions in the neighborhood life, when 
we were having a chat on a Tuesday night before the neighborhood pengqjian started. For 
important rites of passage, Mbak Nur explained to me, people follow their own religious 
instructions in accordance to their faith, and people should respect that simple fact. This 
was because, she illustrated, "we are siblings (saudara)," and mutual help is the way to 
"be a society" (bermasyarakat). Despite such a basic stance of pacific pluralism, 
whenever it comes to worship facilities, Mbak Nur did not deny her worry that 
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Christianity was spreading in the country at the expense of the Muslim solidarity, and that 
their facilities had been disproportionately represented regardless of the feelings of the 
majority in society. 
The perception about the thriving Christian minority has been translated into 
incentives for Muslims to amplify their infrastructure and strengthen the community, so 
that the Islamic character of the city could be shown rather than overshadowed. This line 
of thoughts was unequivocally conveyed in the sermon of the city-wide worship of Idul-
Fifri, the last day of the fasting month Ramadan, held again at the Pancasila Plaza in the 
Islamic year of 1431 or the Gregorian year of 2010. This event was the largest ceremony 
in the city proper. Following the morning worship, the head of the Religious Ministry of 
the city government gave the following sermon: 
Idul Fitri reminds us of one aspect of co-religious life (hidup herjamaah) based on 
awe towards God The Most Glorified...Umat Islam has to unify their steps toward 
the one goal of the Magnificence of Islam by putting aside the differences between 
streams (aliran), factions, colors and social class. Togetherness and unity represents 
great strength so that umat Islam will not be defeated (tak terkalahkan). Umat Islam 
does not want to become like foam in the middle of the sea. We don't want to 
become a Muslim community whose existence cannot set an example. We must not 
become the Muslim community once pointed out by Apostle of God in his dialogue 
with [his] companions: 
"An era will come, in which other religious communities will arrive and seize you, 
almost like a gang of people who are gluttonous, clustering and fighting with one 
another around the dish of their food." 
Muslim Fellows may God give you all blessings (rahimakumullah). 
Hearing the utterance of the Apostle of God about the fate of a generation of the 
Muslim community like that, companions asked: "Can it be that because at the time 
our Muslim community numbers little as minority. Apostle of God?" 
The Apostle replied: "No, your number at the time is a lot! However your quality is 
like foam adrift on the waves." 
The scene depicted in the dialogue between the Prophet and his companions is 
obviously a cautionary tale about the religious ecology in Salatiga. Seemingly, the story 
reproduces the notion of "a majority with a minority mindset," a critique that itself 
reduces the dynamic of the global Muslim-Christian politics into a domestic counting of 
religious populations. The call for unification and empowerment in the sermon, however, 
belies the deep aspiration to rectify just such humiliation, in order to exist as more than 
drifting foam and to unite the diverging streams. 
Like most Muslim leaders in the local neighborhoods who held a pacific pluralism at 
heart, the head of the Salatiga Religious Ministry did not advocate a bellicose attitude as 
the means of the Muslim self-empowerment. Rather than questioning Christianity's 
existence, he urged Muslims to "upgrade." To achieve dignity, the struggle is not to gain 
legitimacy, but to match the legitimacy that is already accorded to them. As such, the 
dialectical journey between the Islamic and Christian discourses on their existence goes 
on, in which a peaceful co-existence will not last without compromises. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I delineate the discourses of Christianization as the central parameters 
of Pentecostal Christian and mainstream Muslim discourses of legitimacy. I aim to show 
the inter-religious dialectical development as integral to their seemingly independent 
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religious identities. While church establishment remains a socially problematic issue in 
need of some extraordinary avenues of legitimacy, the legitimacy accorded to mosque-
building in Salatiga has been transformed by a deeper wish of unifying and strengthening 
the Muslim alirans so as to resist the lure of radical Islamism and Christianity. 
While operating with divergent cultural forms and social rationales, the religious 
journeys of mainstream Islam and charismatic Christianity in Salaitga cannot be 
adequately understood without one another. The coming into being of worship facilities 
and religious networks faces different expectations and relies on distinct narratives and 
social performance. Charismatic Christians and mainstream Muslims thus have 
drastically different strategies to negotiate their differences in the intersecting social 
space, given their different social footings. Rather than assuming that pluralism surfs 
effortlessly in the sea of religious complexity, in this chapter I display a wide range of 
tension between the religious communities and the various strategies of pacific co­
existence. The dialectical development between miraculous power and normalizing piety 
will continue to be unraveled in the following chapters, within the neighborhood and 
congregational lives, their changing public discourses on gender and individuality, and 
their intertwined encounters. 
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Chapter 3 Not Fanatical 
"Muhammadiyah and NU are still siblings. " 
On the night of maulud (the Prophet's birthday) during the Islamic calendar year 
1431, or on February 27"', 2010, the residents of Sinaran gathered in their main mosque 
Al-Falah to celebrate. I had already practiced in the rebana team with three professional 
players and three volunteer residents, rehearsed the repertoire of Shalawat Nabi (songs 
exalting the Prophet) the night before, and served as one of the tambourine players that 
night. Ibu Eka was our leading singer and conductor, who had admonished the men in the 
team to closely follow the tempo of her voice. Sometimes she even yelled at Mas Agus, a 
middle-aged male drummer who often missed the beat, and ordered him to take off his 
jacket so he would be more agile. That evening, Ibu Eka's enchanting solo in Arabic 
signaled the beginning of the celebration. Her voice echoed resoundingly through the 
speakers of the mosque in the otherwise quiet night. Her confidence in subsequently 
leading chanting responses from the congregation of 120 women and 60 men marked her 
presence, even if she was dressed in the identical batik uniform shirt of women's Islamic 
sermon group with some fifty other members sitting in the main hall. Clapping my 
tambourine while closely following Ibu Eka's breaths, her frequent smiles at me struck 
me. The idea that women's voice is aural (parts of the body to be clothed or prohibited in 
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public), which explains why most broadcasted adzan (call for prayer from mosques) in 
Java are in male voices, was rendered so glaringly irrelevant by her captivating singing. 
Following two Shalawat Nabi, Mbak Catur started the opening recitation. A 30-
year-old student at the State Islamic College (STAIN), whose father is an active member 
of Muhammadiyah and a regular preacher in an Islamic sermon session for retired people 
in Sinaran, Mbak Catur is a leading reciter in the regular Koranic sermon sessions. That 
night, her Arabic prayer was forceful and awesome, as it was in the routine penagjian, 
only more powerful, like the first ample rainfall nourishing the lands stricken by drought. 
As her voice diminished, we heard the Indonesian translation of the prayer by twenty-
year-old Mbak Icha, who is also a STAIN student and a cadre in the mosque youth 
organization, who just recently started her practice of fasting on Mondays and Thursdays 
to follow a sunnah (Prophet's tradition) this year. After the translation, the congregation 
sang the song of Maulud in High Javanese that we had already practiced at the last two 
routine pengajian. Later a young man from the committee of the day's event stepped 
forward to report, but his presentation was soon cut short due to the arrival of the vice-
mayor of Salatiga. The vice-mayor gave a rather long greeting in her glamorous makeup 
and headscarf, flanked by two members of her entourage, and only after her departure the 
committee from the Islamic education center next to the mosque, currently under 
construction, delivered the financial report to the congregation in Indonesian. Our rebana 
band played music intermittently in each transition of the ceremony until the last songs 
following the main Islamic sermon given by one of the regular male preachers in Sinaran. 
When we started to get snacks and hot tea passed by around the congregation, we knew 
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we were Hearing the end of the ceremony. Showing her satisfaction with tonight's 
performance, Ibu Eka joked that she wanted to bring our rebana band to the United States 
when I got married. 
The scenes of Maulud continued to linger with me for some of its "uncanny" 
components. Given the ethnographic literature about communal rituals in Java, the 
composition, texture, and quality of this maulud were not expected at all. Two things 
stood out: the prominence of women in a ritual described by Geertz as one of "the two 
most important calendrical ceremonies" of slametan (the rituals meals, 1960, 79), and the 
presence of followers of Muhammadiyah, the reformist organization that has been known 
for generally renouncing the maulud ritual, among other practices that were considered as 
bida' (un-Islamic innovation) (Beck 1995, 260-62). 
This chapter discusses the crucial role of women's religious activities in reshaping 
the local Muslim community against Islamic fanaticism in the neighborhoods of Sinaran 
and Graha. It aims to explain women's new roles as the majority of publicly visible 
enactors of communal rituals broadly defined as slametan, roles that were previously 
men's preserve (see Geertz 1960, 12; N. Sullivan 1994, Woodward 1986, 62). My 
ethnographic accounts will focus on the rise of women's pengajian (Islamic sermon) 
groups in the neighborhood life, and the new public rituals where pengajian has figured 
prominently. Challenging the assumption that Islamization would necessarily lead to the 
marginalization of women, this chapter suggests that members of pengajian have in fact 
have obtained more public roles through closely aligning themselves with Islamic 
activities. 
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Photo III. Mbak Catur reciting Koran verses in the maulud on February 27, 2010. 
Photo IV. Women of the Islamic sermon group in their batik uniform sitting in the 
mosque. 
Signs indicating this new trend of "feminization" were observed by anthropologists 
working in Java in the last three decades. Brenner expresses her amazement at women's 
invariable role as the majority of ritual witnesses in the late 1980s in Yogyakarta (1998, 
175). In a lower-class kampong near the downtown of Yogyakarta in the 2000s, Guinness 
notes the eclipse of older forms of male-exclusive kendhuren (ritual meals) in the wake of 
more pronounced Islamic public rituals (Guinness 2009). 
Although among the varieties of slametan some of the rites of passage could be 
considered as more female-oriented, such as those related to pregnancy, in Geertz's 
influential study the major slametan that spoke to the general community had no such 
female-majority participants. Rather, men, defined as the heads of the households, were 
responsible for attending ceremonies, confirming ritual efficacy and fulfilling communal 
obligation (1960, 12): 
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The ceremony itself is all male. The women remain mburi (behind—i.e.. in the 
kitchen), but they inevitably peek through the bamboo walls at the men, who, 
squatted on floor mats ngarepan (in front—i.e., in the main living room) perform the 
actual ritual, eating the food the women have prepared. 
A comparable scene was documented by Norma Sullivan based on her fieldwork in 
the 1970s and late 1980s in Yogyakarta, in which she described women's ritual work 
behind the scene as "no way to power'" (1994, 56-58). Although, the eventual thesis of 
Sullivan was to argue that the work behind the scene in the kitchen rewang was just as 
important as the kenduren (the ritual meal part of, or a synonym of slametan) in the front. 
In what follows, I outline the meaning of neighborhood to people in Salatiga against 
the background of neighborhood traditions that were developed in Indonesia, and portray 
the kinds of public rituals and their significance through the lens of members of 
pengajian. 
The meanings of neighborhood 
Neighborhood life does not mean the same thing for different kinds of localities in 
Indonesia. Its importance varies and its style differs. In Jakarta, for example, an 
inescapable scene of extreme division was between the gated turf of the increasingly 
baroque supervillas that guard the rich with skyrocketing walls and the crowded kampong 
made of small, ramshackle dwellings irregularly divided by tiny alleys. To what degree 
and in what ways neighbors share resources and service are always empirical questions. 
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In Salatiga, there has been a strong continuation and further transformation of the kinds 
of neighborhood lives that have been documented and interpreted by anthropologists 
working in Java. Robert Jay has emphasized the key role of close residence in villagers' 
moral world, which hinges upon cooperation and trust (Jay 1969, 66; Geertz 1961; 
Koentjaraningrat 1985). Such a cooperative community defined by spatial proximity is 
based on the notion of rukun (harmony), a "'state in which all parties are at least overtly at 
social peace with one another" and hinges as well a mode of action in which the 
individual has to "subordinate, perhaps even sacrifice, his personal interests" (1969:66). 
As Barbara Hatley in her study of a peri-urban Yogyakarta neighborhood puts it, 
neighborhood pride and solidarity required "participation in the mutual-aid networks of 
the kampung, self-identification with the local community, and being identified by one's 
neighbors as being of, rather than merely in, the kampung" (Hatley 1982, 57). 
Scholarship has revealed that such neighborhood lifestyles in Indonesia are not some 
timeless tradition but a historical construct. The formal units of neighborhood lives, 
rukun tetangga (harmonious neighbors, or RT) and rukun warga (harmonious citizens, or 
RW)1. are legacies of the Japanese wartime administration, which was adopted by post-
Independence governments as an effective way of governing urban populations.2 Both 
administrative units include a number of local office-holders led by the head of RT and 
RW, all of whom are elected locally and none of whom is salaried. They are authorized to 
"assemble tax monies, register and monitor residents and visitors, collect demographic 
1 There was RK, or Harmonious Village, that supervised RW. In 1988-89 RK was abolished in favor of 
the smaller of RW. 
2 Ideally RT comprise no more than 30 households and RW three to seven RT. In Salatiga and other 
cities, however, these numbers are often far surpassed. 
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and economic data, disseminate state directives, promote government plans and policies, 
extend local infrastructure, administer social welfare services and generally help to 
advance national development" (J. Sullivan 1986, 37). Seen through this perspective of a 
rational governmentality. neighborhoods are local organs of a modern state established by 
top-down development policies, rather than spontaneous, self-sufficient small republics. 
The cultural notion of gotong-royong (mutual-help), which is often accompanied in the 
conceptualization of neighborhood lives, was no more than a key point of government 
propaganda for social control. 
These dimensions of governmentality notwithstanding, anthropologists have 
investigated how the practices of gotong-royong (mutual-help) has persisted and survived 
social change in many parts of Indonesia. For example, John Bowen argues that 
neighborhoods lives do reflect "genuinely indigenized notions of moral obligation and 
generalized reciprocity, " even though they are an extension of a cultural superstructure 
that transmits social control through self-sufficient management of local social welfare at 
the expense of free unpaid mobilization of village labor (Bowen 1986, 546). More recent 
work in the 1990s revealed both preservation and transformation of the neighborhood 
networks among Javanese. Mary Hawkins demonstrates that Javanese living in South 
Kalimantan in the 1990s still emphasized the importance of rukun as the basic tenet of 
neighborhood lives and its best manifestation was still the organization of ritual meals 
(1996, 231). Patrick Guinness, based on his involvement in a kampung in Yogykarta for 
more than 30 years, reclaims the salience of neighborhood lives that demonstrate "strong 
local impulses to community, quite independent of state action" (2009:24). These 
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portraits give us some valuable information about the existence of communal characters 
of urban neighborhoods, surprisingly more durable and vibrant than some earlier 
predications would have it3. 
In Salatiga, most neighborhoods including Sinaran and Graha have maintained their 
status as core social communities. Sinaran is an austere lower-middle class neighborhood 
off a medium-sized street close to the center of the city of Salatiga to the south, and 
adjacent to the campus of UKSW to the east. Most houses were one-story small buildings 
huddled with one another across narrow and irregular alleyways where cars could barely 
pass by. Gravel, sand and abandoned farms crosscut tiny shacks, brick houses, and a few 
larger mansions enclosed with a yard. By contrast, Graha is a middle- to upper-middle-
class neighborhood on a north edge of the city. The roads, although still narrow, are well-
paved and the buildings are aligned regularly and neatly in parallel with one another. 
There are two well-stocked general stores and a photocopy shop. One of the stores is 
owned by Ibu Ningsih, the chairwoman of the women's Koranic sermon group. The 
houses in the neighborhood are one to two stories surrounded by delicately decorated 
porches or even Venetian garden full of potted plants, wooden blinds and birdcages. 
Walls of houses were painted green, pink, tangerine or purple. Cars and jeeps were 
parked in garages. Compared to other neighboring areas this is a relatively well-off place. 
Despite their socio-economic differences, Sinaran and Graha both have a strong 
sense of being local communities. Neighborhoods are where important rites of passages 
i Clifford Geertz and James Peacock in the 1960s both suggested that urban neighborhoods no longer 
represented corporate communities but administrative units (Patrick Guinness 2009: 169), and that ritual 
meals would soon lose their appeal. 
131 
take place, and where neighbors of the correspondent RT and RW assume the obligation 
to attend, organize, witness, or at the very least pay respect through other means to these 
rituals. In Graha, Ibu Zulfa proudly shared with me the albums of her daughter's wedding 
in 2008, lamented that I came here too late, and pointed out the door of her house to the 
street, showing me around and recounting where all steps of the ritual took place. Like 
Ibu De's daughter's wedding 1 attended in Sinaran in June, 2010, the wedding of Ibu 
Zulfa's daughter was held right on the street where the bride's natal house was located, 
and all the close neighbors assumed different, but always some, degrees of responsibility 
to partake in the ritual. 
Perhaps more than weddings, the responses to bereavement manifest the communal 
character of a neighborhood. In Geertz's classic article "Ritual and Social Change" 
(1957) we see how the disruption of a funeral evoked deeply troubled feelings and 
revealed the disintegration of the neighborhood community resulting from incongruent 
ideologies between secular nationalist, Islamists and communists in the 1950s. The 
practices of neighborhood community survive the ideological wars that ended fifty years 
ago, and continue to function in Salatiga. Today, funerals particularly show the strength 
of social obligation among the immediate neighbors. When someone dies, the main 
neighborhood mosque would announce the death through mounted-speakers on the roof 
of the mosque. Neighbors would soon commence visiting the family as soon as they 
received the news. Meanwhile, unless the family wishes otherwise4, one of the nearest 
4 This could happen to Christian families, who would request pastors to conduct the kinds of rituals 
they wanted. But even in this case, Muslim neighbors had the obligation to pay visits and express 
their condolences. I attended the funeral of a professor of UKSW and a GKJ member. The 
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households to the departed's household would take the responsibility to form a committee 
(panitia) guided by the head of RT to organize the funeral. Women, particularly close 
kins and the nearest neighbors, active members of PKK and Koranic sermon group would 
prepare foods in a neighbor's household for the deceased's family and guests, while men 
would be appointed by office holders in the RT or RW to collect funds, dig the grave and 
later place the coffin at the end of the day. The time period from death to burial is short 
and all the activities are entrusted to the neighborhood. If the death occurred in the 
evening, men would stay up until the morning. In the funeral, people would give two 
envelopes of money to the family, one having an obligatory minimal amount, the other 
being optional. In a word, funerals are viewed as an absolute priority that demanded 
neighbors" immediate involvement and collective efforts. 
This of course does not imply that the funeral is a timeless tradition. One of the most 
prominent changes, for example, is a democratization of expertise in handling funerals. 
In Sinaran and Graha, for a funeral and post-funeral rituals where the guests are 
predominantly Muslim, neighbors take up works that were in the past entrusted to the 
modin as the postmortem expert and a dozen invited santri as chanting specialists. For a 
funeral that was organized by church personnel entrusted by a Christian family, the entire 
funeral in the neighborhood was patterned into a service, which were invariably called 
baktian, like any other services. This transformation leaves us two valuable clues: the 
neighborhood was right next to Sinaran. Even though Muslim neighbors were not seated in the 
baktian (service), they helped guarding the proceedings of the ritual by patrolling the surroundings 
to make sure it was not disturbed. 
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continued importance of the neighborhood as a social community manifested in public 
rituals, and the shifting components of these rituals. 
The most significant ritual shift that Guinness identifies in Ledok of Yogyakarta 
over the recent decades is the decline of the kendhuren (2009, 158) and the rise of 
Muslim prayer ceremony sembahyang as well as pengajian (ibid: 162—170). Guinness 
illustrates that kendhuren used to be the key form of slametan in the 1970s and 1980s, 
through which households celebrated important occasions in the family life cycle. The 
kendhuren was a typically a male ritual (ibid: 155, Woodward 1988:62), where all heads 
of households gathered together to distribute the ritual meal, although most of the work 
was done by women, who determined the guest list and prepared the food (see N. 
Sullivan 1994). Nowadays. Guinness observes, people in Ledok think that only old-
fashioned people (wong kuno) would do kendhuren (2009, 155). The exclusively male 
public rituals dramatically declined. 
The extravagance of holding kendhuren and the difficult economic situation in the 
1990s cannot fully explain the decline of kendhuren. Weddings, a ritual that continues to 
be marked as a nexus showing belonging and status transition of a family in the 
neighborhood, have become more lavish than ever, but without kendhuren. Guinness thus 
writes (ibid: 156): 
The acknowledgement of community was not lost, however, for the wedding 
reception was preceded the night before by an Islamic prayer ceremony 
(pengajian) at both the bride's and bridegroom's parental homes, attended in each 
case by probably 200 RW neighbours. 
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In the Sinaran neighborhood where I attended Ibu De's daughter's wedding in June, 
there were more than 150 RW neighbors in attendance. The attire of the bride, groom, 
and four parents and the theme of the wedding in general was an emulation of an opulent 
Javanese royal wedding, which was considered as the standard for a "traditional Javanese 
wedding" today. Across from them sat the guests, the vast majority of whom were 
women in their miscellaneously-colored headscarves and layered robes, at least forty of 
them from the pengajian group. Men only constituted a small portion of the guests, and 
were usually office-holders in the RW, seated away from the stage where four parents 
were seated on royal throne. 
Weddings were not the only type of rite of passage in which women outnumber men 
as guests sitting in front. In fact, in all types of public rituals held by Muslim families I 
have attended, encompassing circumcisions weddings, funerals, post-funeral 
commemorations, Islamic holidays, and other syukuran to mark smaller turning points 
(such as a birthday, promotion, graduation, etc.), this has been always the case. In more 
rural areas near Salatiga, however, the gender pattern of communal rituals still conforms 
to the logic of "men outside, women inside" that were captured in previous ethnographic 
accounts. The phenomenon of women-majority on the public side, then, is more 
prominent in urban settings. 
Because these rituals often take place over the weekend or after the late afternoon in 
the day, and because many participants are professional women themselves, "men are at 
work" does not seem to explain the gender skew among the ritual participants. In an early 
135 
account of this phenomenon, Brenner expresses the difficulty she faces in explaining it 
(1998. 175-76): 
It was equally striking, given the ethnographic record, that women, not men, were 
carrying out the rites as the representatives of their households. These were not 
unimportant rituals...almost invariably, women outnumbered the men by a 
significant margin.. .How are we to account for the fact that.. .women are entrusted 
more than men with matters of ritual efficacy, as well as with matters of money? 
Conceptualizing this phenomenon as "the gap between ideology and practice" (ibid, 176). 
Brenner points out a strong sense among women that it is their obligation to carry out the 
endless cycle of ritual duties. Here, I wish to reinterpret this development and view the 
female-majority public ritual today in a diachronic way by examining the types of 
essential social networks in the neighborhoods that support such a transformation. 
Like Norma (1994) and John Sullivan (1992) in their research based on fieldwork in 
Yogyakarta during the 1980s, Alison Murray identifies women-centered networks as the 
backbone of the kampung community in Jakarta in the 1990s (1991, 80). Guinness 
synthesizes these approaches (2009,19), and compares women's neighborhood groups in 
Jakarta and those in Yogyakarta. While the former build social networks through Koran-
reading sessions and rotating credit societies (arisan), they are not involved in 
organization of ceremonial feasts like those in Yogyakarta, partially because the 
population is too heterogeneous and fluctuating in Jakarta. In this vein, women's 
neighborhood networks in Yogyakarta seem to present a stronger role in public rituals. 
Like those in Yogyakarta, women's neighborhood networks in Salatiga are heavily 
implicated in the local ceremonial feasts. What is new is not the continued importance of 
women-centered networks and communal rituals, but their new publicity. 
Beyond the scope of the local neighborhood, a further theoretical implication is the 
part women's public roles play in redefining moral communities through religious 
activism. In her work on the veiling movement during the 1980s in Turkey, Gole 
observes the centrality of women's imagery in both the Islamic revival and the "master" 
it strives to rebel against: a western, secular, and homogenizing modernity (1996, 17). 
Female students' veiling is thus a political claim that interrogates "the modernization 
experiences" (ibid, 83) in Turkey, and the most visible emblem of politicized Islam. Deeb 
(2006) tells a different story in Lebanon about how Shi'i women do not see the relation 
between Islam and modernity as antagonistic, but instead view Islam as a better form of 
modernity that outshines the western modernity which, for its materialism and 
individualism, suffers from moral decadence and communal disintegration. Like Gole 
and Deeb, I see engagement in religious life as personal strategies for women to acquire 
public forms of visibility and even gain some leverage in the political territory. What 
differentiates the story I present here is that the fault line is not between "the forbidden 
modern" and Western modernity or between "an enchanted modern" and the corrupt 
western modernity, but between "Just Islam" and "the fanatic Islam." In other words, the 
pengajian movement and feminization of public rituals are accompanied by aims to reset 
the terms of sociality of the community against the local constructs of Islamic fanaticism. 
In what follows, I present women's more conspicuous involvement on the public 
side of rituals through the lens of women's Koranic sermon groups. I argue that women's 
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successful pengajian have allied them closely with Islamic activities. Subsequently, those 
re-Islamized public rituals also yield more public room to women and their anti-zealot 
voice. 
The ascendance of pengajian 
Pengajian (Indo. kaji. to study, pengajian, the study) is a meeting that incorporates a 
brief Islamic sermon that has become a crucial wheel gearing the neighborhood life 
cycles in Central Java over the recent decades. Although pengajian was once viewed as 
an electoral stratagem designed to court Muslim voters (Ward 1974, 82), or a public 
vehicle for reformist Islamic movements to propagate a state-dictated ideal of 
womanhood (Baried 1986), today it has become a truly popularized social activity that 
have been normalized into everyday lives. 
In Salatiga, there are routinized weekly pengajian and holiday pengajian. The 
former is run by neighborhoods and clubs regularly based on the Javanese calendar (5 
days a week, 35 days a month) or the common calendar (7 days a week); the latter was 
held by the government and mosques at all levels on Maulud (the Prophet's birthday). 
Ascension Day of the Prophet, Sura/Muharrarn (Islamic New Year) as well as I Jul Adha 
and Idxd Fitri. In addition to these major events, pengajian has figured more prominently 
in all the slametan. which has now been often called by urban residents under the 
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category of syukuran or simply under the name of specific purposes of each life-cycle 
rites, such as pernikahan, khitanan, sunatan, tahlilan, etc. On ordinary days, there is 
pengajian: on special days, there is also pengajian. So entrenched and naturalized is the 
existence of pengajian in Salatiga today that one of the members of pengajian in Sinaran 
answered my question as to when the "pengajian' was initiated, she immediately replied 
"since the time of the Prophet." 
Depending on the definition one takes, the origin of pengajian can be traced back to. 
what Dhofier identified as an educational part of the pesantren (Islamic boarding school) 
tradition (1980, 27-29) and what Geertz observed as weekly prayer meetings (1960. 168-
70) named pengaosan (Jv. "the reading") in Eastern Central Java in the 1950s. Since the 
1980s, ethnographic evidence shows that all sorts of neighborhood pengajian have been 
implemented by different interest groups, including Golkar, the government-sponsored 
and the then permanent ruling party, other reformist Muslim groups such as 
Muhammadiyah, and the traditionalist group, NU (Hefner 1987, 545-47; Jones 1984; 
Weix 1998). Accordingly, the meaning of pengajian has increasingly become the 
neighborhood Islamic sermon clubs (Weix 1998), largely independent from pesantren. 
Recently, Bruinessen and Wajidi (2006) portrayed the current pengajian in a 
delightful fashion: "The pengajian or religious sermon is a major form of entertainment 
in Muslim villages, taking place at set intervals (once a week, biweekly, or monthly). A 
good preacher (muballigh) combines the skills and styles of the stand-up comedians, the 
moral critic and the political agitator and teaches simple moral lessons in a highly 
entertaining form. ...it is widely believed that attending pengajian brings religious merit" 
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(ibid, 235). In a similar vein, the Indonesian anthropologist Bambang Pranowo noticed 
that in the rural area of the Magelang regency in the late 1980s, being humoris 
("humorous") (Pranowo 2009, 154) and keeping the audience from falling asleep is a 
touchstone of a successful pengajian preacher. While pengajian constitutes a path for 
enriching religious knowledge and cultivating moral selves, the successful pengajian is 
conducted in an entertaining way so that "no single heart would be hurt" (ibid). The 
socializing power of pengajian is remarkable, and the jokes and witty wisdom given by 
the preacher in the sermon become a topic for several weeks among the villagers. 
Women and the neighborhood pengajian 
The neighborhood-based pengajian groups in Salatiga vary. Some, unlike Sinaran 
and Graha, do have fixed preachers. Some have joint Koranic sermon sessions in addition 
to regular sex-divided meetings. In most cases, however, men and women do not attend 
pengajian together; instead they have separate clubs. In general, women's pengajian are 
more successful and better organized than men's. In Graha and Sinaran, women meet 
more than three times a month, whereas men only meet every month or two. Moreover, 
the number of male participants is not as many. In terms of charity, the donations from 
women's groups could often significantly contribute to sponsoring orphanages and 
distributing food to the poor. Women are said to be more rajin (diligent) than men in 
attending pengajian. There are also pengajian for children and teenagers on a weekly 
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basis. However, many middle-class households would rather spend more on hiring tutors 
to teach their children at home to obtain higher quality of reading skills. In the adult 
pengajian, not every participant needs to be able to read Arabic script; many read Arabic 
with Latin transliteration, while others simply rely on the arts of memory. 
In terms of the professions of the members of pengajian, those in Sinaran vary from 
small entrepreneurs, lower-ranking civil servants, teachers, petty vendors, to housewives 
and labor workers. In Graha, they vary from schoolteachers, entrepreneurs, to civil 
servants and housewives. Some of the pengajian members in Graha have made the 
pilgrimage to Mecca, the cost of (36 million rupiah, about 3600 US dollars) which was 
beyond the financial capacity of all members of the Koranic sermon group in Sinaran. 
For the latter, the cost of such a trip was more than several years of gross income for an 
entire family. This limited financial capacity and socio-economic footing that prevented 
the vast majority of Sinaran residents from the Holy lands was once amusingly reflected 
in a sermon given by a male preacher in a routine pengajian: 
If [you] want to make the pilgrimage please read sural Ibrahim (the chapter of 
Abraham), but if [you are] already impatient please read surat tanah (the 
certificate of land ownership). 
Although divided by socio-economic differences, women in Sinaran and Graha 
share a similar interest in organizing pengajian. In Sinaran, the women's pengajian takes 
place once a week on Tuesday or Thursday late afternoons, except the second week. 
Every selapan (35 days), based on a combination of the Javanese (five days a week) and 
Gregorian calendar, one more pengajian would be added. The typical number of 
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participants of women's pengajian varies each time, but usually around 50 people and 
occasionally more, organized by an emcee, a chanter, a translator who reads the Koranic 
verses in Indonesian, and a sermon preacher. The group rotates locations within the 
neighborhood mosques and each time invites different teachers, mostly local male 
preachers such as retired schoolteachers or religious teachers. In Graha, the women's 
pengajian takes place once a week on Friday afternoons at four, except the forth week of 
the month. Members meet regularly in the main mosque and each time invites speakers 
from STAIN, Muhammadiyah, NU, or the Department of Religion in the city. The 
number of participants of pengajian is usually around 60 people and occasionally more, 
organized by an emcee, a Koranic chanting leader, a translator who reads the verses in 
Indonesian, and an invited sermon preacher. 
A pengajian meeting usually started with the customary shaking hands all around, 
with one's right hand lightly brushing that of another person, and then brought back to 
one's chest. This must be done with everyone already on the scene, except when one is 
very late and the activity has already started. During this time, women would chat about 
household affairs and health matters, while a box for donations was passed around. The 
MC would announce news and remind the members of the next meeting time and 
location. Then the teacher, usually a male, an ustadz, occasionally a female, an ustadia, 
would show up. The group then started chanting some Koranic verses, followed by a 
translation, and then the sermon. The sermon might last from half an hour to an hour. 
After the sermon, it was chanting again, while the snack boxes and hot tea served in 
covered glasses were passed hand to hand from the entrance of the hall until the foods 
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reached everyone. Hot tea is usually heavily sugary; the snack box, often hand-made by 
members, consists of a combination of standard refreshments: tahu (fried tofu), tahu isi 
(fried tofu filled with young bamboo shoots), sosis (egg roll with chicken filling), krupuk 
(deep fried starch-based crackers), kripik singkong (cassava chips), pudding, and 3-5 raw 
green peppers or more. After the boxes were distributed, the attendants would shake each 
other's hands again and quickly clear out. 
In what follows, I wish to extend the significance of the rise of the pengajian by 
presenting the ways it has reinvigorated women's social footing in local communities and 
facilitated an Islamic avenue to a more public profile for pious women. To do so, I 
introduce the stories of Ibu Eka and Ibu Siti, and present two social gatherings in which 
the activities of pengajian members embody the reconstituting forces of communal 
rituals and of the community proper. 
Ibu Eka: a struggle for respect in Sinaran 
Ibu Eka was born in 1968 in Cebu, East Java, in a Javanese family that loosely 
affiliated with the Islamic traditions of NU, although she was never educated in an 
Islamic boarding school. Since she was a little girl, she had shown her talent in singing 
without receiving professional instructions. After graduating from high school, she 
became a professional singer for ceremonial events in a rebana band in Semarang, where 
they played a wide variety of music including religious songs, campur sari and pop 
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music. Her rebana groups had won several awards in competitions and contributed to 
local ceremonies, whose photos Ibu Eka proudly framed and hang on the walls of her 
living room. It was in Semarang she met her future husband, a middle-ranking civil 
servant originally from Salatiga. Even though she had a strong aspiration to continue her 
career in Semarang, due to the marriage she gave up the career and moved to Salatiga in 
1995. Nevertheless, her renown as a singer was soon spread by word of mouth in 
Salatiga. A rebana group centered at downtown started to invite her as a guest singer in 
ceremonial events. 
After three miscarriages, Ibu Eka had a son and a daughter born in 1998 and 2003. 
The younger one also started formal schooling, and therefore Ibu Eka decided to devote 
more time to taking care of them and only occasionally accepted part-time job as a singer. 
Nevertheless, she has still been busy with her engagement in the PKK meetings. 
pengajian and mosque activities. Neighbors appreciated her outgoing spirit of leadership 
to a point that just a few years ago when the RT was electing a new head of the RT after 
the Christian Father RT had served the neighborhood for more than three terms, many 
asked Ibu Eka, not her husband, to be the head of the RT. 
But Ibu Eka declined. She thought that would add too much burden on what she 
already had on her plate. Her most avid concerns now was simply getting her children 
good educations, saving money for her parents to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
accumulate more religious merits (amalan) for herself. Each goal was not easy. First of 
all. she just spent lots of money in holding her son's circumcision ceremony. Second, she 
has sent her children to an Islamic elementary school on the southwest edge of the city in 
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hopes that one day at least one of her children could study in apesantren. "Because 
studying in a pesantren [one] can be enlightened... isn't that we eventually would return 
to the Heaven? If [one] becomes a pious child (anak sholeh), the merits [of the parents] 
would be magnified," she said. At this passionate remark, an expression of worry 
descended upon her. "But then," she said. "[I am] not sure whether they want to do it or 
not." 
One evening in March in her house located on the main road of Sinaran, Ibu Eka 
was showing to me the photos of us that were taken in her son's circumcision ceremony. 
In one of those photos, I was in full Javanese attire of kebaya and sarong when many Ibu 
from the Koranic sermon group were so proud and told me that I looked "just like a 
Javanese" and smiled at my loose headscarf. In another photo, Ibu Eka and I were closely 
leaning against each other's forehead when we were checking together the sms messages 
she sent me about a "Muslim fashion show." Unlike in public, where she was always 
shining, confident, and assertive, at home, she seemed a lot more relaxed. She took off 
her headscarf in front of me, and shared with me her views about her neighborhood, 
including the importance ofpengajian for individuals. Ibu Eka was motivated by a 
passion to engage in religious activities, such as maulud, pengajian and other rituals, 
colorfully characterized by her as the way to "heighten the merits." Moreover, 
recognizing that women have been more diligent in organizing pengajian, Ibu Eka 
implied that men have been a bit "too lazy" sometimes. Answering my question why 
most of the guests in important rites of passages were women, Ibu Eka replied, "Isn't that 
we have pengajian? Isn't that mothers would exchange information and let each other 
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know [what is going on]? Fathers also have their pengajian. But really [they are] not as 
diligent as those of the mothers." 
For Ibu Eka, harvesting copious religious rewards that would eventually accrue to 
her was extremely important. But there was one more reason why Ibu Eka strongly felt 
the social gathering facilitated by pengajian and syukuran was essential to harbor the 
integrity of her community. She explained to me that those (who represented) "Islam 
fanatik" had emerged everywhere in Salatiga, such as the Salafit Father RT who had 
forbidden his female family members interacting with people until recently (see 
Introduction). "Fanatic as such, if we do not guard against them, what would happen to 
us? Later people would say Islam is broken, fanatic, and discordant." If Ibu Eka and other 
neighbors have successfully ''converted back" the Salafist by forcing him to interact with 
people "normally," their attitude towards Christians were much more ambivalent. 
Although she felt it was necessary to spread the true messages of Islam that emphasized 
harmony and mutual help, she was not entirely happy about Christians often being the 
heads of the neighborhood associations. In her view, this was a sign of the "foolishness" 
of the Muslim majority that needs to be changed. But her discontent did not change her 
aversion to those who refused to partake in the neighborhood lives and her positive 
attitude towards Muslim-Christian interactions. "I am kind with every body... even though 
I am Islamic, the family of the head of the [former] RT [who are Christians] must be 
invited.. .how can it be otherwise? I do not favor one over another (pilih kasih). Even the 
Christians are also intimate (akrab) with me!" 
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Ibu Siti: Setting an exemplar in Graha 
Ibu Siti, aged 53, is an elementary school teacher, a high-ranking cadre in the 
Salatiga branch of Aisyiah, a grandmother, and the head of PKK in her RT. She is from a 
Muhammadiyah family that runs batik trades in Yogyakarta. She and her husband are 
cousins, so she often said "'masih saudara" ("still siblings") to describe their kinship 
relationship. They had Arab ancestry three generations ago, and that was partially why 
they practiced endogamy. She has been living in Graha since 1986 with her husband, now 
a high-ranking manager of Coca-Cola factory in Central Java. She has five children, and 
the oldest daughter recently finished her bachelor degree in Universitas Muhammadiyah 
Yogyakarta. One of them was currently studying in Semarang, and the other three were 
still in elementary school, middle school and high school, respectively. She hired tutors to 
come to teach these younger children how to read the Koran. The thing she encouraged 
all of her children to do was pray together as a family. 
After I befriended Ibu Siti while we were engaged in the activity of cutting and 
dividing raw meat on Idul-Adha in the main mosque of Graha, one afternoon in 
December, 2009,1 was invited to have lunch with her in her house, where we chatted 
about the recently cancelled monthly meeting of Aisyiah due to a heavy downpour. Ibu 
Siti was very disappointed, but admitted that the cadres of Aisyiah tend to be busy 
professional women. More than half of the members of Aisyiah in Salatiga were 
schoolteachers or even principals, and therefore they were often overwhelmed by their 
work and their duties in the organization. "But since we are Aisyiah, we have the duty to 
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do our work, no?" she said. Despite all the trouble that organizing events and networks 
might cause, Ibu Siti was quite proud of her devotion to Aisyiah as well as her work in 
PKK. She said through PKK, they have worked with the government to make the 
community more prosperous and healthy. This included disseminating the government 
policy, delivering subsidies to the poor, circulating vitamins and food supplements, 
transmitting knowledge about vaccination, reproductive health and about childcare to the 
general public. 
In addition to serv ing as the head of PKK, Ibu Siti was also often called upon to 
wash the bodies of women who just passed away in the neighborhood. Originally, Ibu 
Zulfa was not berani ("brave'') enough to do so. But with the help of Ibu Siti, now both 
of them take any call from neighbors to do so. "Only those whose spirituality is strong 
(imanyang kuat) can wash the deceased's body and assist the ritual after one's death," 
Ibu Siti said, "people could do these things themselves but sometimes their iman is not 
strong enough. So if the one that died is a woman, I would go there to help out." With 
regard to my question whether the postmortem procedure should be entrusted to a modin. 
Ibu Siti replied. "Actually, if people have the correct knowledge to conduct the 
procedures then we no longer need modin." 
The experience that Ibu Siti took the most pride in, however, was the pilgrimage she 
made with her husband in 2008. She was completely absorbed by a passion for being in 
Mecca with other Muslims every time she remembered it. She opened her albums to 
show me her photos taken in Mecca and Medina, excitingly recounting the scenes to me: 
So-o-o many people!!! All Muslims from all over the world! I also spoke Arabic 
with people from Turkey. Mongolia, and China. So-o-o happy...And they really 
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made this so easy for Indonesians to be there. For Indonesians, if we eat bread, we 
never feel full, because we eat rice. They served us with all the foods we want! 
There was bakso (meat ball), soto (spiced soup)... everything! This is because 
Indonesian pilgrims are the largest group, the largest, in Mecca. 
This sense of the universal Muslim community has a particular role in Graha. As 
shown in the various affiliations of regular preachers in the main mosque and my survey 
of members of the women's Koranic group, the residents are quite evenly divided into 
supporters of Muhammadiyah, NU, and "Just Islam" (those who refused to take sides). 
With regard to these diversities, Ibu Siti commented on the discrepancies between NU 
and Muhammadiyah including grave visiting, post-funeral rituals, and so forth. When I 
asked about the prayer of Qunut, Ibu Siti was impressed by my knowledge and explained 
to me its significance in the neighborhood. The paryer of Qunut in subuh (the morning 
prayer) is often practiced by NU followers but discouraged by Muhammaidyah followers 
for it is considered as illegitimate bidah' (innovation). This often causes problems in 
major holidays when one may pray with other people who have different manners of 
praying. Ibu Siti told me how things worked in the morning prayer in Graha: 
Even though we know who is Muhammahdiyah and who is NU, but 
Muhammadiyah and NU are still siblings... Well, usually the prayer leader {imam) 
in here would invariably do the prayer of Qunut in subuh, which I don't do. I just 
stand there and wait. I don't read it. I still get up at four every morning, go to 
mosque and pray with other neighbors! I am not fanatikl 
Not only do the Muhammadiyah and the NU people worship together, but Christians 
and Muslims live in peace side by side, according to l£>u Siti. Like Ibu Zulfa, who just 
lives a few blocks a way, Ibu Siti confidently pointed out that her Christian neighbors 
always dropped by to greet her on Idul Fitir. and she did the same on Christmas. 
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Although, Ibu Siti recounted, recently something strange happened. There was a 
Christian family across the alley that went to ''the Bethel Church" (a Pentecostal 
congregation, as 1 figured), and sometimes there were people hysterically wailing in this 
household. One day, Ibu Siti dropped by, cordially asking what happened and whether 
they needed help. The neighbor said they were fine. At that moment, Ibu Siti realized that 
they were having a service at home. 
But it was fine, she said, after all, it was like climbing Mount Merapi; everyone had 
a different path, but the goal was all the same. This recurring mountain climbing 
metaphor was nevertheless followed by a qualification by Ibu Siti. There were some 
people whose path was simply "lost" (sesat), sinking in the "misguided streams" (aliran 
sesat). These were people who used the name of Islam to exercise violence, coercion and 
over-displayed religiosity to disrupt social harmony. Ibu Siti reasoned that having 
pengajian and collective worship in the mosque across the lines between Muhammadiyah 
and NU was an effective way to set examples for people. Despite minor differences, they 
are still siblings and the neighborhood should maintain its sociable character. Moreover, 
people had to work together to check the rising tide of Islam fanatic, whose behaviors 
were "over the top (keterlebihan)," she said, pointing her finger towards the northeastern 
outskirts of the city. "There," Ibu Siti uttered, alluding to the looming images of women 
enshrouded in black cadar (chador. a full-length garb that covers the entire body and face 
except eyes), riding motorbikes, and disappearing into the woods only a few miles away 
from Graha. 
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A circumcision ceremony in Graha 
On a Sunday morning of January in 2009,1 was walking slowly with other mothers 
from the Koranic sermon group in their variously-colored kebaya, sarong, and jilbab to 
Ibu Eka's house for her son's circumcision ritual (.sunatan). In addition to kebaya and 
sarong. I only wore a loose kerudung—one of those that Ibu De often prepared for me in 
advance—over my hair. Although this was a circumcision ceremony, it should be noted 
that the boy already had his surgery in a hospital several days earlier. Physically, he 
already disunat (was circumcised), but socially and symbolically he was not until the 
community recognized it collectively. The organization of the public ritual retained the 
power of efficacy in legitimizing one's social status in the community. As Woodward 
(1988, 80) and Beatty (Beatty 1999, 34) have observed, the guests in a public ritual are 
present not as passive audience but as active sekse (Jv. "witnesses") validating the 
reiterated intentions of the host and as participants in completing a collective prayer. 
The gathering started at 10 am, and at the time the road was already saturated with 
sounds of buoyant Arabic music. As people started to sit in under the tent or within the 
opened space in Ibu Eka's house and her neighbors", the number of guests reached about 
150, mostly married adults and only a few young adults. Women numbered more than 
120. and the dominant group consisted of regular attendants of women's Koranic sermon 
group. At the entrance of the tent stood the adult greeters: two Christians, the wife of the 
former heads of RT and RW, as well as two Muslims, the closest neighbors of Ibu Eka. 
Meanwhile, five teenage girls delivered snack and tea to the guests. Behind the stage on 
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the porch sat a rebana band consisting often female hand drummers, all in their blue 
robe uniforms with identical jilbab, one leading singer in the uniform but her jilbab was 
decorated with purple floral motifs one leading singer (in her shining purple jilbab), one 
male keyboard player, one male tambourine player, and one female drummer. 
Women were seated separately from men as long as the pengajian lasted. Many of 
the female guests were seated right in front of the stage, while the men mostly stayed in 
the back. All the speakers in the ritual turned out to be men only. Songs of Shalawat Nabi 
opened the ceremony, followed by the opening speech given by the former Pak RT and 
more songs of Shalawat Nabi. A young but skillful male preacher gave the Arabic prayer, 
and it was the turn for the representative of the family to thank the community on behalf 
of the father, mother and son, who at this moment were standing in a line on the stage. 
What followed was a rather amusing pengajian delivered by a preacher, which I shall 
discuss soon. After the pengajian more Shalawat came, this time featuring Ibu Eka 
herself as the leading singer who selected songs to convey a special message to her son. 
Only after this, and after a final prayer, during which the sexually segregated 
congregation opened their palms facing upwards, would the ritual meal start. 
The meal was rather opulent, neatly placed on a wood table inside the house, which 
served as a buffet. Before all the guests left, they gave contribution to Ibu Eka. This must 
be done in rather discreet ways, usually by folding one's buwuh (an envelop with money 
inside) into a very small packet, so that the transition of the buwuh between hands was as 
invisible as possible. 20,000 Rupiah (about 2 dollars) was an appropriate number, as Ibu 
De had already instructed me, but it could depend on one's wish as well. In the old days, 
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as Ibu Eka and Ibu De told me, rice or other goods were also acceptable. Nevertheless, 
nowadays the trend of giving money in an envelope has largely replaced the old way 
here. 
Marriage, as the defining marker of full-blown adulthood, retained its significance in 
Salatiga. yet people also preserved the idea that marriage was rite of passage for a girl to 
become a woman, whereas for a boy to become a man. it was the circumcision ceremony 
that defined the transition (Geertz 1960, 51). In any case, the two ceremonies in the 
neighborhood have shared eminent significance in a family's social footing. They may be 
quite lavish, depending on the parents who wish to transfer the ritual luxury into public 
recognition to what degree. The recognition of the neighbors are vital, and the styles and 
repertoires these two kinds of ceremonies would linger as a topic of conversation with 
neighbors. For this particular sunatan, Ibu Eka spent more than 15 million rupiah (about 
USD 1670) to cover the cost of the foods, the rebana (Arabic music) band, the 
decoration, the invited preachers and so forth. Considering the estimate for the monthly-
living expenditure on average for an urban Central Javanese household in 2005 was 
between USD 120 to 150', the household basically paid what a family would normally 
spend for a whole year on a ritual that only lasts for two and a half hours. Even if every 
guest contributed USD 2, it would only cover less than one fifth of the cost. But Ibu Eka, 
who designed, managed and organized the event, told me that it was worth it. To a boy, a 
circumcision ceremony is just as important as a marriage ceremony is to a young woman. 
5 Based on various statistics of BPS Central Java 2005, expenditure per capita multiple the household 
size. 
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Moreover, if her son did not get a proper simatan, she reasoned, his amal (merits) would 
not count. 
A relatively long sermon was given to entertain the ritual witnesses. As I mentioned 
above, moral messages and jokes are both indispensable components to a sermon. The 
following is a selected and much condensed record of an episode during the interaction 
between the invited kyai and the audience. 1 would first dwell on the common themes that 
a pengajian in other occasions would cover and entertain, which could contain some 
subversive performances of some hackneyed gender ideologies. I then move to examine 
the gendered structures of ritual in the event. Here, it should be noted that since women 
and men were seated separately, it was very clear that the preacher was mostly talking to 
and interacting with the women rather than the men. 
Preacher: Raising a kid is no easy thing...[considering all those] expenses, [one] 
still can't be sure that the kid will be a good person.. .the happiness of this life is 
not lasting...perhaps one can obtain a beautiful wife, but then, as time goes 
by...the wife will also become NOT pretty... 
Women: [laughed out loud ] 
P: It's more important to have a pious wife than a beautiful wife, [so one can 
have] heaven in this world. 
W: Yes. 
P: [turning his head to the male audience] Don't be mad at [your] wife! Because 
[my] wife is the one who makes me not unchaste, who educated my kids, and who 
will determine whether I will go to hell or heaven, [turning back to the female 
audience] If your daughter is proposed to by two men, [and] one of them is not 
handsome... and NOT pious, while the other is handsome and pious, what to do 
now? [pause]. Of course you choose the one that is handsome and piouslW 
People: [laughing.] 
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P: Yet your daughter should also look at the mirror to see whether she is beautiful 
or not. 
P: [laughing loud again] 
K: Hopefully [your daughter] will obtain a husband as handsome as [President] 
SBY.) 
W: Yes. Amen. 
(underscored: High Javanese; italicized: Low Javanese: non-formatted: Indonesian) 
Preaching episodes like these, however entertaining, were considered to be ilmu and 
pen gat ah nan, that is, knowledge. Being humorous was a way of effectively engaging the 
audience, and this preacher was an expert. For example, on the subject of beauty, the 
preacher reversed a cliche about men's insatiable lust to seek beauty. He in fact pleased 
the female audience by giving women a license to look for a perfect, pious and handsome 
man, creating a sarcastic rhetoric by redistributing the rights to be lustful to women. 
This episode reveals that, while the purpose of the ceremony is sunatan. the focus of 
the sermon falls on parenthood and marital relations. More details about the changing 
marital ideals will be discussed in chapter 4. Here, suffice it to say that the experience of 
marriage (including broken ones) remains a near-universal institution in Indonesia despite 
dramatic changes since the 1970s. In the 1950s, the divorce rates of populations in Java 
were among the highest in the world. Ever since the implementation of 1974 Marriage 
Law, the divorce rate dropped abruptly and statistical marital stability increased 
significantly (Heaton, Cammack, and Young 2001). Delayed marriage and higher 
autonomy of individuals also compromised the older notion of marriage as a necessary 
rite of passage but dissolvable partnership, in the direction of the companionate marriage 
tied by emotional bonds. The ethics involving in the maintenance of a prosperous 
marriage, then, becomes a vital issue for the guardians of public morality, the religious 
preachers. It is thus not surprising that marital relations have been among the "must-talk' 
topics in the repertoires of a pengajian. 
In the sermon, after the brief greeting in Arabic to show his Islamic knowledge and 
High Javanese to show his ritual sophistication, the preacher started with formal 
Indonesian. He then quickly switched to Low Javanese to be entertaining. The message 
of this sermon would be more striking to anyone who knows the Javanese phrase 
"suwarga nunut neraka katut" (heaven or hell, a wife follows her husband, or the 
happiness or the sufferings of women depends on their husbands). This phrase is often 
used by indigenous feminists, the idea of which may be vividly epitomized in the stories 
of the classic early 19th century "Encyclopedia of Java" or Serai Centhini. In some 
versions of these supposedly patriarchal stories, however, the pious woman even rescued 
an abusive, devious husband from hell, hence reversing the logic of dependence while 
burdening women with the responsibility for morality. It is clear that the idiom was 
reversed in the sermon: the husband's deeds do not determine the wife's fate; rather, it is 
the wife's treatment that determines the husband's fate. 
Of course, all possible discursive interpretations would have little currency as long 
as they remain without resonance for the audience. It ultimately depends on the listener, 
with all her enduring dispositions, to determine the meaning. In this instance, the 
eloquent preacher chose to interact more with women and to get a sense of approval from 
them. The popularity and the legitimacy of each idea and sentence were constantly 
156 
reinforced or negotiated by a resounding wave of "inggih" (High Jv. Yes) or a bored 
silence. In this sense, the sermon was perhaps not only women-friendly but almost 
obsequious. 
Why? Among the educated members the pengajian in Sinaran and Graha, the 
importance of the idea that Judgment is based on a spiritual methodological individualism 
is difficult to be overstated. Everyone needs to take responsibility for what she has done, 
without exception and regardless of sex. Read in this vein, the sermon's message is not 
that the husband's fate depends on the wife's but rather, his fate depends on his deeds, 
including how he treats his wife. 
Underlying this notion of individual responsibility is the assumption of a bounded 
individual with exclusive responsibility for his or her own actions and an independent 
religious subjectivity inaccessible to others. This religious individualism has been a 
hallmark of Islamic reformism since the end of the nineteenth century, and the 
subsequent religious debates and social conflict have been well documented (Bowen 
1993; Ricklefs 2007). 
In the narratives of Ibu Siti and Ibu Eka, however, it was clear that the believer's 
ethical personhood was not only defined by such individualism, but also constituted by a 
network of social relationships and a concern for defining and defending community. Ibu 
Eka's devotion to public rituals and communal solidarity is not hindered by her pursuit of 
merits through exalting the Prophet and attending the pengajian. Even for loyal followers 
of Muhammadiyah such as Ibu Siti. Mbak Catur and her father, reconciling Islamic 
individualism with social relationships in the neighborhood has become as important as 
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their reformist worldview. They celebrate holidays they disagree about, and worship with 
the prayers they disbelieve in, as shown in the beginning of this chapter, because 
"Muhammadiyah and NU are still siblings." 
Parallel to this reconciliation between individual piety and social obligation is a 
gendered transformation of the ritual. Certainly, in most of these predominantly Muslim 
occasions the religious leaders are expected to be men if the audience consists of both 
sexes. This rule was often explained in reference to Islamic laws. Notwithstanding, a 
synchronic portrait of this gender asymmetry between the male speakers and female 
audience would miss a diachronic transformation that is emergent: the previous male-
exclusive nature of public enactment of ceremony complemented by female-exclusive 
preparation of food and offering behind the scenes, has given way to the female-dominant 
public enactment of key rituals in urban communities. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
the preachers are invariably men. women are less pupils to be educated than the audience 
to be entertained and served by the male preachers who are invited to give sermons and 
who are concerned with earning favor among the audience to accumulate reputation and 
future invitations. 
This is not say. however, that male-dominated kenduren has become a relic of the 
past. Kenduren in Salsatiga was still exclusively practiced among men, but its scale has 
become smaller, its duration shorter, and its significance diminished. In a sense, although 
kenduren in Salatiga did not decline swiftly as it did in Ledok, Yogyakarta, it has 
nevertheless become more privatized. By contrast, public rituals incorporating pengajian 
have become more elaborated, more public, and featuring female-majority participants. 
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Pengajian before Ramadan in Graha 
On a Friday afternoon in August when the beginning of Ramadan was around the 
corner, women from the Graha pengajian group were moving and piling up snack boxes 
outside on the porch of the mosque. An old lady I never met was escorted by her family 
under an umbrella against the drizzles that still remained after a downpour, stepping 
slowly towards us. Ibu Rini. one of the administrators of the group was busy examining 
the agenda of the day and counting the inventory of snack boxes. Since people came a bit 
late, the invited usladz, who was an officer in the city Department of Religion and 1 
chatted a while before the event began. Learning that I was an ''S-three" (Ph.D.) student, 
he was amazed and joked that he was "S-four'1—four years of study, meaning college, a 
title that does not really exist. He also encouraged me to get married earlier when I was 
still young. This topic came my away all the time but I still had not grown out of an 
expression of awkwardness in my response. Luckily, Ibu Rini, a follower of NU, who 
was charging with the food preparation today, happened to pass by us and reminded me 
that after the pengajian I should bring more snack boxes home. At this time, it was 
already half an hour waiting of "jam karet" ("rubber time,'' meaning a cultural habit of 
not being punctual). Fifty women eventually filled into the mosque against the platform 
where the invited ustadz would stand. In addition to the speaker, there were also three 
other men from the neighborhood, one was another preacher, the other two were the 
office-holders of the RT. Unlike the arrangement of gender separation in worship in the 
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mosque, where women were seated always behind men, in the women's pengajian, 
women were seated in front of all the men except the preacher. 
After the moderator's introduction and an Arabic prayer, the sermon started. The 
ustadz preached about the balance between reason and passion, and illustrated that 
possessing both reason and passion was unique to humans, who were distinguished from 
angels and animals. Here is an excerpt from the sermon: 
Ustadz: That is the case for the angels...right?... So how many times of rakaat 
(prayer-unit)? 8 times will do, 20 times wi 11 do. Even 40 limes will do, and even 100 
times... well, please try. 
Women: (laughed). 
Ustadz: For example earlier at noon you prayed 100 times and every time [you] 
read Al-Fatihah, just tip to 5 times alone [you were] already tired. 
Women: (laughed). 
Ustadz: This is because we are humans. Last night I watched the World Cup from 1 
am to 4 am, that [was] strong. Why? Because of passion. How enjoyable [watching 
football ;.v/.'...[we are] given reason and passion by Gusti— 
Women: A-11 ah. 
Ustadz: Like Pak Mukid last night ...[who usually has to] leave the house at 6. but 
watching football game until 4 before going to bed, [he] wrote "Mother, please 
wake me up at 6" on a note and placed the note next to his wife who was in sleep. 
The Mother woke up at 5:30...and wrote "Father 1 already wake you up at 6, come 
on get upand placed it on top of the place [where] Pak Mukid slept. With the 
awakening note, Pak Mukid slept until 9. He asked his wife, "Mother, I asked you to 
wake me up at 6, how come [I was] not awaken, now what?" "Don't be like that. 
Father. I already did. You asked me with writing, I also woke you with wiring." Pak 
Mukid was not mad because he felt he did it wrong... 
(underscored: High Javanese; italicized: Low Javanese; non-formatted: Indonesian) 
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The preacher then commented about men's susceptbility to desire, explaining that 
men themselves have to take the responsibility for the consequences of their passions, 
instead of blaming their wives. In general, the twenty-five-minute sermon, although often 
tangential in style, was pivoted around the weakness of the passion for ritual observance 
of men and women, the problem in communication between a husband and a wife, and 
the importance of avoiding anger. At the end, he expressed his wish that everyone could 
maintain her ritual purity (including physical and emotional fasting) during the fasting 
month, however hard it could be. 
The spatial arrangement and linguistic interactions in this pengjian reveal some 
complex interplay of gender relations. The ritual space was occupied in an inverted way, 
where women occupy the main place of the mosque, the more prestigious spots, while 
men stayed behind. Needless to say, this was a social gathering where women 
outnumbered men. In terms of linguistic asymmetry, the gender hierarchy was obvious. 
First of all, the preacher almost invariably asked for responses in the polite form of High 
Javanese, even when he was using a mix of High and Low Javanese. Second, when the 
preacher imitated a dialogue between a husband and a wife, the former only used Low 
Javanese where the latter largely employed a mix of Low and High Javanese. 
Keeler comments on the speech styles of the pengajian, as "avuncular-at once 
indulgent and patronizing" (Keeler 1998. 169), because the linguistic interaction involves 
cropping term, a device parents and teachers use when speaking with children. For 
example, the preacher would say 'Gusti—* and wait for the audience to chime in 
'Allah"'. Nevertheless, one can equally argue that such manner was an effective way to 
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engage the audience. In fact, this type of cropping words to elicit audience reaction also 
occurred in some explicitly egalitarian social gatherings, such as the Pentecostal 
fellowships I have attended, when the speaker may say "posi-" and the listeners would 
imply "tif' as an interactive way to engage the audience. 
At any rate, my goal was not to deny the obvious gender asymmetry that one could 
find in such an occasion. My focus was to examine the ritual shift. Participating in the 
pengqjian gave women some opportunities to organize and perform religious activities 
that were not later handed over to men, who were officially the heads of the community. 
Rather, they had sole control over the activities that exclusively belonged to them such 
that they could even claim a more prestigious space in the mosque. This new spatial 
inversion of social hierarchies was more striking than the already known linguistic 
asymmetry between men and women. 
Perhaps another intriguing component of the event was the beacon of tolerance that 
was emanated effortlessly from the sermon. Aware of the religious discrepancies existent 
among the listeners, the preacher mentioned a recurring debate each year during 
Ramadan in Indonesia—the performance of tarawih (special prayers performed in the 
night during the month of Ramadan) with different times of rakaat, the essential unit of 
prayer, consisting of bows and prostrations for a prescribed number of times. Supporters 
of NU usually do the tarawih with 20 times of rakaat plus 3 times of witir, while 
followers of Muhammadiyah would do it 8 rakaat plus 3 witir. Recognizing the different 
practices but leaving their legitimacy to the audience, the preacher's inclusive narrative 
did not keep disagreement implicit, as in what Bowen called "an economy of professed 
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ignorance" (1993, 318). but acknowledged the existence of differences while 
emphasizing the common goal of increasing passion for ritual observance. 
This episode of pengajian, discursively and behaviorally, represents how women's 
pengajian group could potentially provide a platform in which both Islamic piety and 
Islamic tolerance could find their expression. As an Islamic activity, pengajian allows 
women of divergent backgrounds to cultivate their piety regularly exposing themselves to 
and coexisting with other forms of piety. Every doctrine may be felt to be false when 
separated from the agreeable human relationships. Members of pengajian know that 
whether one is being ikhlas (sincere, honest, just) or not ultimately can only be judged by 
God. individually. Yet. as individuals are always traversed by social ties, members of the 
pengajian know when and where they do not need to stress difference. Seen from this 
angle, women's new Islamic social gatherings thus not only offers incentives to increase 
individual piety and foster women's place in the public sphere, but also a chance to 
reconcile factional discrepancy within a community of variety. 
The female ascendance in public rituals and communal pluralism 
The extension of women's roles in the routine pengajian to those in the new public 
rituals is perhaps best attested by the strong overlapping of participants in the two types 
of activities, which often resulted in women outnumbering men in the later. If I am 
allowed to say that the ritual affinity between a pengajian and the new selametan that 
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includes a pengajian extends women's executive roles in one ritual space into another 
with relative ease. I believe that the act of participating in pengajian has generated 
unintended consequences, whose importance is more powerful than any pre-envisaged 
agenda. 
This checkered history of communal rituals suggests a complex interplay among 
various transformations of Muslim neighborhood community. It supports neither a 
unilateral "trickle-down" model dictated by the state policies or particular Muslim 
organizations, nor its inverse, a model in which the agendas and beliefs of ordinary 
Muslims operated independent of the larger social milieu. Before the rise of pengajian in 
the 1990s in Salatiga, adult women already had highly intensive networks through PKK 
and rewang (the female part of slameian. according to N. Sullivan). At this point, 
although women's labor was indispensable to the communal rituals, they stayed behind 
the scenes and handed over the ritual enactment to men. With the rise of women's well-
managed pengajian, women acquire their own public terrain in the noble name of Islam, 
building their social visibility on top of the pre-existing social ties. The densely 
connected women's group facilitates the spread of news and in fact the coordination of 
labor required for events. Not surprisingly, women are more aware of and more directly 
involved in community events. However, more important than pengajian s role as the 
means of communication, is the transformative form of publicity where residential 
women meet each other in public space frequently for pengajian. As a result, when 
eventually as the role of pengajian became larger in communal rituals, so did the role of 
women. 
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As the organizer and visible participants of these paramount moments, women have 
reshaped the expectation of validity of the ritual and the community. The extension of 
women's roles in the women's pengajian to a public ritual attnended by both men and 
women was perfectly evinced by Mbak Catur, who was the leading reciter in the Sinaran 
women's Koranic sermon group and the leading reciter in the mosque for celebrating 
maulud on behalf of the entire community. Like Mbak Catur's sacred chanting, Ibu Eka's 
singing was not denigrated as "non-Islamic1' innovation, but as evidence of a sincere love 
for the Prophet that would eventually accrue rewards for all in the neighborhood. As the 
ethno-musiologist Rasmussen's fieldwork in Jakarta in the 1990s shows, women are 
reciters of Koranic verses on television, radio, and cassettes, at a wedding, in national and 
international competitions or at governmental ceremonies (2001, 39). Women are thus 
capable of being the authoritative voice (Rasmussen 2010, 211): 
women contribute to the creation of messages of great beauty, power, and potency. 
They not only have access to the divine, but they also help to create it both for 
themselves and for others. Their voices, loud, strident, an authoritative, are heard by 
all an often emulated, even by men. 
In Salatiga, communal rituals have been reshaped rather than abandoned in the 
expanding Islamic climate; neighborhood as social community was restructured so that it 
was not a soulless administrative unit that produced social indifferences along with 
consumerist and religious individualism, urban heterogeneity and religious discrepancies. 
Rather, communal rituals retain their social significance as indispensible anchors of the 
social life. In the 1950s the slametan was at one pole along an Islamic spectrum (the 
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abangan side), with the Koranic sermon pengajian at the other end (the santri side); 
today they are intertwined in public rituals and represented more prominently by women. 
This is not a trivial transformation, given that scholars have relied on Anderson's seminal 
work (2006[ 1972]) on Javanese notion of power and concluded that Javanese women's 
"work" behind public rituals was low status compared with men's ritual enactment and 
performance (Brenner 1998). Being part of more Islamically charged rituals, women's 
workload is not diminished, but women have obtained unprecedented public visibility 
and a sense of responsibility for mitigating factional tensions against fanaticism. 
Comprehending this development can enrich our understanding of a new phase of 
the history of religion and gender in Southeast Asia. It critically reconsiders an 
assumption that the coming of "scriptural religions" in this area must result in an 
unprecedented expansion of the male domain in public affairs and religious life. If my 
interpretation and ethnographic aacount of the expanded roles of women in the public life 
is correct, the female ascendancy in public rituals is just as remarkable as the 
unprecedented Islamic ascendancy in social life. Although an analogy cannot be hastily 
drawn, this female ascendance is perhaps remotely reminiscent of the pre-Islamic prestige 
accorded to women, who were vital "in ever}' aspect" of the religious practices and 
beliefs (Reid 1993, 162). 
Thinking back to the scenes on the maulud and my conversations with Ibu Eka and 
Ibu Siti. it is worth noting that the coming together of members of Muhammadiyah and 
followers of NU in both pengajian and public rituals was foreshadowed and prompted by 
their common reaction against the rise of various types of neo-fundamentalist Islam and 
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their persistent worry about the shadow of Christianity. Their reaction against "Islam 
fanatik" realized in acts of redefining Muslim community was, of course, not the nail in 
the coffin for radical Islam in Indonesia, but more like a revitalizing surgery wishing to 
bring "the lost" back to "normal". The maulud or other rituals, the numbers of prayer 
units during the month of Ramadan, and the singing in the rituals and pengajian, could 
always be interrogated and debated due to their potentially insufficient 'islamic 
foundation." One says these acts represent "Just Islam," another says "not Islam," and 
still others patiently explain that "although it is not Islam but it is a good tradition." Yet 
for all of the members of the pengajian, as long as they temporarily forgo their 
differences and engage in these communal activities, they see themselves diligently 
observing their vision of "normative Islam" that is not fanatik, in all its meaningful 
senses. 
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Chapter 4 The Forbidden Polygamy 
"Because human beings can never be fair. 
Strictly speaking, polygamy is not really forbidden in Indonesia. Legally a Muslim 
man can take a second wife if he can obtain the first wife's permission and is granted the 
right by the religious court. In fact, some high-profile celebrities even openly advocate it. 
such as the owner of a chain store restaurant "Wong Solo." a husband of four women who 
sells polygamy juice made of four kinds of fruits. He is also the founder of a national 
polygamy award. Polygamy is forbidden, however, in a rising Muslim discourse that 
denies polygamy's Islamic basis. 
Both polygamy and veiling were once rare in Indonesia among the general public. In 
the last two decades, however, veiling has been transformed from an act of social heresy, 
a sign of the overly orthodox few, to a greatly normalized practice among ordinary 
Muslims arousing little objection. By contrast, polygyny in recent years has faced 
unprecedented challenges with regard to its Islamic foundation, even if it remains a rare 
practice and a symbol of recognition of Islam in the national legal system. These 
transformations problematize an approach that assumes a self-evident coherence between 
sacred texts, interpretation, and individual enactment, while begging the question of the 
timing and the selective focus on particular religious practice. They also make it difficult 
to ignore social actors" choice-making among competing and contradictory readings of 
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religious stipulations, and bring our attention to the selective agency of religious persons. 
This chapter explores the discourses that sacrilize jilbab (Indo. The headscarf) and 
de-legitimize poligami (Indo. polygyny) in the context of Islamic revivals, changing 
gender norms and new family values. Examining the processes in which some gender 
discourses have recently prevailed, while others faded, I contend that marital ideals are 
crucial in mediating the comprehension of divine knowledge, not merely vice versa. 
The question of women's subjectivity within Islamic revivals has been widely 
attended to by scholars (Brenner 1996; Gole 1996; Macleod 1991; White 2002). In the 
post-9/11 United States, the best-known anthropological work that addresses this issue is 
arguably Saba Mahmood's Politics of Piety (2005). Mahmood challenges what she argues 
to be the underlying assumption of feminism, namely the presumption of freedom as a 
universal human desire and resistance a defining feature of human agency. Building on 
Asad's approach to Islam as a "discursive traditional986) and Foucault's theories of 
discipline and subjectification (1979), she argues that Egyptian women in the mosque 
movement fulfill their desire to be moral. In the process of cultivating virtuous 
dispositions, women accomplish an ethical self-fashioning and a realization of the self. 
The self is not a pre-existing being capable of "internalizing" social norms, but is only 
achieved and animated through docile religious embodiment. The feminist concern with 
freedom and the resistance-biased definition of agency that presumes a pre-social self are 
thus irrelevant. Worse yet, they prevent us from understanding other forms of human 
agency. 
A number of anthropologists have questioned this approach for its tendency to 
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flatten the complex composition of morality in a given social context (Soares and Osella 
2009:10; Schielke 2009). Samuli Schielke, for example, argues that for the Egyptian 
youth, what constitutes "good" or moral is not always based on religious tenets. As a 
matter of fact, everyday experience often involves negotiations between different "moral 
registers." rather than flowing from religious observance alone. 
In a similar vein. Joel Robbins (2007:295-96) persuasively argues that moral 
reasoning is not unconscious cultural reproduction but a process of choice-making among 
contradictions between values derived from different social spheres, or between new and 
old key values (ibid: 307). A vivid example is the perennially fraught relationship 
between the Christian and the Urapmin system of morality in Papua New Guinea. 
Because each value system has rendered the other immoral and provided no 
straightforward solution, conversion to Christianity has thus caught the Urapmin people 
in a state of constant moral torment (Robbins 2004). 
While these approaches show a viable path to avoid oversimplifying religious 
subjects" experience. I am less comfortable with the idea of a "key value'" that underlies 
all systems within a "culture." Different from Robbins' view that sees cultural change as 
taking place only when the "key cultural value" changes, I simply define cultural change 
as changing ways of organizing meaning. Treating meaning as embedded in the 
generative and distributional nature of knowledge (Barth 1993; Hannerz 1992; Hefner 
1985). I present cultural reproduction as a problematic issue. Particularly, 1 emphasize the 
role of unforeseeable social change in generating new inclinations and embodiment (cf. 
Bourdieu 1977; Douglas 1973), while acknowledging the long-established sensibilities 
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that have structured actors' embodied inclinations. 
It is perhaps useful to state up front that my concern here is not to determine whether 
veiling or polygamy is essentially endorsed by Islam. My interest is to investigate how 
people authenticate and disqualify the discourses surrounding them. The current ubiquity 
of veiling and the Islamic discourse against polygamy cannot be taken for granted. Just a 
few decades ago, both scenarios were unthinkable. The different degrees of affinity 
between a reified culture and elements of an essentialized religion it receives are not a 
plausible explanation, unless both culture and religion are historicized in an investigation 
of social change. I shall start with the social forces that usher in an era of veiling. 
Piety, beauty and dignity 
It is commonly assumed that Islam mandates women to cover their aurat (the part of 
the human body that should be concealed in front of men who are not muhrim or close 
kin) as a means to defend their honor (Abu-Lughod 1999:137: Gole 1996:93). Against 
this conventional wisdom, scholars of religious studies and feminist studies have argued 
that, strictly speaking, the related Koranic verses lack a concrete prescription that directly 
requires hair-covering (Barlas 2002; Mernissi 1987:127—29). Rather, hair-covering and 
related dress code is a historical phenomenon possibl> derived from a cultural adoption 
of elite culture in Persian or Byzantine courts, rather than a religious injunction inscribed 
in the scripture. 
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In the wake of the contemporary Islamic resurgence since the 1970s, this line of 
scholarly "correction" has had little resonance with the mass movements of veiling across 
the globe. In Turkey during the 1980s,"To play the rebel heroine in Turkey you don't pull 
off your scarf, you put it on" (Pamuk 2005:337). This is because, at least among the 
newly educated youth, veiling represented a moral critique of Western modernity and 
secularist political repression (G5le 1996:83). In Egypt during the same time, the veil 
served to legitimize career women's presence in the workplaces and to appease their 
moral anxiety due to their "neglected" duty as mothers and wives (Macleod 1992). In 
Indonesia, before the last decade of the authoritarian Suharto regime, the veil was never a 
part of the mainstream Muslim women's accessories and was even banned by the 
government. During the pro-democracy movement in 1998, veiling became an anti-
government symbol among activists(Smith-Hefner 2007). Although the connotation of 
resistance diminished after the democratization in 1998. the trend of veiling has not 
declined but instead grown rapidly. Veiling is argued to constitute a form of self-
transformation in a modernized Islamic milieu (Brenner 1996) and to speak to heightened 
religiosity among the emergent middle-class (Smith-Hefner 2007; Rinaldo 2008). 
In addition to the "enlightening" model above that describes the choice of veiling as 
"becoming aware" (Brenner 1998: Smith-Hefner 2007), an essentialist idea has also 
gained wide currency regarding the rationale of veiling: the headscarf protects women 
from "inflaming men's carnal desire" (memmbulkan nafsupria). In Salatiga, this 
rationale has been treated as a truism such that the typical feminist critique of its 
misogynistic and "blame the victim" logic (that feminine beauty is a threat to social 
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order, and women should be responsible for the attacks targeted at them) has little 
resonance. 
In practice, such rationalizing accounts of veiling's function by no means exhausts the 
variegated meanings of the veil among practitioners, not even among the different stages 
of a person's adopting process. First of all, veiling was not a universal phenomenon. 
Compared to larger Muslim-majority cities, veiling in Salatiga is less conspicuous among 
young women than middle-aged women, even though the overall trend is expanding. The 
long-term influence of the Christian university and the high Christian population (more 
than 20% of the resident) on this tiny city is difficult to overestimate. Muslim college 
students have been reluctant to give up the concomitant popular youth dressing style 
today influenced by the global cultures that celebrate the model of a sexy temptress: tight 
T-shirts, blouses, spandex, fitted jeans or skinny pants. Consequently, the aesthetic 
threshold to turn to the headscarf among young Muslim college students has been higher. 
Moreover, young Muslims college students today held a "once veiling, always 
veiling" attitude, unlike their older counterparts who have recently started to wear veils, 
but only on ritual occasions. Such variations have contributed to keep the veil a source of 
pride for the younger generation, who were viewed as keeping a deeper commitment to 
the religious observance. Although a lifetime commitment of veiling creates a threshold 
for young Muslim women, they always invariably expressed that they would wear jilhab 
one day. They said, if they had not already started, they were simply not ready yet (belum 
siap). Their non-Muslim dressing styles, therefore, were not perceived as a challenge to 
the emerging social norm, but rather a prudent waiting for a deferred virtue. In other 
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words, there was little, if any, ideological objection to veiling. 
In Sinaran and Graha. the loosely-fitting robe and headscarf has even become the 
default dress code for virtually every member of the Islamic sermon groups {pengajian) 
in all ritual occasions central 10 local communities, ranging from holiday celebrations, 
sermon gatherings, neighborhood meetings, to rites of passage and other public events. 
On these occasions, to fail to don a headscarf in public events has in the last two decades 
become an unthinkable violation of social graces. Even for those who never don the veil 
outside of these ritual contexts, wearing one for rituals is now an absolute necessity. 
This development represents an update of the veiling movement in Indonesia, in 
which veiling was largely initiated by pious educated daughters who "passed up" the new 
tradition to the older generations. In the 1980s, for example, an angry mother might yell 
at her veiling daughter for being "so Arab," only to be convinced in later years and follow 
her daughter's lead (Brenner 1998; Smith-Hefner 2007). Such attitudes indicates that 
veiling today has passed from being a sign of excessive religious fervor, a vanguard 
symbol of religiosity, to an established etiquette in the normal course of social life. The 
adequacy of veiling in important social occasions is no longer subject to social stigma or 
a matter of personal choice, but an obligation for communal rituals. 
Veiling's increasingly axiomatic rationale has been succeeded by more informal, 
variegated modes of social reproduction of the practice, notably the rise of a new 
aesthetic standard and a new avenue to make a status claim. The madrasa teacher Mbak 
Nur's fifty-eight year old father had more than once encouraged me to wear a headscarf 
beyond ritual occasions. They joked that even if I have not become a Muslim yet, I could 
174 
still "enhance my beauty" (tambah cantik). Young Muslim men also playfully described 
the veil to me as having an enchanting, even erotic, element in it. This particular 
interpretation has moved beyond the assumption that austerity was the ultimate goal of 
veiling, or that veiling was an explicit rejection of the Western aesthetic construction of 
the ideal female as a sexy temptress. Many young college educated women under thirty 
even went so far as to say that they had countless jilhab of varying shades and fabrics, 
that they could look "creative" every day, and that veiling has given them plenty of 
choices to craft styles and express their moods. In this scenario, religious modesty was 
reworked to enhance a richer feminine beauty, and religious observance is not 
incompatible with consumerist creativity, but exacerbated bv it. 
Contrary to the popular imagination in the West of veiling as an oppressive and 
homogenizing institution or an Islamist claim that women should hide their beauty, then, 
veiling among women I work with does not hide anyone, or diminish beauty. If anything, 
the dazzlingly display of headscarves makes women's presence more noticeable. At 
almost every gathering, there was always a splendid collection of shades, sequins, 
jewelries, embroideries and delicate pins on women's headscarves folded in elegant 
layers. 
This does not mean that veiling is simply fashion in a religious disguise. Piety, 
beauty and grace are not mutually exclusive, and may even transform during one's 
process of adopting the veil. 24-year-old college student Mbak Diyan, for example, 
started to veil because she found her friends in headscarves look "so beautiful" {kok 
cantik). She followed ther leads, and enjoyed the ways the veil made her "feel special." 
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more precious," and "standing out from the crowd." It was not until years later, after 
reading several books regarding Islamic jurisprudence that she started to comprehend the 
meaning of the veil and feel "closer to God." Ever since then, she has started to see 
veiling as a constant reminder lest she commit sins. Hence Mbak Diyan's ultimate 
religious experience was initially facilitated by non-religious motivation, but it did not 
diminish the religious spirit of veiling. Rather, it provided an access to initiate it and 
deepen it. Nor did it challenge the hegemonic perception of veiling as fully Islamic. If 
anything, it reinforces it. 
Only a minority of women inherited their practice from family backgrounds. Growing 
up in a Muhammadiyah family, the chairwoman of Aisyiah in Salatiga Ibu Zulfa has 
never seriously resisted or had a turning point to veiling. Veiling for her was more or less 
a natural procession as she grew into an adult. But her religious observance was not some 
meaningless submission. For Ibu Zulfa, the meaning of the veil is much broader. As she 
once commented to me, "As a Muslim woman, one should let other people know her 
identitas."' From her perspective. Islam does not impose control over a woman's sexuality 
as much as it honors her role as the one who represents the religion to both believers and 
religious others. Through veiling and the exemplary deeds of veiled women, the display 
of public piety enhances both the status of Islam and pride of women in society. 
Most members of pengajian in the neighborhoods of Sinaran and Graha did not have 
veiling traditions in their family. Yet, within two decades, veiling has deeply seeped into 
the structure of their self-presentation in everyday life, even if the initial motivation was 
not solely religious. Ibu Eka, for example, adopted the veil during her part-time singing 
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in Salaitga. during which she said she had experienced a lot of temptation (godaan). It 
was after several men's sexual approaches that in 1999 Ibu Eka started to wear jilbab 
when she worked as a singer. Soon she wore it all the time whenever she was in public. 
As she became more observant and important in the neighborhood, her veil also became 
more inseparable from her body. As a leader of the local women's neighborhood 
organization and often a music director for major holiday celebrations, Ibu Eka saw 
veiling as constitutive of her respectability. She said that showing up in public without a 
jilbab would make her "kurang pede" (lack confidence). Failing to fulfill it would be no 
different from announcing one's deficiency, in a way failing to maintain her status. 
The story of Ibu Farida below epitomizes the ways veiling assists women to meet 
the public gaze and earn public respect. Although currently the chairwoman of the 
Fatayat NU in Salatiga, Ibu Farida did not inherit veiling from a family tradition. She was 
introduced to Fatayat NU when her father was running for city legislator in 1999 as a 
candidate of the National Awakening Party (PKB), a party that was associated with NU. 
Although since she was as a teenager she had participated in mosque youth organizations, 
she had never attended any religious schools, and even her college education was attained 
from the Christian university, UKSW. After graduation, Farida became a very successful 
businesswoman. She and her husband ran a company selling vehicles and had earned 
quite a fortune. Her income reached 5 million rupiah in the mid-1990s, when that of a 
civil servant was less than a million. As the company expanded, in their heyday they 
employed 30 workers. 
But the happy days did not last long. The 1998 Asian financial crisis destroyed their 
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business. In 2001 Ibu Farida's company was bankrupt to a point that she was forced to 
sell her own car and other possessions. Her husband went to Jakarta to secure a job, and 
she had to continue the vehicle business by touting around the city and looking for 
sponsors. During this time, she often had to rely on rides given by other people. Often 
times they were men. Sometimes she worked until late, and was escorted home by a male 
friend. Then her neighbors started to gossip about her, eventually creating a rumor that 
damaged her reputation. 
"It was fitna (slander)," Ibu Farida said to me. As I knew her better, I knew that Ibu 
Farida had a strong personality. She was proud and audacious. But instead of fighting 
back to her neighbors or attempting to persuade them that she was "innocent" and 
"faithful,'" she defended herself by donning the headscarf. "With the headscarf, I am 
confident of what I am doing. I no longer care about what people say, as I used to. I was 
once so upset that I visited an respected kyai (Islamic leader, typically a head of an 
Islamic boarding school) to get some advice. He told me 'whatever necessary needed to 
be done," and then I knew that I was not wrong, because I was just innocently doing 
business. God would look after me." Ibu Farida proudly continued, "ever since then, in 
any occasion men would never say flirty words to me. but instead, they would say 
assalam mulaikum (Ar. may peace upon you)."' The slander subsequently died down. 
The stories of Mbak Diyan, Ibu Zulfa, Ibu Eka and Ibu Farida reveal more nuanced 
and multiple forms of representing self-image and the embeddedness of veiling in each 
individual's particular family background, life history, and modes of performance. One 
common theme of their diverse experiences, however, is the ways that the veil helps to 
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build up their dignity. This female concern for confidence and public respect complicates 
the previous assumption that Javanese women acquired their status first and foremost 
through their husbands (Hartley 1993), rather than through their own actions and 
embodiment. 
Many young Muslim women I know aspired to be teachers, arguably the most ideal 
"modern" job for women in Indonesia today. This ambition has been particularly 
promising, since the education sector in Indonesia has witnessed a great expansion and a 
huge rise in female employees. The sector of Islamic education has particularly shown a 
great interest in hiring female teachers. Women have constituted more than half of the 
educational sector, the second largest female-dominated sectors (after home-related 
services). Along with women's translation of veiling beyond religious doctrines into 
personal dignity and public respect, the religious embodiment has also bolstered women's 
status-making and career-envisioning. 
From a symbolic facade to an illegitimate legacy 
Before we move to the other direction of cultural change—from a marginalized 
"orthodox" practice to a greatly undermined legacy, it is perhaps useful to quickly outline 
the status of polygyny in the Muslim world. Although a conventional wisdom assumes 
that in Islam, a man can marry up to four wives, whereas a woman is always 
monogamous, polygyny has never been commonly practiced by ordinary Muslims, 
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historically or cross-culturally (Ahmed 1992:5; Gole 1996:8; Lutfiyya 1966:166; Matory 
2005:111; Yalman 1970:297). Yet, the symbolic value of polygyny has been over-
invested, in both Western and Islamic discourses. This section presents the emergence of 
an Islamic discourse that challenges the legitimacy of polygamy. Commonly known in 
Indonesia as poligarni, the issue of polygamy has consumed a great deal of media 
coverage and generated turbulent sentiments and complex repercussions among Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. As I mentioned earlier, some high-profile Muslim celebrities 
have openly promoted polygamy as an Islamic virtue, while others see it as a possibility 
but frown upon its practice. Still others, particularly neo-traditionalist Muslim scholars, 
have questioned its Islamic legitimacy. Given the relative rare existence ot'poligami, the 
question of ''why now" and "why such a big deal" must be asked. 
Although the attitude of Indonesian Muslim women towards polygamy varies, it 
mostly ranges from tolerance, revulsion to total rejection. As Susan Blackburn notes: 
"Many Indonesian women have passionately opposed poly gamy... it is the one issue that 
has aroused the greatest depth of feeling among the largest number of Indonesian 
women" (2004:111). What is new, then, is not the fact that most women continue to abhor 
polygamy, but the fact that they do so by resorting to new Islamic sources of legitimacy. 
Ibu Farida, for example, held an articulated interpretation of the sacred texts that were 
often used to justify the practice of polygyny. She reasoned that the permission was 
issued specifically in a wartime, when the Prophet encouraged men to provide shelters for 
widows and orphans, and marriage was the most secure form of personal protection in 
Arab culture then. She remarked: 
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The motivation [of polygamy] rested upon moral obligation and responsibility; it 
was nothing like lust. Nowadays, men take advantage of Koranic verses only to 
satisfy their own nafsu, (Indo. "lust, desires"'; Arab., nafs) instead of moral 
obligations." 
Ibu Farida also employed a holistic approach that she learned form the national 
training for cadres of Fatayat, to interpret the Koran. She explained that a single verse 
(ayat) should not be read separately from the entire Koran. It was true that there was a 
verse that specified that a man could marry up to four wives, provided that he can be fair 
and equal to all of his wives. However, in other verses of the Koran, it was clear that as a 
human being, a man cannot be perfectly fair without making mistakes. Read in this light, 
she concluded, it should be clear that polygamy was in fact not allowed by Islam. 
An almost identical perspective soon came to me when Ibu Zulfa responded to my 
inquiry in her recitation of Koranic verses in Arabic and her exegesis in Indonesian: 
If you fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly with the orphans, marry women of 
your choice, two, or three, or four: but if you fear that ye shall not be able to deal justly 
[with them], then only one, or [a captive] that your right hands possess. That will be 
more suitable to prevent you from doing injustice."' This is in the Koran, An-Nisa 
chapter verse 3. In verse 129 it says: "You are never able to be fair and just as between 
women, even if it is your ardent desire." So, men can marry up to four wives, but [he] 
must be fair (adil). Is it possible that humans can be fair? It is clear [they can] not. 
Hence essentially [polygamy] is not allowed. (Laki bisa nikah sampai 4 istri, tapi 
harm adil. Manusia apakah mungkin adil? .Jadi intinya tidak boleh.) 
To further understand a more general attitude of women towards polygamy. I intended 
to encompass a related question in my survey. Eventually 100 Muslim women 
participated in the survey. Among them. 52 people have attained a college degree, its 
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equivalent and above, whereas 30 have high school as their highest degree. In terms of 
occupation, there is 1 medical doctor, 26 teachers or professionals, 33 housewives, 21 
civil servants, 12 businesswomen, 6 college students, and 1 laborer. In terms of religious 
affiliations, they are divided quite evenly among NU, Muhammadiyah, or simply 
"Islam." 
The survey result indicates that 83% of the majority agreed with the statement: 
Polygamy is in fact not allowed by Islam, because human beings cannot be fair. 
which is the precondition of polygamy. 
While some other questions in the survey reflected the divisive aspects and 
ideological chasms of the Muslim community, the question regarding polygamy achieved 
one of the highest degree of consensus among all (after the 100% agreement with the 
statement 'islam respects women" and "women should be allowed to be parliament 
members"). In fact, it was the countless same responses I had attained from women of 
diverse Muslim backgrounds that decided the way I formulated the question in this 
particular way. The result was impressive. Many respondents even added brief comments 
next to the question, showing their strong approvals of Islam's supposed discouragement 
of polygamy. 
To be fair, there was a tiny minority of young female teachers, usually politically 
affiliated with the Just Prosperous Party, the currently rising Islamic party in the nation, 
who firmly embraced the legitimacy of polygamy within Islam. This variation reflects the 
proliferation of competing repertoires of Islamic knowledge, but also particularly points 
to the polarization of the issue. An Islamic justification of polygamy not resonate with the 
vast majority of Muslim women I worked with; in fact, it was a moral offense to them. It 
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is no news that most Indonesians would find polygamy problematic in practice. The 
notorious case of the televangelist Sufi master Aa Gym's rise and fall in recent years 
clearly indicated this distaste: he was a spiritual superstar, admired as the exemplar of an 
ideal husband by many Muslim women "fans", but his fame fell abruptly after he took a 
second wife. 
Despite the existence of such popular discomfort with polygamy. Islamic groups 
have long strived to keep it legal. To symbolize the purity and independence of Islam in 
the arena of national politics, the integrity of Islamic law is often premised upon an 
insistence on where it differs from secular law. When the original proposal of the 1974 
Marriage Act that introduced a secular marriage law to the country was issued, it incurred 
outrage and protest in Islamic quarters, a far stronger reaction than the government had 
foreseen. Such collective effervescence among Islamic activists brought in young Muslim 
protesters who occupied the parliament building (Tempo 8 Sep. 1973:6-8). According to 
the protesters, the proposal was a corruption of the sacred law. The government deputized 
military officers to commence concessions that allowed family law affairs to remain 
under the authority of the religious court. Nevertheless, much of the original proposal 
was left intact. The new laws have given women the same rights to initiate divorce as 
their husbands, and limited male access to legal divorce and polygamy only through 
spouse and court approval (Cammack 1997; Robinson and Bessell 2002). It also 
guaranteed the equal share among wives and husbands in all property acquired during a 
marriage. For indigenous feminists, especially members of the women's federation 
Kowani at the time, this was a long-awaited "feminist victory." After all, various 
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women's organizations at the end of the colonial period had endeavored to limit 
polygamy and a husband's right of unilateral divorce (talak), but in vain. The eventual 
negotiation also seemed to appease Islamic activists so long as the state recognized the 
sacred rights reserved to Muslims. 
Such legal and conceptual acceptance of the legitimacy of polygamy thus has officially 
acquired an ideological life for several decades, such that even female Muslim leaders 
could find themselves hauled willy-nilly towards acquiescing in such identity politics. In 
a sharp contrast to this political legacy that has fixed polygamy as a collective symbol of 
Islam in the arena of legal systems (Blackburn 2004:131-32), the non-compromising 
stance of most Muslim women I worked with is decisively transformative. Their view 
entailed a new relationship of women with the Islamic law, in which women can jettison 
the theoretically legitimate facade of polygamy without risking disavowing allegiance to 
their religion. In the following sections, 1 shall explore the significance of this conceptual 
change in the contexts of modern Muslim politics and changing kinship relations. 
The Islamic revival and choices 
Print media has been an important site of proliferating Muslim discourses. One could 
hardly fail to notice the generously expanded section of Islam in all branches of major 
bookstore giants Gramedia and Gunung Aung, the astronomical number of publications 
regarding fiqhi (Islamic jurisprudence), and the plethora of bukupintar Islam ("books 
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that make you on top of Islam," literally "smart book of Islam") sold in bookstores or 
circulated by religious networks. While there is a religious preacher who published a 
book titled "Polygamy is not the Prophet's tradition (Poligamy Tidak Sunnahy that 
strived to deconstruct the myths of the polygamous license, there is also a conservative 
magazine like As-Sunnah that was busy reckoning "the beauty of polygamy" which, 
according to the editors, could solve social problems such as "men are more ready to 
reproduce than women" and "men more likely to die in all sorts of accidents." The 
magazine even bothered to discuss the legitimacy of taking a fifth wife. On the other 
hand, publishers such as Lkis and Lakpedam and P3M networks (Indonesian Society for 
Islamic Boarding School and Community Development) continued to circulate works 
under the general category of Islamic feminism. The eruption of discrepant and 
contradictory interpretations of religious knowledge has been a core feature of the recent 
Islamic revivals in Indonesia. 
These boisterous scenarios are reminiscent of the contexts that have produced what 
have been called modern "Muslim politics." As Eickelman and Piscatori note, the spread 
of mass education and media in Muslim societies has led to an unprecedented prevalence 
of literacy, popularized channels to study and debate Islam, and, consequently, the 
fragmentation of Islamic authority (2004:39-^2). According to them, the consequence of 
these conscious reflections over Islamic "orthodoxy," or "an objectification of Muslim 
consciousness" (ibid: 37), does not lead to a monolithic "Muslim politics," but instead 
renders Muslim politics more unstable and diverse. Even if it was against the initial 
intention of the state (for an Egyptian example, see Starrett 1998), the unleashed 
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intellectual contestation was most likely unavoidable. 
Academic interpretations of gender and Islam also have mushroomed since the 
1990s in the midst of third-wave feminisms and their critiques of "white women's 
feminism" that was implicitly racist, class-biased, and orientalist. Looking into both the 
scriptural foundation and empirical experience, anthropologists, sociologists and literary 
critics have paid attention to a great number of Muslim female activists in Egypt, Iran and 
Indonesia. They demonstrate how Muslim activists view their revisions of the 
androcentric Islamic epistemologies as an expansion of their faith and see their feminism 
as a way to enhance their lives as Muslims (Cooke 2001; Mir-Hosseini 2006; Badran 
1995: Karam 1998; Doorn-Harder 2006). In their pursuit of gender-sensitive Islamic 
values, women felt obliged to study the religious texts anew to avoid repeating obsolete 
interpretations. In this vein, Doorn-Harder argues that the task of Indonesian Islamic 
feminism is to translate and inteipret Islamic feminist ideas into an Indonesian model 
acceptable to mainstream Muslim believers (Doorn-Harder 2006:35). 
This portrayal of such "Islamic feminism" is, nevertheless, only part of the story. On 
the other side of the spectrum, one finds a diflerent type of Muslim activists who 
cultivate a form of virtuous religiosity in which "women's rights" are not a relevant 
concern at all (Mahmood 2005). This approach conveys an important message that we 
should not privilege a Western construct of freedom as a universal human desire over 
other forms of desire in which such freedom fails to capture the subjects' agency. 
Here I wish to present a different picture that conforms to neither an explicitly 
Islamic "feminism" nor a deterministic subjectification. First of all, feminism is not a 
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widely known or socially meaningful concept among the well-educated members of the 
pengajian groups living in Sinaran and Graha neighborhoods, much less ordinary people 
in Indonesia. Not surprisingly, feminism has little relevance even among the majority of 
my respondents who delegitimize the Islamness of polygamy. Virtually all Fatayat and 
Aisyiah members that I have talked to as well as women in the Sinaran and Graha sermon 
groups do not view the Islamic values that protect and respect women as feminist in 
origin. For them, the Islamic discourse against polygamy is a more legitimate 
interpretation that makes the most sense to them and remains the most truthful to their 
religion, a religion that dearly respects women. In fact, the statement "Islam respects 
women" is the only question that achieves 100% agreement in the survey. 
Equally important, women are aware of the multiple discourses regarding 
appropriate religious practices, and choosing a stance is integral to the process of 
women's realization of subjectivity. The definition of the "properly pious" varies. Some 
members of the pengajian insistence on the illegitimacy of polygamy within Islam. If the 
intention of taking a second wife cannot be stopped, they would rather initiate a divorce 
than endure the humiliation of husband-sharing. Conversely, a minority of young, 
assertive and educated women held a stronger political allegiance to the Islamist Just 
Prosperous Party upheld the most formidable contradictory current of the pro-polygamy 
discourse: It is less evil than having illicit sex ("lebih baik daripada berdosa"). This 
perspective aimed to avoid illicit sex outside of wedlock, thus justifying a man's extra 
desire beyond the first wife. 
Women are thus not pious in the same w ay. Rather, they navigate among divergent 
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routes to be a properly pious subject. This leads us not to ask the question whether 
freedom is universally desired by all women, but to ask: How is certain freedom made 
desired? What makes a religious interpretation appealing? Given the range of possible 
interpretations of the sacred texts, many conflicting stances can find warrant. The 
transparency of sacred texts is never too clear without particular social consciousness. 
From this perspective, the relationship between a religious discourse and the 
correspondent embodiment cannot be taken as unproblematic and purely disciplinary. 
Well before the onset of a discourse, political climates, long-term social inclinations and 
new cultural sensibilities have grounded and limited the possibilities of people's 
perspectives about what can be desired and considered as morally Islamic. In what 
follows, I argue that the Islamic-based objection to polygamy among the majority of 
middle-class Muslim women can be better understood through the lens of the changing 
features of Javanese marital patterns, along with rapid socio-religious change. 
Changing structures of Javanese gender norms and marriage 
The much greater importance of the nuclear family over the lineage in Java has long 
allowed women to own land, manage microenterprises, and participate in public life 
(Reid 1993; Hull 1982). Monogamy has been the predominant norm (H. Geertz 1961:30), 
and although people are familiar with the Islamic rule that sons should inherit twice as 
much as daughters, they think the "real Javanese' law is equal inheritance (ibid:47). 
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Norma Sullivan (1994) and Susan Brenner (1998) have also pointed out the dominance of 
women in the market in Java in the 1980s, at least at the local level. Until today, Javanese 
kinship has continued to feature the nuclear family as the basic productive unit, bilateral 
equal inheritance among descendants regardless of sex, and women's relative economic 
independence (Tanner 1974:134-36; Geertz 1961: Hatley 1993:180). 
Yet scholars have also discovered the ambiguity of what higher female autonomy 
might mean. For one thing, the translation from economic independence into a reliable 
source of power is not automatic in the Javanese setting. Although women are accorded 
economic independence and dominance within the household, activities related to money 
and finance are not credited as socially prestigious, but associated with low status 
(Brenner 1996: Hatley 1993: 182). An entrenched Javanese gender ideology has it that 
women are perceived as inherently inferior to men, emotionally, spiritually, and 
rationally. Material control over money in this conceptual framework is regarded as 
vulgar in contrast to spiritual control over the self through asceticism and meditation, 
which, stereotypically. are depicted as male activities. 
Meanwhile, "feeling"' (kerasaan) is decisively associated with females. Women in 
this gender ideology are usually depicted as more vulnerable to nafsu (Ar. nafs, self, 
passion, desire, and lust) than men. By contrast, men are considered to be better in 
exercising aka'l. (Ar. "aqU reason, intelligence, and rationality). This formal ideology is to 
be used to describe the Javanese market, where women are being vulgar, greedy and 
calculating. They laugh, talk and bargain loudly, which are signs of their mundaneness. 
The fact that commerce is under women's control does not win women more respect, but 
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instead reinforces the notion that women are less able to be ascetic and that they are 
spiritually inferior to men. Women are limited, in a word, by having the "'soul of a trader" 
(Hatley 1993: 182). 
An equally influential countervailing ideology nevertheless reveals a different story 
(Brenner 1996): Women are better than men in self-control, at least in the informal 
gender ideology. This why they are viewed as more resourceful and responsible in 
handling family finances than men (Hatley 1993: 182; Hull 1982:79). Men were 
imagined as less able to control themselves in matters of money and women. They were 
captives of nafsu. This portrait of female rationality over family expenditures was 
extended to their attitude towards men's extra-marital relationships. The general principle 
was that as long as illicit relationships did not hinder family finances, they were tolerated. 
This attitude could also be examined through another aspect of a traditional Javanese 
perception of the first marriage, which was viewed as a temporary practical arrangement 
in which parents could extend their networks and teens could be fully initiated into 
adulthood. Marriage was thus more a primarily economic and social partnership than a 
romantic or affectionate personal bond. Consequently, divorce was common among 
Javanese until recently (Jones 1994:265. 310; Heaton, Cammack, and Young 2001). In 
fact, as mentioned previously the rates were exceptionally high in the 1950s, higher than 
all "developed" countries. 
This fragile structure of Javanese marriage was soon transformed along with 
modernization projects. During the Suharto regime, the modern ideals of the middle-class 
housewife and the working husband were systematically promoted via the housewife 
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training programs implemented in all levels of society. In practice, the state has 
demanded civil servants to obtain permission from their supervisors before obtaining a 
divorce or practicing polygamy (Blackburn 2004:133). Along with other legal measures, 
state policies have made divorce no longer as easily attainable as it used to be, thus 
contributing to the surprising story of a positive correlation between marital stability and 
modernization. 
State ideologies were not the sole determinant in the decline of the divorce rate. 
Urbanization has loosened the tie of a family with its natal kins and galvanized the 
nuclear unit into greater isolation. Moreover, due to middle-class women's aspiration to 
higher education, they are marrying at significantly older ages as they postpone marriage 
until they finished their degrees. This phenomenon is striking, considering merely a few 
decades ago, marriage was almost a universal experience for young women under 30 in 
the Indo-Malay world (Heaton et al. 2001). 
While the period between maidenhood and marriage is prolonged, the notion about 
the nature of marriage is also changed. Born in the period in which marriage has been 
expected to be more than an expedient ritual necessity, younger generations began to 
more readily imagine marriage as a long-term commitment and an emotional bond than 
their predecessors. Mbak Diyan. for example, told me that before getting married, she 
wished to travel abroad, to see the world, and to bring knowledge back to improve the 
Islamic activities in her neighborhood. Because family would consume much energy and 
time of a woman, she would prioritize her dream over marriage for the time being before 
she can step into marriage. 
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For some ambitious women, career can even mean no marriage. Mbak Nur just 
recently rejected a proposal from a wealthy Jakartan entrepreneur, because she had just 
been promoted to the status of a civil servant in the government-affiliated madrasa where 
she taught. "I know I have potential," she said, "I do not wish to end it and just move to 
Jakarta." Her choice represents a trend of professionalization among young women. In 
fact, even among the married women I have carried out the survey with, only about half 
of them agree with the priority of family responsibility over personal pursuit. Many 
showed hesitation and ambivalence towards the question, and some told me that family 
and career should not be mutually exclusive. Compared to scholars' evaluation of 
women's self-position in the 1970s and 1980s (Hull 1982) and in the 1990s (Sears 1996), 
the middle-class Muslim women in Salatiga today showed a higher concern for their 
personal pursuits and career development. 
Not only did the marital ideals change with socio-economic development, but also did 
they seek out religious rationale to be appealing nowadays. The new religious frame of 
marital life can be clearly seen in the newly popular idiom "keluarga yang sakinah" (the 
happy Muslim family, sakinah. Ar. happy, serene, safe), a notion that was distilled from 
Ar-Ruum Verse 21 from the Koran, and first advocated by Aisyiah in the 1980s (Dorn-
Harder 2006: 92). The idea w as later popularized by televangelists, all sorts of books, 
columns, TV shows, and sermons in ritual ceremonies. Since 2000 there are more than 
776 copy righted articles and books related to keluarga sakinah, out of a total 1,040 
pieces including those from previous years. There has been more publications related to it 
since 2010 than the decade between 1990 and 2000. 
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The idiom contains specific imageries and assumptions. First, it constructs the ideal 
Muslim family as a unit based on religious values and emotional bonds. Second, as far as 
the current Muslim cultural market is concerned, the mainstream Muslim understanding 
of keluarga g sakinah is premised on monogamy. In illustrating the ways a husband and a 
wife should interact with one another, religious mentors and preachers, for the general 
audience, always articulate their morality stories within the monogamous framework. In 
what follows, I present an excerpt of a sermon that demonstrates just this point. 
Approaching the beginning of Ramadan, the city of Salatiga held a Pengajian Akbar at 
night to celebrate the anniversary of the city. The event was highly festive, featuring 
Arabic bands with female singers in headscarves and male drummers clad in robes, and a 
slightly longer, but amusing sermon given by an ustadz. It attracted more than a thousand 
people, including a great number of families. As in virtually all the Islamic sermons I 
have attended, martial relations were always the most handy and catchy topic. The 
preacher (ustadz) was quite witty and stirred up a few boisterous moments: 
Ustadz: The question now [is that] if we try to learn how to become a good person like the 
messenger of God, his words would softly rumble like distant thunder, isn't that 
right? 
Audience: Right. 
Ustadz: We men usually speak with a "raised voice" which is not good, [it is] better if you 
ask "Where do you want to go, mother?" (in a feminine, soft voice) 
Audience: (cracked up.) 
Ustadz: Now the mother also cannot be annoyed if her husband asks her in a raised voice, 
instead [you should say] "Well, father, if [you wish to] speak, take it slow." No 
need to get angry. We have to learn communication. If between the husband and the 
wife, "wekwokwekwok" (sounds imitating a bad temper), one gets angry, how can 
we find a way out? It is better we admit, praise to God, [our] mistakes, if [one] 
already admits [one's] fault, this was already cleared up by wasyarinu ilia 
marrohbim birrohbikum ("you hurry up enter the forgiveness of God"). In the 
Koran it is said maff'u anhum was taffirlahum wasyobihum bi amma and the 
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guidance is maffu anhitm, namely "forgive them." If our wife or our husband makes 
mistakes, forgive him/her. For example, "Father, you already cheated, how come [you 
are] still stubborn?" Who can forgive him? Such a good wife. Who is like that? 
Female audience: (yelling) No one! No one! 
Ustadz: Do you forgive him? 
Female audience: No! (a resoundingly solid sound; fits of laughter ensued.) 
Ustadz: No one, no one. In the case of cheating, [the wife] definitely will give [him] a hard 
time. God forbidden, if [it is] the wife who cheated [she] definitely will be choked 
by the husband. 
Audience: (silent.) 
Ustadz: Let us learn the kind way. If there are mistakes [we made] towards our spouse 
because of some intricate reasons. Forgive in the command of God... 
Honestly, let's be honest. If a wife made some mistakes and then was interrogated. 
But a large portion of [you] fathers fears your wives. Do you dare [to cross] your 
wife? [You] Do not dare. Who dares please raise your hand. 
Audience: (fits of laughter, only one hand was raised.) 
Ustadz: Since husbands fear wives, [when] their wives get mad "wekwokwekwok", the 
husband [should] face the west towards the direction of Mecca, not wanting to look 
at her being mad. Oh God. 
Audience: (laughing.) 
Ustadz: This husband uttered: "as soon as my wife came home she did not bring blessing 
but anger instead, oh God. Forgive the mistake and sin of my wife, oh God. Make 
her a sacred woman. Give her the serenity in the world and the hereafter." Have 
you ever done that? Every time when your wife gets mad [do you] immediately 
pray like that? No...let me tell you...the harmony between husband and wife is 
better like that. If one of us is angry, we pray and then the angry one will definitely 
be bashful. Isn't it right? 
The interlocution in this sermon has repeated but also questioned many Javanese 
gendered stereotypes. While women were depicted as cranky and dominant in the 
household to a degree that most husbands were imagined to fear their wives, husbands 
were also described as easily losing their temper and self-control. The most intriguing 
part of the sermon was about cheating. Notwithstanding the preacher's punchline about 
the spirit of forgiveness, the vivid scenarios he provided encompassed both the husband 
and wife's infidelity and their reactions. Not only men, but also women cheated. Women 
were not forgiving to such betrayal, but men could become murderous if the same 
betrayal befell on them. This portrait seems to suggest that men's infidelity was more 
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frequent and women's was less tolerable. Yet, this overtone was curtailed by women's 
refusal to forgive a husband's infidelity, and by men's silence in response to a wife's 
betrayal. 
This reaction entails more than a confirmation of Javanese gendered linguistic 
practices in which women have less restriction than men in bluntly showing their 
emotions via speeches (Keeler 1989, Smith-Hefner 1987), given that men are more 
entitled to and involved in maintaining status through cultivated linguistic registers. 
When divorce is no longer commonly pursued as a solution to marital disharmony, affairs 
becomes unprecedentedly threatening. Rather, a monogamous mutual respect, or "the 
happy Muslim family," is seen as the right path. Both men and women need to learn to 
control their temper, and both assume the duties to accommodate. Moreover, the women's 
reaction to the sermon also indicates that the audience does more than simply passively 
absorb whatever is passed down from a religious authority. Rather, they filter religious 
interpretations, differentiate their legitimacy, and contribute to the reconstitution of 
religious authority. 
Conclusion 
Women's attitudes towards veiling and polygamy are not dictated by any 
disciplinary discourse alone, but by complex social fields, particularly changing family 
values and marital ideals. More decisively, they are the results of the inclinations they 
embody to navigate among conflicting interpretations. What is considered as a moral 
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discourse varies, which makes it all the more pivotal to see how women filter the range of 
possibilities before selecting the one that matches the aspiration they have cultivated. In 
the midst of social change and the augmented Islamic legitimacy, it is to source from the 
affinity between the female desires incubated in the contradictory gender ideologies, 
changing marital relations, and Islamic revivals, that women gain purchase on an Islamic 
rationale against polygamy. 
In a sense, the soul of a materialistic, money-savvy, and prudent trader, has been in 
many ways transformed into the soul of a pious and still prudent teacher, in the 
household, the school, and local communities. The legacy of an accentuated conjugal tie 
has found its suitable expression in the new Islamic rationales for objecting topolygamy. 
An Islamic justification for the domestication of men was not the teleological goal of 
women. Rather, it was during the gradual process of immersing themselves in a mode of 
Islamic ascendance that educated women uncovered this perspective on polygamy. 
That the normalization of veiling and the stigmatization of polygamy occurred during 
the same period reveals the importance of the "embeddedness" of religious knowledge in 
processes of social change that htat remade the comprehensibility of divine knowledge. 
Urbanity, Islamic modernity and changing family ideals in the long run have all 
contributed to an ideology that does not favor polygamy. Against this backdrop, a new 
pluralization of religious knowledge regarding polygamy opened the gate of contestation, 
and for the first time, an Islamic argument for the illegitimacy of polygamy has become 
one of the mainstream opinions. 
The co-existence of the two directions of cultural change also complement the 
196 
literature on women and gender as the key symbol, and battleground, of a variety of 
revived Islam (Ahmed 1992; Ask and Tjomsland 1998; Moghadam 1993; White 2002; 
Gole 1996), and beyond. Like the debate about gay marriage in the United States, the 
great attention paid to polygamy in Indonesia demonstrates that gendered practices often 
speak to the core of the self-understanding of a society. But women are not merely the 
instrument of difference, they are also its creators and actors. The veiled women create 
self-worth and earn public respect for themselves. They do not fastidiously question 
everything conventionally known as Islamic or make feminist enquiries. But when 
multiple interpretations lay there for them to choose, they know which one makes the 
most sense to them and which enhances their self-worth. 
If the last chapter shows that women have achieved higher public prominence in 
communal rituals, this chapter problematizes an approach that assumes a self-evident 
coherence between sacred texts, interpretation, and individual embodiment, and 
demonstrates how a certain interpretation is increasingly made desirable. In the following 
chapter, we will pay equally close attention to how shifting religious embodiment and 
discourses are embedded in social change among the Pentecostal congregations. 
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Chapter 5 More than love 
" Women are created by God to endure more. 
In Fendi's weekly bulletin on Sunday. February 14, 2010, which was Valentine's 
Day, the cover story of the pamphlet was "Just Love Her" (sic). 
One man asked, "I no longer love my wife." 
His shepherd advised him, "Go home and love her." 
He said, "You did not hear what 1 said. I no longer have any feelings for her 
anymore." 
Then his shepherd replied, "I did not ask about your feelings. I only said, 'Go 
home and love her.'" 
He replied, "But emotionally 1 won't be honest if I treat my wife like that, when 
in fact I don't have any feelings." 
Then his shepherd asked, "Does your mother love you?" 
The man felt a bit insulted, but said. "Of course." Then the shepherd said, "Think 
about after she brought you home from a hospital, when you cried hard because 
your diaper was wet, and she was forced to wake up although her body was still 
weary, but still had to change your diaper and feed you. Do you think she really 
enjoyed it?" The man replied, "No." 
The shepherd then said. "Well, then your mother was emotionally dishonest." 
This is the goal of this conversation: the great love of a mother is not that she 
enjoys changing diapers in the middle of the night, but that she is willing to do it 
although she does not like it. (my translation) 
Appropriating the theme of Valentine's Day. the story does not discuss pre-marital 
romantic relationships, nor does it present a cautionary tale condemning them. The Fendi 
church in fact allows a pre-marital relationship as long as it is recognized and supervised 
by the congregation and it is initiated with the goal towards a holy marriage (nikah 
kudus). Rather, the story seemingly restates the question that has engaged many 
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anthropological studies on the Pentecostal theology of domesticity: Is Pentecostalism a 
"women's movement" (Martin 1996, 52) oriented towards "the reformation of 
machismo" (Brusco 1995, pp. 5,125)? Does the analogy between mother versus son and 
husband versus wife necessarily mean a "domestication of men"? Finally, what are the 
assumptions regarding faith and human agency behind the question of the man, and the 
answers behind the shepherd? 
This chapter deals with the new gender norms that are advocated in Ester and Fendi, 
and the underlying notion of human agency behind them. I first introduce the wider 
gender ramifications of global Pentecostal revivals, particularly the ongoing debate over 
the "gender paradox"—namely more women than men supporting seemingly patriarchal 
religious movements—and dwell on their relevance to the Indonesian context. Through 
the lens of the life experience of the congregants of Ester and Fendi and a workshop on 
Christian femininity held by Ester in 2010,1 suggest that the approach that views gender 
relations as a battle between subjugation and empowerment prevents us from asking what 
really matter for believing women. Inspired by the life stories of born-again women, I 
contend that the ultimate goal for Pentecostalism in Ester and Fendi is "success" namely 
the culturally defined as health, wealth, and joy fulness. Consequently, "the domestication 
of men" or other gender reformation is a strategy for the pursuit, rather than the goal 
itself. More significantly, the lessons regarding womanhood, fatherhood, marriage, the 
self and social relations that are taught in the congregations will shed light on a different, 
but equally important, understanding of the Christian subjectivity that is divergent from 
the Calvinist idea of agency. This subjectivity does not seek sincerity by aiming to 
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overcome the distance between words and feelings, but through submission and devotion, 
and by looking for sacrifices and rewards. 
Gender and power in global Pentecostal Christianity 
The approach that links Pentecostalism and women's empowerment results from the 
empirical studies from several parts of the world during the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries, particularly Latin America, southern Europe, and to a lesser extent Africa. The 
most widely attended studies are those conducted by Elizabeth Brusco, Salvatore 
Cucchiari. and Ruth Marshall. Despite theoretical and empirical differences, their 
research similarly emphasizes the power of Pentecostalism in transforming the pre­
existing gender values and creating a theology of men's domesticity. 
Brusco contends that Pentecostalism in Columbia does not aim to revolutionize the 
public sphere, but instead tries to reform the private realm of the home. Men are 
admonished to quit gambling, wantonness, irresponsibility, violent inclinations, 
alcoholism, and other male sins of "machismo." In a word, men are meant to fulfill the 
role of the good provider committed to family welfare (1995:143-58). The appeal of 
Pentecostalism, Brusco argues, is "the reformation of machismo," through which both 
men and women can benefit from a more stable family unit that is conducive to upward 
mobility (ibid: 149). 
Similarly. Cucchiara claims that Sicilian Pentecostalism is in fact a gender-system-in-
the-making (1988, 687). Theologically, despite the exclusive use of masculine pronouns. 
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the God of Pentecostalism is a cross-gender God, and even a maternal patriarch that is 
emotionally vulnerable (ibid. 701-707). As Jesus and the Holy Spirit are painted as 
feminine or even androgynous beings, men must cultivate feminine qualities such as 
obedience and submissiveness in their relationships with God. Female "gifts" and male 
"ministry'' are thus in flux, alway s mediating each other. In practice, the male honor and 
prestige in public are domesticated (ibid, 702), whilst women's inputs in the household 
are publicized as community concerns. The new gender system thus complicates the 
prevailing gender hegemony and opens up a space for negotiation and reinterpretation of 
gender values for believing women. 
In the context of urban Nigeria. Marshall notes that Pentecostalism is reshaping the 
domains of marriage, family life and sexuality, and by extension, the labor market (1990, 
232). The Pentecostal sexual discourse represents a powerful resource for women, 
through which women regain a higher level of control over their sexuality and marriage. 
The choice of spouse is left to the individual, respect for one's wife is required of a man, 
and the stress on individual achievement grants women more incentives to pursue careers 
outside the home (ibid, 233). Against this literature focusing on the relevance of the 
gendered re-imagination of spirituality and subjectivity in Pentecostalism and the bulk of 
studies that they inspired, it is no wonder that David Martin would go far enough to say 
that Pentecostalism is, in a sense, a "women's movement" (1996, 52). 
This broad stance does not lack opponents, who argue that Pentecostal ideologies do 
not easily shatter patriarchal values of gender inequality. Rekopantswe Mate's study of 
Pentecostals in Zimbabwe, for instance, suggests that patriarchy is reinforced in the 
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church, rather than destabilized (2002). Notions of female domesticity and female 
subordination are promoted as Christian ethics and sway the theological inculcation of 
gender relations. She thus suggests that modernity means upward mobility tempered by 
the constraints of a patriarchal private life. Similarly, sociologists Riesebrodt and Chong, 
based on their research on Korea (1999), also draw a comparable conclusion. Disagreeing 
with the link between Pentecostalism and women's empowerment, they argue that gender 
relations in a given society are largely determined by its own "patriarchar system more 
than by a particular religion. 
Another angle to probe the question of empowerment and Pentecostalism is through 
examining the spiritual and social capital that congregations offer to members. More than 
offering an empty hope, the charismatic religion provides feasible and living solutions to 
combat the emotional disturbance caused by intensifying geo-social mobility, economic 
insecurity, and medical insecurity, problems that arise out of structural conditions that are 
beyond the power of individuals to alter. As Bernice Martin (1998) argues for the case of 
Pentecostalism in Latin America, individuals find support within an intimate voluntary 
community of believers. Within the community of believers, practices of mutual support, 
the promotion of education and training, and participation in the work of the church 
endow members with a sense of individual responsibility and the experience of 
leadership. Individualization and the voluntaristic collective creation of new social capital 
thus can occur in tandem (ibid: 1998: 130). Engaging in the Pentecostal theology equips 
believers with a divine repertoire that clearly reveals what should be considered evil. 
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what should be desired, and what should be refrained from in the increasingly complex 
social life of neo-liberal economies and "modern" cultures (Maxwell 2005). 
If the aforementioned description were true. Pentecostalism should appeal to a 
broader constituency beyond women. If believing women in Latin American find the 
"reformation of machismo" useful, in Sweden it seems that congregants are attracted to a 
connection to a cutting-edge "global culture." While studies deriving from Latin 
American constantly feature women as the vast majority of the members, Coleman's 
research on Swedish congregations (2000) indicates otherwise. Hence the question: even 
if Pentecostalism does something for women, what does it have for men? Are there 
underlying interests that engage both men and women? 
Following the remarkable shift of scholarly attentions from a theology of 
domesticity to a theology of prosperity, I suggest that we can more easily grasp the 
appeal of Pentecostalism to both men and women. Indeed, in the works of Brusco, 
Marshall and Mate we find that both men and women desire upward social mobility and 
aspire to become successful and propserous according to the moral regimes they belong 
to. 
The eagerness to have "success" has great significance for the believing Pentecostals 
I worked with in Salatiga. The path to success through redefining the self and its relation 
to God, nevertheless, is heavily gendered, particularly through a feminization and 
infantilization of Christians as the "children of God." The adoption of a gendered lens to 
probe this "success movement" allows us to discern some crucial differences between the 
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kind of agency that concerns us here and that one find in the anthropological theory of the 
"neo-liberalization of Christianity." 
Soothill describes a related phenomenon in the Ghanaian context (2007, 40): 
Faith is symbolized by "success," "abundance" and "fruitfulness," abstinence and 
self-denial are virtually absent as theological themes. Born-again Christians are 
guaranteed "winners" who can expect to enjoy victory over disease, poverty and 
suffering to achieve success in this world. 
In a similar vein, Coleman argues that the Pentecostal desire for prosperity began to re-
emerge in the last quarter of the twentieth century and marked a massive shift away from 
the ascetic individualism and toward the consumerist and neo-liberal worldview. As 
Andrew Walker put it, the individualism that is endorsed by the charismatic repackaging 
of Christianity is "thoroughly modern," which transforms "asceticism—what you could 
do for God—towards self-gratification—what God could do for you" (1997, 30). 
Spiritual women, caring men 
Indeed, it is difficult to overestimate the role of consumption and self-gratification in 
Ester and Fendi. New cars, big mansions and successful businesses are the common 
components in the repertoire of testimonies. The style of worship also heavily relies on 
new media, new books, and new music in order to generate revitalizing bodily sensations. 
Moreover, converts' double allegiance to multiple churches and their habits of "window 
shopping" for worship session also invoke a consumerist image of Pentecostals searching 
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for the best merchandise in a mall full of Christian products. "Go home transformed" is 
the motto of all sermons in Ester and Fendi. as every congregant is promised to get 
something that transforms his or her heart after attending the service. 
Two things in Ester and Fendi show the applicability of the neo-liberalization of 
Christianity and women's empowerment in the charismatic religion: the continued 
salience of self-denial and the emphasis on the success of the family. On the one hand, 
"Bapak yang seticr (the devoted Father) is the ultimate image of god, and theologically, 
everyone is a child of God, and can make requests to an indulgent God like a willful 
child. On the other hand, converts are often encouraged to rectify their wrong thoughts, 
wrong desires and wrong behaviors. Sermons repeatedly single out the verses related to 
the worldliness of wealth that is eventually futile (sia-sia) as opposed to the truly 
valuable spiritual wealth that is eternal. Humility, generosity, gratitude and altruism are 
ingredients to moral success, and pride, selfishness, greed and egoism are the top 
obstacles to achieving personal transformation. 
In addition to the absolute importance of individual transformation, a great deal of 
attention is paid to strategies of creating "successful families." Patriarchal hierarchy is 
not challenged, but softened to yield to more harmonious relationships between the 
husband and the wife, and more interactive relationship between the parents and the 
children. The strategies towards such success entail many restrictions. Pre-marital sex is 
strictly forbidden, adultery is condemned, divorce is in principle unthinkable, 
homosexuality is anathema, and resistance to authority—from the wife to the husband, or 
from the children to the parents, is frowned upon. Thai said, it should be noted that 
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Indonesian Pentecostalism does have some appeals to women, especially in a society 
where religiosity is widely regarded as a betterment of the self. 
Pentecostal congregations offer more participatory and egalitarian modes of 
leadership among mixed congregations. Although the majority of pastors of charismatic 
churches in Indonesia are still men. women who participated in Pentecostal congregations 
have much more chance than their Muslim counterparts to achieve the rank of spiritual 
leaders of both men and women. Beyond the pastors' circle, lay women play the role of 
spiritual mentors or "shepherds" of other congregants just as frequently as men, and 
develop public leadership skills as preachers, healers, and prophets who can potentially 
forge new social relationships, if not a solid community. A short film that was screened 
in the Ester congregation theatrically demonstrated this social aspect of women's church 
affiliation. In the video clip, a woman is asked by her husband to make dinner, clean up 
the house and take care of the children who are fighting crazily. Overw helmed by these 
multiple tasks, she yells at everyone at home. Then her phone rings. The woman answers 
and it is a call from a church friend who invites her to a fellowship. The woman thus says 
to the camera: "True enough, I'd rather go to church than be a slave at home." The 
pastor's comment following the video, though, was that women should transform their 
families rather than taking refugee in the church. 
As illustrated earlier, women are not the only group that is attracted to 
Pentecostalism. In fact, in Ester and Fendi as well as in other bigger congregations that I 
personally visited throughout Central and East Java, there is never a significant sex 
difference in the congregations' composition. Pentecostalism's appeal here must be seen 
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as stemming from its "egalitarian" principle—that whoever is touched upon by the Holy 
Spirit can be a spiritual leader regardless of gender, age. social class, ethnicity and 
educational attainment. As David Martin puts, the egalitarianism of the Holy Spirit and 
its distribution of "gifts* to all 'subverts every principle of social honor, inherent status, 
and necessary mediation" (2005: 12). This principle was well evinced in the actual 
services, fellowships, testimonies and exorcist walks. A young woman can pray for an 
old man. and ethnic minorities can certainly lead the majority in the congregation. 
Converts are given new roles and new strength to solve their family problems, such as 
underemployment, debt, financial insufficiency, or conflict among members in 
envisioning the future. Alternative models of parenting and family relationship are 
warmly welcomed, and often feature the themes of the sermons. 
In contrast to the state-sponsored discourses about motherhood, the Pentecostal 
discourses about fatherhood have an eminent salience. In an emulation of God, who is 
often called bapak (father), a good father should be loving, understanding, and devoted to 
his children. Parenting thus often emphasizes the role of the father more than the mother, 
as the former was considered as more neglected and the latter taken for granted. In the 
Ester's Sunday bulletin on January 26 2010, for example, one of the evangelical columns 
titled "the role of a father" began w ith a cautionary tale of a biblical figure, a notorious 
model for his son and the nation, the lecherous and wanton king Jeroboam (1 Kings 
15:26): 
He did what was e\i! in the sight of the Lord and walked in the way of his lather, 
and in his sin he made Israel to sin. 
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To avoid repeating the mistakes of Jeroboam, the column urges a father to rid himself of 
sins and become an "idol" for his children by playing the right roles: a problem solver, 
who attends to his children's stress, suppressed feelings and problems; a playmate, who 
has creative intimacy with his children; a punishment giver; since children need to be 
disciplined, without punishment children would become wild, although the manner of 
education should be legitimate and conducted with love; a provider, who sees supporting 
the family as the foundation of his task; and a counselor, who leads children to do right 
things and avoid corroding habits such as drugs, cigarettes, and sexual relationships. 
Pentecostalism promises a better future in this world. The issues that are central to 
converts are individual success and family prosperity encompassing health, wealth and 
status. Compared to these culturally desired life goals, the problems of "'patriarchy'* or 
"gender equality" are not of central interest. Pentecostalism is hence never considered as 
women's movement by the members of Ester and Fendi. In fact, what concerns women 
the most are all "traditional" wishes—attaining a reliable marriage, having obedient 
children and avoiding worries about money. Although some female converts are more 
ambitious about their careers than others, most of them hold the opinion that family is 
central to their value. This is not to say that gender is irrelevant. What is irrelevant is 
equality. In addition to granting women more access to leadership and advocating a 
•'feminization" of men, gender reformulation works most powerfully as certain feminine 
attributes are naturalized, celebrated and pursued by members. In what follows, I tell 
stories of two charismatic women to illustrate this point. 
208 
Ibu Mir a: The way that women outshine men 
Born in 1960 in Salatiga. Ibu Mira is the junior pastor in the Ester church. Owning 
some properties including a hotel in downtown, Ibu Mira's family could be considered 
upper-middle class. She served as a bank clerk after graduating from the department of 
Education of the Business World at UKSW, but quit her jobs in order to take care of her 
newborn child. Only after all of her three children graduated from elementary schools did 
she start to pursue her ministry. After studying in the Ester school of theology and 
mastering the four major domains of knowledge— salvation, the Holy Spirit, healing, the 
second coming—she was ordained in 2000 as a pastor. Below is her conversion story 
taken from my fieldwork notes: 
The Ester congregation's female pastor Ibu Mira was born to a Christian family 
in GKI and married to Pak Toni, at the time still a Catholic she met in UKSW while 
pursuing her college education. In 1988 the couple really wanted a child but in vain. 
They had visited doctors everywhere, including those in Jakarta, and sought 
alternative medical solutions. But the prospects were not good. One day, in one of 
the Christian spiritual camps held on campus (Ibadah Pembangunan Rohani), she 
decided to ask God to give them a child. She had heard from people that God did not 
only speak through the Bible but also could speak via visions (penglihatan) or 
speech (peurutan). She knelt down and prayed on the ground. She waited there. 
However, she did not hear anything. 
Several days later, her husband told her that he heard something when he was 
praying alone in their bedroom. He said there was a beam of strong light, very white 
and bright, but not dazzling, that was increasingly imminent. Then, when the light 
eventually approached him. there was a voice out of the source of light: "Because of 
your love and your prayer, you will have children" (Karena kasihku dan doamu, 
katnu akan punya anak). It was a breathtaking sight; when the light disappeared he 
wondered whether it was simply a hallucination. He could not understand, and 
therefore told his wife about this. She was delighted, telling him that God has 
answered her request. 
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A month later, she was pregnant. Because of this magical experience they 
started to believe that the Lord was real and alive (Tuhan adalah riil, Tuhan yang 
hidup). In 1995, their friend asked them to come to the Ester church in Semarang. It 
was New Year's Eve. During the service they felt so grateful and they cried over and 
over again. In 1999 Pak Toni started to be a pastor. Several years later it was her 
turn to become a pastor. 
One Friday afternoon in December when we were chatting in her office, Ibu Mira 
explained to me the role of women in a Christian family and community. Being a pastor 
herself, she admitted that most pastors were men. Yet, there was no hindrance for a 
woman who wished to become a pastor. As in the family, the man should be the imam 
(leader). Likewise, a church should be led by an imam as well. "But,'" she added some 
more qualification, "other churches do not allow or discourage female pastors. If a 
woman serves as the leader in a theology school, it is fine. But not a spiritual leader of a 
congregation. But here, in Ester, women are allowed to be pastors. In fact, there is a 
tradition that if a male Pentecostal pastor dies, his wife is supposed to take on his 
position. A pastor needs his wife. Without the support of a wife, ministry is very difficult. 
So, of course, women can be pastors as long as they are capable. Why not? But in a 
family she must respect her husband, no matter how capable she is. This is the case for 
the Christian family." 
Family, then, is defined as one of the most sacred places to worship God. Ideally. 
Ibu Mira continued, it is men who work and support the family. If it was not enough, the 
wife may help contribute to the income. If there was no financial issue and a woman still 
aspired to have her own career, it is also good, as long as she gets the permission from 
her husband. It is a matter of the agreement between the spouses. Yet, no matter how 
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much the wife earns or how successful she is, she still needs to respect her husband. 
"Because a husband is the head of a family. She is not supposed to make her husband feel 
inferior (minder)" A husband should take care of his wife just like Jesus takes care of the 
church. Women can work, not only stay at home, as long as she knows how to make time 
for home and family. The household chores are the couple's mutual responsibility, not 
just the wife's. The father should take care of children, too. because the mother is often 
too tired. 
Following this logic, as long as a woman respects her husband at home, she could 
pursue any career she wants. "Even becoming a president, as long as she is capable, why 
not?" Ibu Mira said. In fact, she believes that women even have some capacities that 
outshine men, such as in the domain of their mystical connection with God. This point 
was mentioned several times by Pak Toni. According to him, women are more sensitive 
than men. and that was why it was Ibu Mira. not Pak Toni, who immediately 
comprehended where the voices were coming from when God first spoke to Pak Toni that 
he had granted his wife's prayer. Pak Toni often praised Ibu Mira for her sensitive "sixth 
sense" that had granted her a stronger, mystical resonance with God. Another example 
Pak Toni often mentioned was that in 1996, when he spent a great deal of effort to secure 
a place to found his church but in vain, Ibu Mira reminded him that he had a dream 
several years ago that prophecied the place of the church. "So. you see," Pak Toni said, 
"without her, how can I build this church? Even when God had already spoken to me, I 
still thought it was my hallucination!" 
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Hui: true love is enough 
The story of Hui is not about the "sixth sense." but similarly about suffering, 
submission, and the final rewards that define success. Thirty-seven-year-old mother of 
two daughters, Hui is the owner of an accessory store in the downtown area. She had two 
older siblings working in Jakarta, whilst she and her mother lived in Salatiga with two of 
her younger nephews in a small house along an extremely narrow alley where even one 
single motorbike had to be carefully navigated to pass safely. 
For years during the mid 2000s, Hui's life had been a mess due to marital failure. 
Her husband was a recent Chinese immigrant. Unlike Chinese Indonesians who have 
resided in Indonesia for several generations, he was a "'rear' Chinese. Hui met him when 
she worked at a travel agency in Jakarta after she graduated from high school. After a few 
years of marriage the husband had an affair with a local Javanese woman. Eventually he 
took all of Hui's savings from her and ran away with his mistress. They disappeared 
somewhere in Jakarta. Hui's life fell apart. She felt she was destroyed. She had to endure 
bankruptcy, repay her debts, and re-start a new business. Ever since then, her elder 
daughter, who was only 4 years old at the time when the father abandoned the family and 
stole all the mother's wealth, has often said to people: "Don't ask me about my dad. He is 
dead. I hate him." 
After he was gone, Hui prayed to Jesus everyday. She worked long hours to repay 
her debt in hopes of restarting her accessory business. Years later, when mentioning this 
dark period of her life, she seemed proud and calm, with no sign of self-pity. 
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One afternoon in her shop, which I frequented, she was hanging earrings on a 
spinning stand. Upon seeing me, she stopped her work, assigned some chores to the 
clerks, and brought me to a nearby restaurant to have lunch. She ordered an ice chocolate 
drink for her elder daughter, two plates of grilled sate, two orange juices, and my favorite 
solo. In the restaurant, she suddenly took a piece of paper out her bag and showed it to 
me. "See, I am married to this guy. Now he is gone. I don't know where he is now." I 
scrutinized the marriage certificate, still a bit in shock that she brought this to show me, 
and quietly felt the peace and resignation in Hui's face. For a while I did not know what 
to say. Then after a few spoonfuls of broth, 1 asked whether she would want to know his 
whereabouts and why he did what he did. Hui scoffed and shook her head: 
1 do not miss him at all. Seriously, after 1 realized how much Jesus loves me, I 
really do not need a husband any more... Jesus' love is true and real. With Jesus, I do 
not even need a husband. Jesus will give you more. As long as I have faith in Jesus, 
I work hard, give my children good education, well, I mean. I am quite successful, 
but 1 did not have good education. Maybe if my children attain better education they 
won't have to be this hardworking. So, those things were already in the past. 1 do not 
think of them very often. I am too busy to think about them. 
If there were someone who could testify how busy Hui had been, that would be me. 
Not only was she maintaining the business of the accessory shop, Hui also zealously 
brought people to Jesus, cared for children was active in her neighborhood life. In the 
store she often multi-tasked at a high speed, talking to other dealers at one moment before 
inviting friends to come to prayer the next. Additionally, Hui also served as the treasurer 
of the PKK in her neighborhood, and she often hosted or helped host the meetings with 
neighbors. 
For Ibu Mira and Hui, being faithful to God has brought them rewards in this world. 
For the former, it was childbearing and the ministry; for the latter, it was a peaceful life 
and financial success. In Hui's story, monetary success is a reward for spiritual 
faithfulness, rather than a result of women's money-grabbing "nature." In Ibu Mira's 
story, intuition is identified as a distinctively feminine quality that is not available to men. 
Women are deemed no less spiritual than men. and are in fact attributed with unique 
access to God's mysterious blessings. Women s faithfulness is presented not simply as a 
prescriptive regulation, but a motivational act that looks forward to rewards. These 
themes of spiritual, mental and financial wealth would later be recapitulated in a 
workshop that systematically and intensively educates women on Christian femininity. 
"Beware: " The judicious women 
At 9AM in the morning on August 11lh, 2010,1 was already seated in the main hall 
of the Ester church for a two-day workshop titled "Beware, Women Restoration" (sic). 
From what I have understood, "beware" here means to be cautious and judiciously guard 
against worldly temptations. Francis and I were assigned to the youngest group of people 
under 30 years old. Francis did not tell any other friends at Fendi. because she did not 
want other people to suspect that she might have "double loyalty" to a different church. 
There were six of us in the youngest group, and one of them was 29-year-old Anisa who 
already had two children and who worked as a petty trader. There were four other groups 
consisting of middle-aged women, as well as some bespectacled grandmothers and bun-
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wearing grandmothers and mothers in their traditional attire kebaya and sarong. 
Altogether there were 33 women. The instructor, a female pastor invited from Surabaya, 
who 1 call Ibu Har, grabbed the microphone and exhorted us in a thunderous voice: "Now 
repeat after me, sentence by sentence, and raise your hand up! Be-ware!" Most of us were 
stunned by her enthusiasm and remained a bit shy. We did not speak up and that seemed 
to really make her angry. "You are not loud enough. Repeat again! Beware!" After 
practicing a few times, we drew a louder and louder voice from our bodies: 
Beware! Successful individual! Successful family! Successful church! Yes Yes 
Yes! 
(Beware! Pribadi sukses! Keluarga sukses! Gereja sukes! Yes Yes Yes! ) 
After since this initiation we would be asked to shout the same slogan over again 
whenever Ibu Har felt the necessity or when we were in transitions between the sessions. 
The two days of sessions were the following: women's destiny (kodrat wanita). sin 
(dosa), emotion, the power of forgiveness {kuasa pengampunan), submission 
(penundukan diri). faithfulness, devotion and loyalty (kesctiuan), appearance 
(pemmpilan), the intimacy with God (mcnjalin keintiman dengan Tuhan) and the power 
of prayer (kuasa doa). All the points were invariably supported by authoritatively 
presented biblical verses. Each of us was given a booklet that provides the outline of 
these topics with blanks within the sentences where we were supposed to fill in the key 
words or the entire key answers to questions such as ''When will women really become 
•women"?" 
After introducing these materials. Ibu Har started the class with a string of questions: 
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How can women serve God in the church, if women fail to serve their own families? 
How can women be capable of serving families if women are incapable of 
understanding who we really are in God's eyes? 
The mystery of "who we really are" was unpacked in the first and most important 
topic covered in the workshop: women's destiny. First of all, according to Ibu Har, 
women's subjectivity is not defined by gender, but by their universal identity as the 
children of God (artak tuhan). Each individual is emphasized, as often repeated in the 
term "pribadi" (Jv. Indo. person, individuals) whose importance overrides the 
significance of'kaum wanita " that referred to women in a collective sense. Ibu Har 
stressed that a woman should be viewed from the point of view and intention of God, 
instead of other people including men and other women, not even the self. Women should 
NOT ask: "Oh, do 1 look beautiful? Do I look good?" because theses were classified as 
wrong thoughts. Instead, women should ask: "What do 1 look like in God's eyes? Does 
everything I do match the plan that God has designed for me, and only for me?" 
It was only after this sacred identify of anak tuhan, with all its individualizing 
forces, that women were defined as a wife and a mother. In an ideal Christian family, Ibu 
Har went on vehemently with her microphone, a wife is the penolong (helpmate) and 
partner of her husband, not a leader of him. As a mother, her goal should be to fulfill 
women's reproductive functions, and to take care of children so that they will become a 
victorious generation. Ibu Har agitatedly admonished us, 
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Do not forget that roh (spirit) is something each woman has and can resonate with 
the Roh Kudus (Holy Spirit). Your roh is not in your husband! God created 
women as equitable w ith but different from men. The difference could not denied. 
In fact, women are created by God to endure more (ketahanan lebih)...if your 
husband cheated, do not cheat! If your husband had a child outside of wedlock, 
take the child as your own child. It is hard and heartbreaking, but remember, God 
will give you more rewards, and you will see. 
So far this conversation assumed that all women had a husband. When Ibu Har 
turned to the next lesson—the worst enemies that defy the women's destiny—the 
assumption became less relevant. The list of a woman's own worst enemies is below: 
Feeling inferior, "manipulating" the functions of men (i.e. "becoming torn boys"), 
resistant and rebellious (resisting marriage), and obeying unconditionally without 
thinking. Behind this checklist is however a larger checklist of the sin in daily life habits 
and practices that would corrupt the destiny of women. Here Eve (Hawa) was introduced 
as the prototype of women, and the sins that she committed were also sins that women 
often did and what they should refrain from, which includes indulging in useless talk, 
wrong friends, wrong perspective, wrong thoughts, wrong decision, wrong actions, and 
shirking responsibilities. This session ended with the inculcation of a cautious attitude 
towards betrayal, and the focus on marriage resumed. If the husband cheated, one should 
not cheat; if the marriage really could not be restored, one should remain single rather 
than seeking a second marriage. One should seek relationships with God, rather than with 
men. 
At this point it was already clear that the workshop as a whole had assumed that the 
most challenging problems facing women today are not poverty and health, but spiritual 
barrenness, mental fragility, and emotional distress that hindered the right path to 
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"success." According to Ibu Har. the dominant problem of women was really a soul 
(jhva) that was yet to be transformed. Symptoms of a sick soul includes being overly 
optimistic, making easy promises, being melancholy, choleric, self centered, indifferent, 
inferior, feeling vengeful, and being critical. In a word, it was bitterness (kepahitan) that 
summarized all these negative emotions. Feeling pain was one's own choice, and it did 
not help to solve the problem. The solution to all these problems of the soul, according to 
the workshop, was to 
1) Be aware that the primary problem is there with yourself; 
2) Make a decision to solve problems in a way that can change things; 
3) Give place to the Holy Spirit and God's firman (verses, creeds) to transform 
out souls; 
4) Take actions to change with God's help. 
In realizing each of these steps, however, the goal of fulfilling women's destiny was to 
grow into a woman that was desired and intended by God (Ams. 31:10-31), rather than 
desired by oneself. Hence lbu Har commented: 
Don't ever say "my personality is really just like this. I can't change it." This is a 
kind of people who don't want to be changed by God's firman. Read Ams. 1:22! 
When the deeds of women are desired by God's verses, no matter what problem 
they confront, they will still be strong and can enjoy their lives with sukacita 
(joyfulness)! 
It was amazing how many words Ibu Har had said before the lunch. Even while 
eating, we were not spared, but given time to repent with our teammates in groups. Anisa, 
the only married woman in our group, shared her story: 
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One time, I was really mad. 1 had been overwhelmed by my business. But my 
children were just horsing around and messing up everything at home. So 1 could 
not control myself. I hit them, very hard... I really did not want to... after all, 1 
love them. But I was so angry, and my husband never helps at all! Afterwards, 1 
felt guilty, and prayed to the Lord to forgive me. I repented that I failed to control 
my emotion. Now God has given me strength. Whenever I felt furious or 
frustrated, I would remind myself of the time I beat my children. Then God let me 
stop. God made me a new person. 
Anisa was tearful at the end of her story. Another woman shared her story about how to 
communicate with her fiance. I shared how I came to realize the importance of gratitude 
in my life. Francis, the youngest among us. did not say anything, but she meticulously 
took the notes throughout the sessions. 
While still young, Francis is an explicitly religious person. She went to Ester on 
Sunday mornings, and Fendi on Sunday afternoons. This pattern of patronizing different 
congregations was not uncommon among converts. In fact, I know members from 
mainline church GKJ and GKI who go to Ester on Wednesday night for a worship 
session. Other charismatic Christians told me that they enjoyed going to multiple worship 
sessions, even if in different churches, and this was because she could yield to a "double 
portion" of the rewards. This concept of reward cannot be overemphasized. Often the 
preachers at Sunday services would promise that the congregants would ugo home 
transformed," bringing abundance of spirituality and strength with them, and nothing in 
the worship session would be futile. The same logic applies to the workshop we were 
attending here. Worshippers can expect to get something to take home, extending the 
limina! ecstasy and spiritual wisdom into everyday life. Francis was particularly 
enthusiastic in apply ing this. In her tiny pink room stuffed with dozens of dolls in a dorm 
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near the campus of UKSW. she pinned cautionary notes in bullet forms at every corner of 
the room: 
Don't fall asleep! Don't be stupid! Or you'll be left behind! 
1) ask Lord to always PURIFY my heart! 
2) ask Lord to help me PREPARE! 
3) no compromise with SINS! 
In the afternoon, the workshop moved into a key discourse on the transformation of 
the subjectivity: kesetiaan (faithfulness, loyalty, devotion). Here, a fine line between 
submission (pemmdukan diri) and faithfulness is drawn. While submission refers to an 
attitude that is unchallenging. kesetiaan means a connotation of full obedience deeper 
than submission, but including submission. Women have to be both submissive and 
devotional (selia) to God, because God is the highest authority and is always mutlak 
benar (absolutely right). By contrast, humans, including authorities, one's family and 
spouse, and supervisors can err. To these people, women are not required to be setia 
(devotional). However, submissiveness is demanded. Even when the authority is wrong, 
one should consider the rights of another authority to solve the problem. Ibu Har stated: 
If something is wrong with your husband, you can seek other spiritual leaders or 
authority, but don't teach your husband! Your husband is your authority. You do 
not teach your authority. Whatever you want to do, your attitude must be 
submissive. You can give correction with love and kindness, and you can change 
the situation by yours prayer and your deeds as examples! Now if the authority 
refuses to change, what should we do? Remember, you have to dare to suffer for 
the cause of justice, like Jesus has done for us! Forgive those who wronged you, 
and believe that God as the highest authority will act. Beware (sic)! 
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This session ended with a lesson on why kesetiaan was indispensable for the ideal 
womanhood: 1) Because God is kesetiaan; 2) Creatures are desired to be selia like the 
earth going around with sun; 3) Angels are created to be setia: otherwise they would be 
kicked out like Satan; 4) Humans are created to be setia because humans are created 
according to the image off God; and 5) Women are especially desired to be faithful 
because of their kodral. The last point resonated again with the women's destiny by 
recapitulating the idea that "women are created to endure more" and that women are 
more capable of being setia. In order to live a life in kesetiaan, one should fill in the life 
with God's verses, be intimate with the Holy Spirit, and befriend people who are setia. 
Finally. Ibu Har promised that the reward of kesetiaan would be to "get a crown for the 
rest of your life" (Revelation 2:10) 
Marriage, devotion, and a Pentecostal humanity 
A paradox that struck me during the workshop was Ibu Har's theory of marriage. In 
the discourses she embraced, women should not resist marriage, and marriage was part of 
women's destiny. However, as also taught in the workshop, a believing woman's most 
important identity was not motherhood or wifehood, but being a child of God. Therefore, 
between these multiple identities that each judicious woman has, there is a space to fulfill 
the most fundamental one without fulfilling others, and it can be justified by God's 
idiosyncratic plans for particular individuals. These varying layers of a believer's identity 
helps to explain why many converts in Ester believe that women can live on their own 
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life without men. Ibu Mira, for example, told me that it was God's plan if one was 
unmarried. When asked the same question, many even provided the Catholic nuns as 
examples of why God's plan might lead a woman to be unmarried. For these born-again 
women, to be married or not was the sovereignty of God (kedaulalan Tuhan), and e2ch 
person has her own life journey (jalannya masing-masing). 
There are limits of this seemingly liberating ideology for women's life choices. A 
woman does not have to be married, but once she is married, she has to accept the 
hierarchy of the family, that is, to be led by her husband. In any case, as long as there is a 
husband, then the husband assumes the position as the head of the family and the leader 
of his wife. In fact, my survey shows that the support of this notion among charismatic 
Christians is higher than among average Christians and all Muslim groups. Nevertheless, 
it is not clear what this leadership actually means. Does it mean that the husband has a 
total control over his wife, that this is a lip service offered by the wife in exchange for 
more bargaining leverage, or something in between? 
Ideally, as was taught in the workshop, a woman is required to be submissive and 
devoted to her husband, and the husband must be submissive and devoted to God. In 
other words, submission and devotion are not only required of women, but also of men. 
Nevertheless, when the husband is wrong, a woman has the choice not to be devoted to 
him, because submission is already enough. She is thus encouraged to behave 
submissively but has the right to feel differently. Ultimately, because God demands 
absolute submission and devotion, and women are expected to be submissive more than 
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men. submission becomes a distinctively feminine quality, one that is also the most 
desirable trait of humanity in the eye of God. 
As part of a regular repertoire of topics in sermons and weekly news, the inculcation 
of kesetiaan does not target women only. For example, on the weekly bulletin of Ester on 
November 15th a column states: What is desired in a person is kesetiaan (Proverbs 19:22). 
In the same weekly bulletin, Ruth, the great-grandmother of King David who refused to 
leave her mother-in-law after her husband died and who says "Entreat me not to leave 
you, or to turn back from following you; For wherever you go, I will go; And wherever 
you lodge, I will lodge; Your people shall be my people, and your God, my God. Where 
you die. I will die. and there will I be buried" (Ruth 1:16-17) is not only portrayed as a 
model for faithful women, but also for men. As the news quoted the verses Ruth 4:11: 
Then al! the people who were at the gate and the elders said, "We are witnesses. 
May the Lord make the woman, who is coming into your house, like Rachel and 
Leah, who together built up the house of Israel. May you act worthily in 
Ephrathah and be renowned in Bethlehem." 
The column coult not praise Ruth enough. It reasoned that Ruth was still young when her 
husband died, and she could have been married again. The fact that she didn't proved she 
was a woman of kesetiaan. The column then lamented that kesetiaan is something that is 
rare today in today's social realities shaped by a hyper mobility and transience: residents, 
employers, churchgoers and event the servants of God can always change their places. 
Kesetiaan is thus something that God values but something difficult to keep. 
The gist of the story, however, is that the reward for faithfulness is always 
guaranteed, not in the afterlife, but in this world. Hence the column asserts, "Loyalty 
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would yield to something fruitful beyond anticipation. As a result, she [Ruth] became the 
wife of Boas, a wealthy landlord in her mother-in-law's lands, and gave birth to Obed, 
grandfather of the future King David. And the line of genealogy also gave birth to 
Joseph, "father' of Jesus." The column ends by saying "God values loyalty very much... 
The harvest may not come overnight. Devotion requires a long process. But once it 
arrives, faith will bring miracles into the lives of believers." 
Again we see the space between interpretations of devotion. While in Ibu Har's 
workshop, a divorced woman should not seek a second marriage, in Ruth's case, a second 
and better marriage may be God's blessing. Ruth's loyalty was set as a model for 
everyone, and it helps explain why sacrificing is valued more than personal feelings, 
which resonates the story we started this chapter with: "Just Love Her." 
After the shepherd's reply, the story keeps goes on asserting that marriage is not 
based on "buoyant love," but on commitment. The buoyant love (cintayang menggebu-
gehu) is transient, and only commitment can transform the buoyant love into mature love: 
The kind of love that is possessive and dependent on feelings is egotistical and 
detrimental (egois dan merusak). Christ does not love like this. True love is the 
way Christ loves His church. Love is to sacrifice for the beloved; love that does 
not dwell on cost and benefit for oneself, but the advantages for the 
beloved.. .Love... is not the foundation of marriage... [only] Commitment can 
overcome the languished love, and heal the wounded heart...Commitment to the 
decrees (firman). [and] to Christ, who is the foundation of marriage and 
relationships. 
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As mentioned earlier, the story offers an alternative interpretation of the verses of 
Ephesians 5:31-33 Jthat is often used to justify women's subordination in the household. 
First, the analogy between Mother vs. son, Christ vs. church, and Husband vs. wife 
alludes to an idea that a husband has something to learn from Jesus as a caring, 
sacrificing and maternal figure, to love his wife just like a mother caring for her children. 
In other words, it is the sacrificial agency that manifests the feminine trait of submission 
and that underlies the necessity of a feminization of men in the Pentecostal envisioning of 
the ideal Christian personhood and family relationships. 
Female submission and kesetiaan is presented as a strategy for achieving personal 
success— children, wealth, and status. In Hui's story, the success was a reconstruction of 
life, both in the family, career and church life, after the abandonment of her husband. For 
lbu Mira, the reward for her was childbearing, and the ministry of the church. They have 
different visions and results of success, and both see themselves as living the destiny that 
God has prepared for them. 
From the life stories of lbu Mira and Hui. as well as the purpose of the BEWARE 
workshop, it is clear that women have more than "domestic life" to pursue and improve. 
Indeed, the promotion of feminine virtues that are cultivated and cherished by believers 
have further ramifications lor the kind of agency that is widely exercised by members of 
Pentecostal congregations. To be loyal involves obeying God's intention at the expense 
of one's own feelings ("I didn't ask your feelings. I only ask you to go home and love 
1 
"For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two wili 
become one flesh. This is a profound mystery—but 1 am talking about Christ and the church. 
However, each one of you also must love you wife as you love yourself, and the wife must respect her 
husband." 
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h e r " I f  t h e  h u s b a n d  i s  w r o n g ,  y o u  d o n ' t  h a v e  t o  b e  f a i t h f u l  b u t  y o u  d o  n e e d  t o  b e  
submissive"). Kodrat ([women's] destiny) in this sense, then, is more than a fixed nature, 
but a sacred goal designed by God that can be resisted, betrayed, or fulfilled. The reward 
for sacrifice is in often grasped through a reference to the intersection between the 
humanity of Jesus and humans as a standard trope for moral conducts. After all, even 
Jesus complained and resisted God's command before he was crucified. 
Sacrificial agency 
Underlying the cultivation of submission and devotion is the logic of "insincerity." In 
the spirit of submission, one does not do what one wants. In the power relations between 
the submissive believer, the working Holy Spirit and God, the self is not encouraged to 
be purified of ritualistic mediation so as to achieve a sincere faith, as a Calvinist theology 
would have it. Nor is it a process in which practices of embodiment mediate and realize 
the consciousness of the self, as a medieval Christian manual of ritual would have it 
(Asad 1993). Instead, the self is to be prepared to approach the divine plan God has 
designed for each person, even if this process involves self-denial. Contradictory 
consciousness and feelings under behavioral submission and faithfulness to God is 
acknowledged as meritorious and as preludes to victory, so long as submission is 
continually sought and vigilance is always required for an ongoing struggle between the 
evil and the divine since the self is always in danger of sins. In other words, the 
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transformation of the self is a never-ending project, permanently struggling against 
demonic temptations ("tomboy, divorce, adultery, feeling inferior") with multiple layers 
of consciousness that often involve willing acts of sacrifice. One sacrifices the right to 
personal expression in return for joyfulness in glossolalia; one sacrifices the desire for 
temporary pleasure in return of eventual grander rewards: success. 
In his sermon on Sunday morning. February 21, 2010, Pak Toni remarked on 
submission to God. "For example, if a pastor wondered where he wanted to carry out his 
ministry. God said 'America," then he immediately said 'sure, God.' But if the 
destination is Africa, he would chicken out, and said. 'Sorry, sorri, God, I can't.'" Pak 
Toni concluded that one should not choose the destination of missionizing. Even if one 
disliked God's plan, one had to fulfill it. 
Devotion as the most divine feminine feature does more than naturalizing gender. It 
is the ultimate quality that is desirable for all children of God. Seen from the perspectives 
of this chapter, believers are only entitled to excellence in the wider society if they obey 
God's intention and always have faith in God. Although one is encouraged to be a 
shameless request maker ("Please let me speak in tongues," "Please give me a child," 
"please help me graduate." "please allow me to succeed," etc.), one is also asked to be the 
faithful servant of God and a fearless warrior ("Don't resist your destiny," "Don't say 
that you cannot change"). The worldly rewards go beyond a consumerist allegory in 
which the church simply creates new products for consumers to desire or teach believers 
to desire more desires. On the one hand, the global form of Pentecostal ism does contain 
resources that can equip born-again Christians with a kind of subjectivity compatible with 
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individualism, productivity and consumerist prosperity. On the other hand, however, 
Pentecostalism as it is manifested in Indonesian congregations clearly rejects the 
personality that is egois and materialis—the images typically associated with Western 
individualism and modem society in the local perceptions. 
Submission is not a sincere state of mind and heart, but a process that recognizes 
resistance, battle and surrender despite discomfort. It thus does not aim to "purify" social 
mediation (cultural expectation and social norms) to reveal a true faith (the Calvinist 
profession that must be asserted by the self, rather than the Catholic ritual that is 
performed by others), but places socially constituted desires (childbearing, prosperous 
family, health, and wealth) as the ultimate rewards at the end of a journey led by prayers 
and the Holy Spirit to discover God. Well before the journey, the self is already formed 
by the pre-conversion past. The feelings of loneliness, inferiority, insecurity, betrayal, 
and bitterness are not newly made in the disciplinary training of ritual ecstasy and daily 
submission. They are guarded against by the new ethics of devotion and commitment that 
knows well the omnipotent hazard of temptations that can engulf the newly saved self. To 
feel the ritual ecstasy that opens and renews the self is to supply the capacity for 
forgetting one's uncomfortable feelings, or in a word, to sacrifice. 
As will be illustrated in the following chapter, this sacrificial agency is important in 
conditioning the configuration of the social actions of born-again Christians in the 
neighborhoods of Sinaran and Graha. Contradicting the born-again impulse to perpetually 
spread the goods news of gospel. Christians never proselytize by words among non-
Christians. since it is not socially acceptable by the Muslim majority. They do. however. 
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wish to increase their leverage and diminish the possibility of their marginalization by 
their deeds, particularly through volunteering. The training in feminine submission that 
discourages confrontation and values a high potency of influence seems to justify 
precisely that adaptability. Christians' "submission" to a Muslim hegemony, however, 
does not have a single configuration. In fact, the "Christian" submission can even be 
manifested in some unexpected, "Islamized'* manners, which is the core argument of next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Gossiping Citizenship 
"Long live the PKK!" 
On a late afternoon in July of 2010, the wooden dining table at Ibu Parjo's was 
occupied by thirty identical porcelain bowls and materials of soto ayam. an Indonesian 
dish made of chicken broth stewed with cumin, coriander and other spices topped with 
hand-torn chicken strips to be served with rice or glass noodles. Chopped cucumbers, tiny 
carrot cubes, fried shallots, whole green chili pepper, and raw bean sprouts were placed 
in separate bowls to be added along with the broth later, which would not be served until 
the end of the meeting. Magnifying the already rich aroma in the air were handy snacks 
ready to serve, including tempe (fried soybean cakes), fried banana, and deep fried 
crackers. Accompanying these greasy but delicious refreshments was always the over-
sweetened black tea in crystal glasses. The chattering of some twenty women passed 
through the yard of Ibu Parjo's residence in Graha. All but seven of them were Christian, 
and understandably they were the only people who bared their hair. Most of them wore 
their self-designed uniform of PKK in deep saffron, regardless of religious identity. As 
these mothers slowly seated themselves, an old man also showed up. He shook every 
mother's hand, and sat at the edge near the doorway. He was the Father RT. He was, of 
course, not a member of the PKK. but he came with a mission. 
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The emcee opened the meeting with the standard Arabic greeting "Peace be upon you 
and so may the mercy of Allah and His blessings" (assalamualaikum warahmatullahi 
wabarakatuh) and posed for the audience to reply "And peace be upon you" 
(waalaikumsalam). Among all the attendants, the one who answered the Muslim greeting 
the loudest was not one of the Muslims, but Ibu Parjo, the long-term member of GIG and 
recent patron of the Ester church. Other Christians simply remained silent during this 
Muslim-centered exchange of greeting. Then the chairwoman invited everyone to pray 
prior to the meeting in accordance with each individual's religion (berdoa menurut 
agama rnasing-masing). When this was happening, the recitation of the Al-Fatihah was 
not too loud but clearly audible. By contrast, the Christian prayers were completely silent. 
As soon as the prayer session was finished, women stood up and sang "Mars PKK" ("the 
marching song of PKK", my translation below) with the chairwoman conducting the 
chorus with her hand indicating the beat: 
Marilah hai semua Rakyat Indonesia Oh all the people of Indonesia 
Membangun segera Let's develop immediately 
Membangun keluarga yang sejahtera Develop a prosperous family 
Dengan PKK with PKK 
Hayatilah dan amalkan Pancasila Let s involve and practice Pancasila 
Untuk Negara For our country 
Hidup gotong royong, makmur pangan Life of mutual help, food 
dan Sandang and clothes plenty 
Rumah sehat sentosa Healthy and peaceful family 
„ . . , j -j i u. Carry out the order in the family Tata laksana di dalam rumah tangga . J ,, . 
Rapidanindah I ^ , 
rvj-i i u . i u , Children have the character of the country Didiklah putra berpribadi bangsa .... . ,, . . } 
m  . . .  ,  .  S k i l l f u l  a n d  h e a l t h y  Trampu dan sehat J 
Build cooperation maintain the environment and 
Kembangkan koprasi jagalah lingkungan the surroundings 
Dan sekitarnya Safe and happy is the planned family 
Aman dan bahagia kluarga berencana Lone jjve ^ 
Hidup jaya PKK 
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After this obligatory opening sequence of greeting, prayer, and song, the meeting 
proceeded to the report of the Father RT. followed by those of the heads of each division 
within the PKK. The Father RT started with the Arabic greeting again, explaining that he 
was here to brief the participants on the progress of the road construction on the main 
road within the neighborhood. Meanwhile, he also called for their support of the 
upcoming national census and festive activities for the upcoming Independence Day on 
August 17th. He then remained silent after the briefing, while division executives 
skillfully took turns to report their updates, if any. Whenever a new person uttered her 
first speech with the Arabic greeting, Ibu Parjo would once again answer the loudest in 
Arabic. 
These seemingly trivial interactions in a PKK meeting provide a vintage point for 
examining the kinds of personhood, sociality and pluralism that people subscribe to. The 
act of salim (shaking-hand all around) remains the default politeness that initiates any 
interaction between social persons in a social gathering. The act of doa (prayer) remains 
the indispensable procedure that defines the first moments of a proper social event, in 
which religiosity is formerly seen as an integral part of sociality. To pray together, the 
announcement berdoa menurut agama masing-masing (to pray in accordance with our 
respective religions) is an acknowledgement of the presence of religious diversity, which 
is the standard announcement in all the RT and RW as well as PKK meetings. Such 
recognition of plurality notw ithstanding, it is never clear what "to pray in accordance 
with our respective religions" together could mean, and what would be carried out in 
actuality. 
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In Sinaran, for example, when the moment of praying together at the beginning of the 
PKK meeting happens, the head of PKK and born-again Christian Ibu Diyan always 
recites Al-Fatihah in unison with her Muslim neighbors. Unlike the audible but non-
synchronized Koranic prayer in the PKK of Graha, the Arabic prayer in the PKK of 
Sinaran is loud and virtually has no difference from the way women recite in the 
pengajian (Koranic sermon) meeting. If in Graha we have the Christian hostess who 
replies to the Arabic greeting the loudest, here in Sinaran we have the head of PKK who 
even goes so far as to forgo her Christian prayer in favor of chanting Arabic scripture 
together with her Muslim fellows. 
There is yet another pattern in the male-dominated RT monthly meetings. In Sinaran, 
for example, when Muslims and Christians sit together and enter the moment of "praying 
together" at the RT meeting, it is almost completely silent, and rather short, unlike the 
elaborated and long one in the PKK. However, a different kind of Christian 
accommodation to Muslims is also present. The Christian vice-Father RT, for example, 
often serves as the emcee in the RT meetings. This is how he opens up the meeting: 
"Assalamualaikum warohmatullahi wabarokatuh. Salam sejahtera bagi kita semua. 
("Peace be unto you and so may the mercy of Allah and His blessings. Peaceful 
prosperity to all of us"). Here the Muslim greeting is uttered by the Christian, and placed 
prior to the religiously neutral greeting (see chapter 5). When Muslims open their 
speeches, however, they often no longer utter "Peaceful prosperity to all of us," because 
it is already replaced by its Arabic equivalent. The accommodation thus belongs to the 
vice-Father RT, who does not wish to be left out in the new greeting style, but also wants 
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to keep his own voice. The Arabic greeting thus represents his solidarity with Muslim 
fellows, whereas the Indonesian greeting preserves his integrity as a non-Muslim. 
These cross-religious interpersonal interactions bring us back to where we started the 
ethnography: What is the relationship between pious Christians and Muslims in the 
neighborhood? What does the religious identity mean when people interact with their 
religious others? Why would a Javanese Protestant who recently became karismatik not 
only reply to the Arabic greeting, but so showily, as if she was afraid other people would 
fail to notice it? What about the Father RT? What compels him to attend the PKK 
meeting to repeat the official briefing, as if the decisions made in the RT and RW 
meeting cannot reach every household unless it runs through the PKK? 
Starting with an unconventional way of talking about PKK, the theoretical goal of this 
chapter is to bring women to the center of the neighborhood public. It focuses on how 
women's associational life across religious lines in the PKK has been an integral part of 
pluralism in Sinaran and Graha, and how women of fire and women of the robe interact 
with one another in this quasi-obligatory neighborhood organization. 
Here I wish to briefly discuss what I mean by pluralism. Associating pluralism with 
democracy, the political scientist Arend Lijphart sees democracy as the general principle 
that requires civil and non-coercive mechanisms for expressions of a full variety of 
identities and interests (1977). Such a portrait of democracy shifts the emphasis from top-
down rules of political games to bottom-up social values, and regards civic pluralism and 
civic society as a defining feature of a democracy. 
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Recent anthropological research has helped unsettle a narrow Eurocentric definition 
of civil society as purely voluntarist, the public sphere as essentially secular, and public 
religions as incompatible with modern democratic processes (Hefner 2000; White 2002; 
Bowen 2003; Peletz 2002). Instead, anthropologists have painstakingly shown that 
informal, primordial networks can be just as important as formal, non-primordial 
organizations in promoting pluralism, that vertical and horizontal relationships are co­
existent (Weller 1999; Dunn and Hann 1996), and that the relationship between the state 
and society are often more complicated than opposition. The assumption of 
"voluntariness" and "the autonomous space" between the family and the state thus bear 
overly individualistic assumptions that do not translate into various social contexts. 
Despite these theoretically adjusting gestures to take cross-cultural settings into 
account, the fundamental problem of civil society theory remains. Deep down, 
associational lives by themselves never effectively guarantee civic pluralism (Hefner 
2003). Associational connections can be well exploited to accumulate social distrust 
against others as much as they build social trust among members, and a worldview can 
easily clash with another. The propaganda of the Ku Klux Klan, the bullying of gay 
students in high schools, or the recent anti-birth control campaigns in the United States 
are but some more obvious examples among other numerous traces of the uncivil, or at 
best, conditional, pluralism. 
It is hence important to explore an array of self-positions of the major identities and 
interests in a pluralistic democracy, the mechanisms that naturalize or disguise unequal 
power relations, and how such unequal social footings are justified. In sum, I see 
235 
pluralism as a conscious acceptance of peaceful co-existence of differences, a state that is 
not necessarily free of unequal power and status relations. To present the role of PKK in 
sustaining the kind of pluralism that is functional in Sinaran and Graha, in what follows I 
situate my approach of seeing PKK as a site of practicing public citizenship, instead of 
housewifely domestication, against the previous scholarship working on the PKK. 
Photo V. Soto Ayam (left). 
Photo VI. A PKK meeting in Graha (right). 
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Photo VII. PKK member singing "the song of PKK" in Sinaran. 
The meanings of PKK: beyond domesticity 
Although PKK is arguably the largest movement that involves women in Indonesia, it 
has rarely been viewed as a women's movement, much less as a site of practicing 
pluralism. Instead, it has often been depicted as an important vehicle for the 
implementation of government development programs geared towards population control 
and constructing wifehood and motherhood across the nation. The inception of PKK 
dates back to the late 50s, and it was officialized in 1973 when the Department of Home 
Affairs issued a degree to regional governors. The degree urged all Indonesians to accept 
responsibility in development (pembangunan), a concept that was to be saturated with an 
intermixing of moral responsibility and instrumental modernization in various 
propagandas. 
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The feminist Saskia Wieringa views the establishment of PKK as part of the New 
Order regime's effort to stabilize society after a period of great upheavals in which both 
men and women were heavily politicized, mobilized, even militarized in the early 1960s. 
The new regimes had a vested interest in transforming the "beasts"—political women 
who were depicted as barbarian whores during the political transition—into dutiful 
"mothers" (Wieringa 1992). The conceptual emphasis on women being obedient wives 
and selfless mothers was utilized to consolidate family life and to support the kind of 
social stability and economic growth that the New Order valued. From civil servants to 
the PKK at all levels of administration, the New Order designated women to be particular 
kinds of citizens with gendered responsibilities. As Blackburn observes, the gender 
expectation of the regime was to make it "return to "normal \ by which normality meant 
an amalgam of Javanese priyayi and Western bourgeois models of the nuclear family" 
(Blackburn 2004. 99). 
Many of the propaganda campaigns the PKK endorsed have elicited wide criticisms 
among feminist scholars. Ideologically, the PKK supported the Five Duties of Women 
(Panca Dharma Wanita), expecting women 1) to be loyal companions of their husbands, 
2) to procreate for the nation, 3) to educate their children, 4) to manage their husbands, to 
manage their households, and 5) to be useful members of society. Institutionally, the 
leadership of PKK nationwide was stratified according to the women's husbands' 
positions. That is to say. the wives of governors assumed the heads of the PKK in 
correspondent provinces, and wives of district heads would chair the PKK at those levels, 
and so forth. In other words, it was the husband's status that determined the wife's 
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position, whereas the wife's willingness, personal ability, skills, or political inclinations 
were completely irrelevant. Such arrangements seemed to place women as men's 
appendages to an extreme, and understandably worried feminists. One of the most 
poignant critiques is from Suryakusuma (1996. 101), who claims that PKK is the 
"primary channel between the state and village women through which the official 
ideology is filtered," and the source of both bourgeois "housewifization" and "Priyayi 
Ibuism." 
The Five Duties of Women was not the only package that the PKK disseminated, 
however. In fact, if one reads the ten-tenets of PKK that is more often emblazoned on a 
plaque in all neighborhoods throughout Indonesia, the priority of women's roles in the 
Five Duties would seem to be inverted: 
1) comprehension and practical application of Panacasila 
2) mutual self-help 
3) food 
4) clothing 
5) housing and home economics 
6) education and craft skills 
7) health 
8) development of cooperatives 
9) protection and conservation of the environment 
10) health planning 
The ten-tenets do not prioritize the role of "husband's companion," but instead 
enshrine Indonesian citizenship above anything else. Still, these ten-tenets can be an ideal 
fit for a Foucaultian approach that focuses on the project of producing the subject, or 
subjectification. From a feminist perspective, one can suspect that the aim of these tenets 
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is to fulfill not only an indoctrination, but virtually a production, of a kind of women 
whose role and function are the loyal supporters of the nation (the first tenet), the 
neighborhood community (the second tenet), and the family, as well as homebound child-
bearers, rearers and their educators (the rest tenets). 
It would be a huge mistake, however, to simply read these discourses literally and 
take them as an unproblematic index of women's realities. Policy is one thing, 
implementation another, and the consequence is yet another. Like the implementation of 
the RT and RW (see chapter 3), the institutionalization of the PKK is part of the statecraft 
that mobilizes the most grassroots civil society to achieve social control and development 
(Hunter 1996; Newberry 2007; N. Sullivan 1994; Blackburn 2004). In Salatiga, one can 
confidently say that PKK meetings are women's equivalent to the RT and RW meetings 
that are typically, but not always, dominated by men as the heads of households. The 
wives of Father RTs and RWs can be, but not necessarily, the heads of the PKK, and in 
either case the PKK meetings are independent from the RT and RW meetings. RT and 
RW committees take care of road projects, facility construction, and residence 
registration; PKK is in charge of nutrition, immunization, and medical care. Although 
their tasks are different, they often operate in parallel or in coordination, as officers from 
RT or RW have to visit the PKK meetings to inform specific decisions and ask for the 
support of PKK. In fact, often the heads of the RT and RW had to report to the PKK for 
communicative and administrative efficiency, because the PKK meetings are more 
frequent, have stronger networks and involve closer relationships. 
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Despite this shared public nature of both PICK and RT, the anthropological 
approaches to them have been drastically discrepant. The scholarship on the nature of RT 
and RW often struggles with the oppositional theories between state control and genuine 
communal reciprocity (Bowen 1986, Guineas 2007, J. Sullivan 1986), while being 
relatively silent about gender. The assumption that the organization of RT and RW 
represents the entire community has led to a relative insensitivity to the importance of 
gender and the indispensable role of women's labor. In a stark contrast, a large portion of 
studies on the PKK have lost their sight of its communal aspect due to a preoccupation 
with an investigation on state control over women's sexuality and the domestication of 
women into desirable wives and mothers (N. Sullivan 1983, 148). Seeing the PKK as 
anathema to women's well-being, feminists understandably predicted that its propaganda 
would result in a real drop in importance and status of women in home and community, 
because women would become merely housewives dependent on their menfolk (Stoler 
1977; N. Sullivan 1983, 136). 
These approaches have unwittingly reproduced the male/public and female/domestic 
divides, rather than interrogating their applicability in daily lives. Perhaps more 
detrimentally, when assuming that PKK could not be anything more than a patriarchal 
institution aiming at disciplining women, the rational-critical imagery of freedom as the 
foundation of subjectivity remains unchallenged. Hence ironically, despite these scholars' 
heartfelt concerns for women, in their writings women are often portrayed as helpless 
victims, or in a Foucaultian manner, productive but predetermined subjects. Women are 
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not seen as flexible agents, who are capable of creating meanings of their own that are 
not pre-designated, and as actors who can challenge pre-existing gender ideologies. 
The actual consequences of the implementations of the PKK in different kinds of 
localities can vary widely. If there exists a common trend, it is not a contribution to 
women's confinement to the household, since all kinds of evidence show otherwise. 
Statistically, female employment rates over the last four decades have steadily increased 
(26.6% in 1971, 36% in 1990, and 51% in 2010) at a faster speed than that of males 
(Manning 1998, 233; BPS Indonesia 2010). The wage disparities in gender also declined 
in all sectors, particularly after 1990 (Dhanani, Islam, and Chowdhury 2009, 18). 
Although there is no denying that low wages paid to young women in large multinational 
factories demands improvement and wage discrimination in all sectors still renders 
women vulnerable (Wolf 1992). the majority of these jobs are still occupied by men, 
with other opportunities open for women (Manning 1998, 233). For example, there has 
been higher percentage of all non-agricultural employment absorbed in government and 
social services among educated female workers than male (Manning 1998, 250). In the 
early 1990s, women held approximately a third of Indonesian civil service positions 
(Robinson 2000. 153) particularly in the departments of education and health, although 
the more senior or top managerial and decision-making levels continue to be dominated 
by males. The 2008 women's share in the labor force was nearly 38%. It was highest in 
employed domestic labor (76%). health and social work (57%), restaurants and hotels 
(56%). and education (55%). To sum up, female participation in economy and their 
wages increased markedly both absolutely and relative to males, although their wages 
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and conditions are still worse than males. Female crowding into low-wage and low-
prestige jobs is just a small part of the story of the larger picture of changing employment 
patterns and dwindled wage differentials by gender. In any case, there is no evidence that 
women are more restricted to home than in the past, and therefore one cannot argue that 
PKK rhetoric has resulted in a change that did not happen. 
It is equally misleading to describe the program of PKK as aiming to create the 
subjectivity of a desirable "housewife.'" Most of the literature on the PKK so far has 
seemed to utilize the term "housewife" without sufficient cultural qualifications. In fact. 
Newberry went so far as to translate PKK as "'National Housewife Association", even 
though it literally means "Family Welfare Guidance" in the past and officially changed to 
"Family Welfare Empowerment" recently. Here lies a classic problem of translation: To 
what extent does the notion of "housewife" match the concept of the Indonesian ibu 
rumah tangga1? 
Literally, ibu rumah tangga means "the mother of the household." If in the United 
States, a "housewife" means a married woman who does not have a formal job and stays 
at home, in Indonesia ibu rumah tangga means something else. To put it simply, while 
ibu rumah tannga can refer to those who really are "housewives" in the American sense, 
it could also mean an ascribed status for all women who manage a household regardless 
of their employment status. According to the data collected by a 50-houshold survey 
around the campus of UKSW as well as my survey in Sinaran and Graha, this latter sense 
is predominant. Whether a woman is formally employed or not, once she is married and 
assumes some responsibilities over family members, she is entitled to the status of a ibu 
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rumah tannga. Professional women almost invariably insist that "of course I am an ibu 
rumah tanngaIn fact, career women feel that their duty as "the mother of the 
household" is potentially overshadowed by their career and therefore there is an even 
greater need to explicitly reclaim the role of "the mother of the household," so that they 
could not be criticized for neglecting their womanly duty. 
Perhaps what challenges further the association between PKK and "housewives" is 
the fact that many of the PKK members in Sinaran and Graha are not stay-home mothers 
and wives. Elderly women often assume more leadership especially when they are 
retired, but it would be ridiculous to see their retirement as a process of 
"housewifization." The precondition of retirement already implies its opposite, and often 
retired women do not really stay at home, as they might as well be more involved in 
associational lives than they used to be. Respected and trusted women in the 
neighborhood, even if currently employed, often can hardly resist the request of taking up 
the leadership in PKK. Women like Ibu Siti thus have almost a triple burden: the familial, 
the PKK, and the Aisyiah. And Ibu Siti is but an example of thousands of pious career 
women in Indonesia. 
The fact that "career women" practically participate in PKK as much as stay-home 
mothers and often assume leadership in PKK challenges the notion that PKK must have 
hindered women's advancement. In my survey of 100 Muslim women, only about half 
believe in the priority of family over women's education and career. The other half 
believe that as long as the family is taken care of, women can pursue education, career or 
whatever they want. In other words, the notion of such priority is often used as a 
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justification and acceptance of women's education and employment, rather than a 
prohibition against it. In reality, many families think a double income is much better than 
a single income, and they can always entrust poorer women as the help to do their house 
chores at low cost, much like professional and elite women around the world who hire 
nannies and babysitters throughout history. Hence neither practically nor ideologically 
can we really describe PKK members as purchasing the idea of the confinement of 
women to the family. 
Certainly, the emphasis on women's education often relies on the rhetoric that depicts 
women as the primary educators of the next generation. Yet again, such an ideology did 
not necessarily result in more confinement of women within the walls of the domestic 
sphere. As the state replaces the family as the major provider of socialization via 
education, women also figure prominently in the formal educational sector, instead of 
merely being the reserve of unpaid educational labor at home. The leadership of PKK 
thus is partially to be understood, like the new discourse of anti-polygamy and veiling, 
through a social history of women's education. In the 1970s, poor rural families faced by 
a labor market in which women took demeaning low-wage occupations would have few 
incentives to invest in the education of daughters. They could not hope to achieve the 
advanced educations required by the few employment options that conferred prestige and 
presented reasonable earning opportunities (Hart 1978). But things have changed 
immensely w ith the rise of mass education, in which Islamic education is particularly 
relevant for my purposes here. Today, about 13 percent of students currently enrolled in 
the formal educational system from primary to secondary school are enrolled in Islamic 
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schools (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 173). Islamic educational institutions used to 
be male only until the 1910s (Dhofier 1999, 14, 18) but now boys and girls are 
represented in near equal numbers at the primary and junior levels of madrasa education. 
At the senior secondary level, girls outnumber boys by 10 percent. These figures contrast 
with those from senior secondary schools in the general education system where boys 
outnumber girls by 6 percent (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 180). Unlike the situation 
in some other countries, students in Islamic schools are exposed to the same general 
educational materials alongside Islamic knowledge. The tuition on average is much 
cheaper than public school, and many parents believe that Islamic schools provide a more 
secure environment for adolescent girls. Due to these cultural and economic factors. 
Islamic schools provide girls and women with more educational opportunities, instead of 
hindering their mobility. 
Ibu Zulfa and Ibu Siti are the direct beneficiaries of the expansion of educational 
sectors, both as students and later as employees. Receiving education in the State Islamic 
College prepared Ibu Zulfa to work as a teacher of religion of Islam in the public high 
school. With a degree from an Islamic college, her earnings are almost equal with her 
male counterparts. This is because the trends of wage structure show that the gender 
contribution to wage inequality for persons with the same educational level is largely 
insignificant among receivers of college degree and above (Dhanani and Islam 2004, 16 
17. 22). In other words, women can disproportionately benefit from higher education 
compared to less educated women in improving their earnings. In the positions of civil 
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servants and a teacher of religion, it means not only improvement in earnings, but also in 
prestige. 
Now that it is clear that PKK does not result in women's domestication in any 
meaningful way, I propose to more rigorously engage in the actual practices, subjective 
meanings and social consequences realized through the organization of PKK. Rather than 
a clear-cut institution of women's domestication, PKK constitutes a critical antithesis of 
the modern division of the public and the private, and institutionalizes public roles for 
women. Here, I contend that without being overly sanguine about women's advancement 
due to the PKK, we can still explore its members' public roles beyond the effects of "bio-
power" (Foucault 1978, 143) in the regulation of population through the control of the 
female bodies (ibid, 146-47), or those of the discursive regimes of selfless mothers and 
obedient wives (Suryakusuma 1996). It would miss too much if we simply look at the 
diffusing of a singular kind of power, or the kind of resistance (or the resistance to 
resistance) that such power can enable. Rather, I wish to shed light on the unintended 
effects of agency that are not related to homebound womanhood-making, nor merely 
about state control or unpaid social work (Newberry 2007). 
This approach is not to deny that PKK has provided society with some useful 
resources and achieved amazing accomplishments in public health and population control 
at extremely low cost. Reproductive health was perhaps the most obvious benefit of 
PKK, one that even won PKK a United Nation population award in 1989. But alongside 
this intended impact, PKK also provides women access and skills of associational life and 
public participation. PKK gatherings are as public and official as RT meetings. They 
247 
stand for women's public participation and citizenship in grassroots society more than a 
subjectivifaction of the housewife within the household. 
Women's public roles and Muslim-Christian encounters in the PKK 
The limit of the inculcation of "the housewifely ideology" perhaps has no better 
illustration than what was revealed in a conversation right after a PKK meeting in 
February. After helping distribute some fifty boxes of food to the neighbors, 1 asked Ibu 
Wati what the acronym of PKK stood far. Apparently struck by the question, Ibu Wait 
turned down the volume of the Discovery channel on television she had just started 
watching, and seriously mulled over the question, as if the answer was buried in some 
ancient, mysterious oracle that has long been lost in translation. Pretty certain that one of 
the K should be the acronym of keluarga (family), she however could not answer what 
exactly the actual name was. "Oh well," she gave up and said to me, "[we] already 
forgot.. .the name was really not that important.. .as long as mothers get together, have 
arisan, and circulate food for the syukuran.. .the name isn't important. What is important 
is gotong-royong." She then made a call to the chairwoman Ibu Diyan, asking her the 
same question. Unfortunately Ibu Diyan also could not remember the meaning of PKK. 
so they decided to inform me once they figured it out sometime later. 
This selective amnesia about the "intention" of PKK seems to show that the way 
women understand the obligation assumed in the PKK is not set in terms of the specific 
ideals of wifehood or motherhood, but first and foremost understood in a general sense of 
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good neighborhood life and citizenship. In Sinaran. the Five Duties of Women was never 
recited, but the song of PKK was always vocalized. No matter what is contained in the 
ideological packages of the PKK about being women for men, from women's 
perspectives, and indeed from men's perspectives as well, PKK means women's 
organizations that represent and structure the reciprocal relationships in the local 
community. PKK is being women for the society. 
PKK might even work to undermine the isolation of homebound women. As shown in 
the previous chapters, due to the primacy of one's immediately neighborhood as the 
default social community and the strength of women's networks of rewang and 
pengajian, women are often, and increasingly so, the nodes for disseminating news and 
deployable agents for getting things done. The decisions and the reports of the RT and 
RW meetings often have to pass through PKK to effectively reach every household. 
Consequently, even though women's gatherings may subtract much time and energy of 
women from the family, for the sake of community, both men and women think it is 
better that women keep doing what they do. Even if there is a stereotype about the lottery 
part of PKK, arisan, as a chance for women to chit-chat, gossip, and mind other 
households' business, few would deny the importance of PKK or its contribution to the 
community. After all, it is through gossiping that the community decides to give the 
"fanatic maverick" or the "indifferent neighbors" a lesson (see Introduction), and it is 
also through women's exchange of ideas and information that the list of guests and 
preachers are drawn up. The labeling of women's talk as "gossip" is but another example 
of a cross-culturally ubiquitous gender asymmetry. What stands out about women's talk 
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in the PKK out, however, is its role in ensuring the functionality of the neighborhood 
community. As people often say, if one wants to know what's going on in the 
neighborhood, one goes to the PKK; if one wants to do something to the neighborhood, 
one must go to the PKK. 
PKK thus represents a kind of "gossiping citizenship," in which gossiping is a 
political participation in the life of the neighborhood community, and through which the 
right to receive certain protections from the community, as well as the obligations to 
become part of the community, are negotiated. Gossiping citizenship is deeply gendered 
and personal, more unstable and less predictable than the kind of citizenship depicted in 
the project of liberal governmentality that ensures the production of the self-governing 
individual that many have argued underpins the modern nation-state (Dean 2009; Inda 
2005; Ong 2003). In the gossiping citizenship in Graha and Sinaran, women are not 
uniformly modeled into loyal, autonomous and responsible citizens by the state. In fact, 
the state seems unable to control the effects of its policies. For example, the recent 
redefinition of women as equal partners instead of the spouse's consort by the national 
head of the PKK (Blackburn 2004, 159), or that the official name of PKK has been 
changed from "guidance" (pembinaan) to "empowerment" (pemberdayaan), did not 
garner too much attention. Similarly, ever since the political democratization in 1998, the 
basis for the membership of PKK has supposedly become purely voluntary. Yet in 
Salatiga, almost no one I know would ever mention PKK as voluntary. No matter how 
much the government changes. PKK is still PKK, and the society needs PKK. The 
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attribution of the local society is not based on a rational-critical imagery of agency, but 
on an emotive, social, and feminine public moral reasoning. 
Now, one might as well ask whether this is a perfect picture of the Foucaultian idea of 
the decentering of power, since even if it was never the ideological tenet about the 
womanhood the state promulgated, the spirit of reciprocity carried out in everyday life 
was still at the heart of the state propaganda. The implication is that even after the 
authoritarian regime was removed, the need for such reciprocity goes on, like the effects 
of the panopticon (Foucault 1979): even the watcher is no longer in the tower, the 
prisoners will always feel they are watched. 
A short response to the question is no. because the actors are not determined by a 
monolithic kind of power. That is to say, actors are not equal, nor are they equivalent. 
They do not behave in the same way with the same frequency. The reason for this 
differentiated arrangement is a result of complicated social stratifications, and a concept 
of a working social structure that cannot be explained well by the absolute decentering of 
universal diffusion of power. 
As mentioned, Ibu Parjo's Arabic speaking in the PKK of Graha is not an isolated 
incident. In Sinaran, born-again Christian Ibu Diyan always recited Al-Fatihah when her 
Muslim neighbors were praying in the beginning of the PKK meeting. Coincidently, both 
of their mothers were Muslim, and people used that as an explanation of their 
participation in the Koranic recitation. However, that was an explanation of their 
capability for the recitation, not their willingness. To a great degree, some Muslims have 
taken the willingness of Christians for granted, because it has been the foundation of the 
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kind of pluralism and toleration they have known and accepted. People like Ibu Wati and 
Ibu Eka always say that gotong-royong is obligatory, but whatever extra work Christians 
do, it is purely voluntary. 
Certainly not all Christians would go so far as to participate in the Koranic chanting. 
Yet, it was common that they assumed the unpaid offices in the RT, RW and the PKK. In 
Sinaran and Graha, Christians are the heads and treasurers in the PKK, RT and RW 
positions despite their disproportionately low numbers. The logic of these unequal 
divisions of labor implies that Christians have to care more and sacrifice more, and in 
order to be involved more, it also means that they have to give in more and exemplify 
virtue more. 
One of the most problematic social taboos is Christian proselytizing. In the larger 
religious landscape, aggressive evangelists can give provocative sermons that threaten to 
damage inter-religious respect. The ardent wish to be the salt and light of the world is 
perceptible, as well evinced by the weekly news of Ester on November 22nd, in which 
congregants were invited to consider the following scene: 
Imagine a community where all the prisons are closed due to a lack of 
crimes...Imagine a community where all the night clubs are all changed into 
worship places, a community where more than 90% of the residents are 
committed Christians. Only one word can delineate such a situation: 
TRANSFORMATION. 
Such speeches are, however, confined within the walls of the churches, not to be 
replicated in the neighborhoods. The negative accusation of "Christianization"' has 
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prevented Christians from overtly proselytizing. The alternative way to fulfill their 
mission while dodging the label of Christianization then becomes proselytizing through 
deeds rather than words. 
For example, Ibu Mira held the opinion that "to love those who hate you" is the best 
strategy, because as time goes by, the hearts of the religious others will be changed by the 
power of God. Even if things do not improve immediately, one should be patient with 
transformation. The shepherd of my cell in Fendi taught her "sheep" that they should not 
only be good at schoolwork, but also should be good at interpersonal relationships. "If we 
are good, no need of words, they [non-Christians] will discover us, and be amazed—'so 
excellent!' (kok excellent)" (my emphasis). 
Reinforced by the idea of "submission" as the exquisite feature of children of God, 
born-again women's dedication to the community is not only a minority strategy of 
survival but also a demonstration of spiritual excellence under specific circumstances. As 
chapter 5 has demonstrated, it takes "more than love" to be a true Christian, and it is 
through enduring the hardship and forgoing the self for a moment that one shows the full 
range of moral supremacy. 
This sense of displaying personal excellence is clear in both Hui and Ibu Parjo's 
active involvement in the PKK organizations in their respective neighborhoods. Ying 
often hosted the PKK meeting and has served as the treasurer for several years; Ibu Parjo 
also often hosted the PKK, and due to her financial capacity, she often ordered Mbak 
Yani to prepare extra food so that after the PKK members have claimed their shares, the 
rest of the food can be delivered to those who did not come to the PKK, and those who do 
not belong to the same PKK but are geographically adjacent. 
As a result, the daily-life scenes of the gendered sociality of pluralism —where a 
reborn Christian woman hosts a dozen veiled Muslim women in her house and answers 
the Arabic greeting the loudest—express the female-centered nature of "inter-religious 
harmony" at the grassroots society, and expose the fundamentally unequal social footings 
of Christians and Muslims. 
The kind of civic pluralism manifested in Sinaran and Graha of course does not solely 
rely on Christians* ardent social and emotional work in the neighborhoods. Most 
Muslims have been invite Christian neighbors to their rites of passage all regardless of 
religious identities to their rites of passage. As shown in chapter 3, it is the attitude of 
"for you your religion, for me my religion" that followers of NU and Muhammadiyah 
could pray together, in different manners. In this example of pluralism, Muslims 
contribute no less effort in their aspiration to assert public influence that matches their 
new vision of a Muslim subjectivity, balancing their long-term fear of "Christianization" 
against a distaste for Islamic fanaticism. As shown in Ibu Siti and Ibu Eka's accounts in 
chapter 3, managing Koranic study sessions and public rituals allows women to redefine 
the Muslim community and to increase women's leverage in combating Islamic zealotry. 
Politically, the heightened roles in public rituals thus further situate women in a 
mediating position to negotiate with different types of Muslims and Christians in the 
neighborhood. 
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In Sinaran and Graha. it is clear that Muslims have accumulated enough trust to have 
their regular meetings hosted in Christian households, where Christians are believed to 
prepare and serve 100% halal food. The degree of mutual trust is best epitomized in the 
PKK meeting at the beginning of this chapter held in Ibu Parjo's, a household in which 
people actually eat pork. 
Among Javanese Muslims, there has been strict adherence to the taboo on pork, one 
that is much stricter than alcohol. Given the fact that hogs are among the most common 
domestic animals in all of the non-Muslim societies of Southeast Asia, such taboo is very 
likely a direct result of the influence of Islamic law (Woodward 1988, 61). The pork 
taboo is not simply a conceptual constraint that operates outside of bodily inclinations, 
but a deeply embodied taste and moral imagination. Many Muslims have an undisguised 
abhorrence towards pork, and simply by thinking of the possibility that some people 
actually eat pork can give them goose bumps or nausea. Ibu Eka once told me, "'You are 
what you eat. If you eat whatever that is haram, of course you will become haram.. .So 
are you telling me that even you eat pork too?" That was a rare moment when I felt I 
could not deny my "pork identity," since I am from Taiwan, a place where rice with 
chopped pork gravy was among the most common dishes. I told Ibu Eka the truth, and 
then she became a bit curious about the flavor of pork, despite her naturalized revulsion. 
Although pork is a rare food option in Java, in Salatiga there are a few spots that non-
Muslims can patronize. These are low-profile restaurants with inconspicuous 
appearances, often indistinguishable from other resident buildings, sort of like the small 
Pentecostal churches. They were the kind of places you need to specifically visit, because 
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they were quite hidden, and they were not open everyday. I patronized a restaurant in the 
downtown area a few times, not merely because I was a pork-eater and sometimes I 
missed pork, but because I could observe who actually ate pork. I was able to witness 
with my own eyes some of my Javanese Christian acquaintances, Protestant and Catholic 
alike, did patronize the place and eat pork. The sweeping claim that "almost no Javanese 
eat pork" thus is not entirely true in Salatiga. In fact, some Christians even left me under 
an impression that the determination to eat pork is a proof of the Christian faith. That is, 
if one really were a Christian, why would one be afraid of pork? 
The "pork identity" can be homemade as well, not just in the restaurants. One day in 
May not long after 1 moved in Ibu Parjo's guesthouse in Graha, I asked what Mbak Yani, 
the servant of Ibu Parjo, was cooking. To my surprise, she answered it was pork. I have 
known other Christians families that hired Muslim domestics, and for the comfort of the 
latter, they never asked them to cook pork dishes. Whenever they wanted to eat pork, 
they would simply go to one of those pork restaurants. But some households, such as Ibu 
Parjo's, did make pork dishes at home. Mbak Yani has been a long-term CiKJ member, 
and she was not afraid of pork. I was curious about where she bought pork and whether it 
was a moral burden to touch, carry around, cook, and consume pork in the Muslim-
majority neighborhood. Mbak Yani quickly and defensively replied: "No. There is 
nothing that cannot be eaten. All [are] delicious (semua enak)\'" Mbak Yam's swift 
response showed her moral objection to the moral objection to pork, and revealed a 
nuanced dietary subjectivity in which breaking other people's food taboo is a form of 
self-confidence and an expression of agency. 
On the day of the PKK meeting with which I started this chapter, it was Mbak Yani 
who prepared the soto ayam and other snacks. Needless to say, everything had to be 
halal. What is involved in these two scenarios is not merely a sociology of one's own 
food taboo, but a ritualized violation (special visits to special pork restaurants and 
vendors) and ritualized adoption (neighborhood organizations' meetings) of one's 
neighbor's food taboo. In this respect, at least to some extent, some Christians purposely 
ate pork because they wish to prove that they were true Christians. Alternatively, they 
refrained from pork for ritual occasions because they were good neighbors. In both 
scenarios, the Muslim other is constitutive of the Christian dietary habit. In other words, 
the choice of what to eat and how to prepare and serve it is not merely an expression of 
religious observance, resistance, and personal agency within a single religious worldview, 
but an inter-subjective social action embedded between pluralistic religious worldviews. 
For a PKK meeting to be held in a Christian household, respect for the Muslim food 
taboo among the Christians hosts would require Muslim neighbors to trust their foods 
will be prepared by good, clean hands, since, as other public rituals, food sharing is an 
indispensable part of social gatherings. As I watched Muslim mothers enjoyed soto ayam, 
fried banana and tempe served by Mbak Yani, I was certain that all the guests were 100% 
confident that whatever Mbak Yani gave them, it was 100% halal. 
Food sharing is a core practice that constitutes belongingness across many human 
societies (Carsten 1995; Counihan 1999; Strathern 1988; Wilk 1999). In Java, it is 
through ritual meals and the distribution of food that the sense of neighborhood 
community is established and constantly reaffirmed. As shown in chapter 1 and chapter 3. 
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slametan has been transformed into more feminized and "religionized" public rituals, but 
the spirit of food sharing has remained. Since women are now the majority of ritual 
participants on the public side of rituals, the pubic consumption of food by women also 
becomes one of the new features of communal rituals along with the Christian or Islamic 
sermons, and Arabic music or gospel songs. On the more indoors side of the rituals, 
cooking continues to be women's job, although sometimes a professional male chef 
might be hired. Beyond these rites of passage rituals. Islamic sermon sessions and the 
PKK meetings continue to reinforce the bond between women, food, and public sociality. 
The PKK meetings are thus in many ways the nationalist version of a slametan. It 
begins with a statement of intent, namely the welcoming speech, in order to define the 
community to whom later the food, and reciprocal obligations, will be imparted. The 
song of PKK replaces Koranic or Biblical recitation, the Muslim prayer become the 
audible Muslim prayers accompanied by silent Christian prayers, and reports substitute 
for a sermon. Accepting food serves the same ends as attending a PKK meeting, and 
draws the recipient into a reciprocal web of relationships with her neighbors. 
Some gossips are more equal than others 
The reciprocal relationships in Sinaran and Graha thus comprise deeply unequal 
power relations. Gender and religious identity are the most significant parameters. 
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Responding to the question regarding the logic of social obligations among different 
religious constituencies I asked in the introduction, it is clear that the kind of pluralism 
that is practiced in Salatiga does not mean an elimination of inequality between Muslims 
and Christians, nor a lesser importance of religiosity. To the contrary, it was a fear of 
Christianization (chapter 2, chapter 4) and resistance to fanaticism (chapter 3) that 
prompted Muslim women's further engagement in neighborhood communities. While 
mainstream Muslim women feel the obligation to display the spirit of a true Islam that is 
tolerant of non-Muslims, charismatic Christian women decide that proselytizing through 
exemplary deeds rather than confrontational arguments is the wisest strategy for living in 
the predominantly Islamic society. After all, the fear of the accusation of Christianization 
and the anti-Christian sentiments has been a constant force that has shaped the behaviors 
of Christians in Sinaran and Graha, including their choices to be the leaders of PKK. RT 
and RW. 
The reason why two Christian women served as two of the four greeters in the 
Muslim circumcision ceremony with which I begin this dissertation is now entirely 
understandable. The necessity of being part of the public rituals is crucial in preventing a 
self-induced marginalization under the given social circumstances. If Christian women 
are excluded from Islamic sermon groups, at least they could be part of the community by 
being part of all major rites of passages and, more thoroughly, in the PKK meetings. As 
the hub of gossiping and indirectly regulating social relations, the PKK is where Christian 
and Muslim women weave the same moral world, in which the Salafist family should be 
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transformed, the non-reciprocal Muhammadiyah couple should be criticized, and the 
voluntary Christian leaders should be invited to the Muslim rituals. 
Within this moral framework in which gossiping is rooted and exercised, what is 
operating is not merely a misrecognition that translated specific interests into a general 
spirit of disinterestedness by postponing the demand of future repayment. In fact, people 
are fully aware of the pretense of exchanges as putting self-interest into abeyance by 
stretching them out in time (Bourdieu 1977, 171; Mauss 1967, 1; Weiner 1976, 221). The 
burden and the obligation of gotong-royong is clearly stated, and occasionally 
complained about. Who has given whom how many of what is always unequivocally 
documented as a reference for future repayment in the form of ritual labor, goods, or 
cash, and most constantly in the form of emotional labor, such as politeness and 
greetings. 
The uneven distribution of power and legitimacy is a decisive aspect of the exchange 
system, and it is not simply decided by the giver and the receiver, but defined by complex 
inter-religious relations. Closely aligning themselves with the ascendant Islamic 
legitimacy, pengajicm members exercise their power to sanctify who is an insider and 
who is not, and who should be punished, precisely through gossiping in their numerous 
occasions of meeting and cooking. The rumor that damaged the reputation of the 
Muhammadiyah couple in charge of the orphanage and the "mainstreamization" of the 
Salafist family, are two illuminating examples. The pengajian members not only define 
ritual exchanges as the membership of the neighborhood community, but also redefine 
the forms of such ritual exchanges and expect others to match the new vision of Islam 
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that is envisaged by pengajian members. The Christian Mother RT and Mother RW can 
be the greeters in Ibu Eka's son's circumcision ceremony, yet as soon as the Koranic 
recitation started, they should excuse themselves because their exposed hair would cause 
too much incommensurability in the ritual scene. Other Christian PKK members who 
attended Muslim-centered public rituals, if not in the position of Mother RT or RW, 
should simply stay inside of the house and away from the public ritual scene. 
The unequal social footings are also evident in non-religious social gatherings such as 
the PKK meetings. When the Islamic ways are unequivocally expressed, the same cannot 
be said to the Christians: Christian's silent prayer next to the audible Al-Fatihah in the 
same room; Ibu Harjo's loud response to Arabic "Peace be upon you." In fact, I have 
even witnessed a Protestant deacon in a RT meeting held in Ibu Wati's place use the 
Arabic greeting, right before the formerly "standard" non-religious greeting (see chapter 
5) to open the event. Such is the kind of pluralism known to be legitimate in Sinaran and 
Graha. On the one hand, although both Muslims and Christians are in the same exchange 
system of mutual help, what counts as mutual help is Muslim-centered and the 
obligations of Muslims and Christians are not entirely equally distributed. On the other 
hand, although Christians are in many ways second-class citizens, for precisely that 
reason they are also disproportionately the leaders of local citizen organizations. 
By emphasizing the unequal social footings of Muslims and Christians within the 
neighborhood republics, I wish to present the logic of pluralism that is at work in 
Salatiga. This pluralism cannot be grasped through or judged by an idealized romantic 
notion of liberal pluralism, in which all individuals and collectivities have an equal access 
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to a full expression of identities, arguably an impossibility in any human society. The 
pluralism is maintained and monitored by the gossiping citizenship, which is circulated 
and sanctified by women, a citizenship that is personal and social, and granted to citizens 
based on a complicated matrix of religious identities and social performances. 
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Conclusion 
"If one day they pray at four, we will pray at three. " 
Starting eight years ago, Ester has had a prayer service every morning besides 
Sunday at 4 am. Curious about the motivation for having a prayer meeting so early 
everyday, one Saturday afternoon in April I engaged in a conversation with fifty-two-
year-old Ibu Neng, a staff member at Ester in the church. 
"So why [do you] want to hold a prayer meeting so early everyday?" 
"Well... many people have to go to work and send children to schools at six, so 
there is no time, four is early enough to finish the worship." 
"How about in the evenings? I mean, if it is because of working time... perhaps 
evenings would work better? 1 know that almost every night there is already a 
worship session.. .do you think having evening prayer is not enough?" 
"I tell you what...don't they (Muslims) pray at five... [so] we pray at four. If one 
day they pray at four, we will pray at three." 
Whether consciously or unconsciously, there is a plenty of evidence of competition 
between religious communities. The adoption of the Hebrew shalom (sialom) among 
charismatic churches is an especially illuminating example. The usage of shalom is 
clearly competing with assalamu alaikum ("peace be upon you"), the default most 
popular and fundamental greeting nowadays among Muslims. Since the early 2000s, the 
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frequency of hearing selamal (which originated from the Arabic salaam but has been 
religiously neutral in Indonesia; as the standard greeting has dropped rapidly, as the 
charismatic Muslim leader and 4lh President Gus Dur unwittingly popularized the 
formerly restricted use of the Arabic assalamu alaikum ("peace be upon you"). As the 
status of .selamat as the first and foremost greeting element gave way to assalamu 
alaikum, sialorn became a timely adoption among Pentecostals who have been left out by 
the growing prevalence of the explicit Arabic greetings. Functionally, sialom works fairly 
similar with assalamu alaikum. It is used to start an utterance, and it also appears in 
letters, emails, and cell phone text messages. The ambition of using sialom as a Christian 
version of assalamu alaikum is obvious, as is well evinced by the (Muslim) governor of 
East Java who recently uttered both of them in a row to open his speech at the 21st 
Pentecostal World Conference in Surabaya. 
The message of multiple religious revivals hence is more than that Muslims are 
trying to be more Islamic, and Christians want to be more spiritual. The competition over 
entitlement to moral supremacy has a special inter-religious overtone. Only through the 
lens of the dialectical development between religious communities can we understand 
many unexpected religious activities that would be unthinkable otherwise. Part of the 
GKJ congregations, for example, in seeming contradiction with their Protestant 
backgrounds, in recent years stalled to adopt the Catholic ritual of "Ash Wednesday" as 
their own. Fendi also holds regular outdoor walks of 'exorcism' that aim to eliminate 
harmful spirits and transform the souls living in the city. There is a trend to amplify or 
even invent new rituals, a clear index of a thirst for religiosity. Some of the new forms of 
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religiosity are more puritanical, while others are ever more ritualistic. It is under such 
competitive circumstances that prompted Ibu Neng to go so far as to say if one day 
Muslims pray at four, born-again Christians will pray at three. 
During the last decade of political democratization and regional legal autonomy, the 
mounting fervor of sharia movements and Christian proselytizing have generated worries 
about whether religious revivals will lead to a growing social conservatism towards 
women and an intensification of inter-religious conflict. My research, from its beginning 
towards its end, is a response to these concerns. It is true that the multiple religious 
movements are adding incommensurabilities to the pluralistic life. While the 
contemporary force of normative Islam features competing interpretations of Islamic law, 
public piety and the prosperity of the umat, the strength of charismatic Christianity 
focuses on unmediated inspiration, individual spirituality, and the victory of the chosen 
people. Yet, this widening religious discrepancy is in tandem with mutual influence 
among religious communities. As Arabic greetings and Islamic early morning prayer 
become the daily melody, Pentecostals also adopt a Hebrew greeting and organize early 
morning worship sessions to match; as the fear of uChristianization,*, apostasy and sharia 
movements continue to periodically flare up in the democratizing era. mainstream 
Muslims call for a renunciation of old traditionalist and modernist cleavages so as to 
avoid the notorious label of Islamic fanaticism. 
Women have become unprecedentedly public carriers of pluralism due to their double 
roles: their symbolic position of representing religious differences, and their continued 
ritual labor of sociality. Through wider religious participation, born-again Christian 
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women and newly pious Muslim women in Salatiga have reshaped the pre-existing 
gender ideology, and achieved heightened public roles. The reorientation of gender 
norms resembles neither a docile immersion into a single disciplinary tutelage to realize 
the self, nor a pursuit of an autonomous self freed from social shackles. Rather, it 
involves choice-making among competing interpretations of religious knowledge and 
personal desires that are produced by, and further produce, socio-cultural change. In the 
neighborhoods, as Muslim women have expanded their public roles in communal rituals 
through their deeper alignment with Islamic activities. Christians women have actively 
engaged in non-religious gatherings, such as PKK meetings, in order not to be 
marginalized. While members of women's pmgajian feel the obligation to display the 
spirit of a their version of a true Islam that is tolerant of different Muslims and non-
Muslims, charismatic Christian women decide that proselytizing through exemplary 
deeds rather than forceful words is the wisest strategy to live in the predominantly 
Islamic society. 
If my understanding is correct. Christians' and women's ritual labors have 
substantially maintained the largely amicable social relations across religious divides in 
Sinaran and Graha. although this pluralism does not imply equality among all in any 
simple way. While Christians in many cases may be argued to be "second class citizen" 
in the predominantly Muslim society, they are also in many nuanced ways, local leaders 
of neighborhood citizens. While the emphasis on women's public piety threatens to 
sharpen religious differences, it also grants women higher publicity, as well as burdening 
them with further responsibility to publicly alleviate inter-religious tensions, precisely 
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due to their increasing importance in communal sociality. Women's duty encompasses 
the personal, the communal, and the inter-religious. One might as well name such a 
phenomenon as women's triple burden in pluralistic Java. 
From anti-fanaticism and anti-poligamy, to sacrifice and submission, I have 
emphasized the salience of changing gender norms in forging religious subjectivity. 
Building on this foundation, I suggest that the pious subject is not determined by the 
totalizing disciplinary power, and demonstrate that the public sphere is not limited to the 
kinds of deliberative practices that many hail as the hallmarks of rational political debate 
(Hirschkind 2006). The communicative and critical contestation of religious knowledge 
is no doubt an important aspect of the religious revivals and the public sphere in 
Indonesia, particularly among intellectuals and policy decision-makers. Nevertheless, to 
resonate the kinds of religious pluralism experienced by people in Sinaran and Graha, I 
have focused on more emotive and unequal power relationships that undergird their 
public of gossiping citizenship. Their experiences suggest that the spate of Muslim and 
Christian discourses in fact urges an even greater need to explore the ways ordinary 
people relate to religious authority and engage in the production of moral knowledge that 
are beyond the new religious reinterpretations themselves. 
Narrating this untold story, I wish to shed light on the centrality of women and the 
Christian minority in the religious pluralism of Salatiga. I have delineated the kinds of 
liberations that are meaningful to them within, and between, different religious 
movements, and outlined the significance of women's ritual labor in both representing 
the religious self and interacting with religious others. What the story has told us, I 
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believe, is a reconsideration of a viewpoint that sees religious movements as leading to 
the marginalization of women, or an easy formulation of pluralism as an access to "free 
expression" equal for all. Women are not equal with men, and not even equal among 
themselves. Women are not free, but are bound to many, perhaps more, social 
obligations. Women are ever more religious, and the nationalist tenet of gotong-royong is 
increasingly justified not by a secular pluralism, but by the Koranic verses "for you your 
religion, for me my religion" as well as the biblical creed "love your neighbors." 
Women of the robe like Ibu Siti, Ibu Zulfa, and women of fire like Ibu Mira and Ibu 
Har, all firmly believe in the spiritual egalitarianism before God. They see the deepened 
religious sensibilities as the path to the betterment of the self and society against the 
corrosive effects of the religious others —the salafist, the unsocial, the fanatical, the 
polygamist, the unsaved, and the apostate. When women are placed at the center of 
pluralism, the paradox is not one of gender, but of a gendered pluralism: while women 
are representing things that are more Islamic and Christian, they are also more frequently 
straddling religious borders. They have been feeling threatened and have doubts about 
one another, yet at the end of the day, they work together. 
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